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Abstract 
The “international” has for long been imbued with dreams of emancipation, unity and 
sociality beyond the boundaries of the “national”. However, despite its centrality, little 
critical reflection has been directed at the “international” within the discourse of 
international law. Specifically, the socio-spatial fabric of this concept/category is rarely 
discussed. This thesis seeks to theoretically disrupt and problematise this disciplinary 
comfort zone by highlighting the non-territorial socio-spatiality of cyberspace.  
Arguing for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the “international”, this thesis 
develops on the basis of a re-reading of two modes of analysis, namely logos and nomos. 
While the former is associated with a territorial configuration of socio-spatiality, the 
latter is thought as a lived and co-produced understanding of law, space and society.   
The thesis proceeds with offering cyberspace as an instance of non-territorial and 
internationally experienced socio-spatiality (nomos), which fundamentally differs from 
how it is currently conceptualised under international law (logos). The thesis proceeds 
with an exploration of international law’s socio-spatial fabric, arguing for a fundamental 
re-thinking, from a predominantly territorial configuration (logos), to a non-territorial 
and lived account of the “international” (nomos). The thesis is further illustrated through 
a critical reflection on the social movements and international law literature, arguing 
that nomos is the right mode of analysis for international law, in a world where normative 
claims and emancipatory dreams are increasingly woven into the non-territorial fabric of 
everyday life.      
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The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, 
the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to escape 
suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and become such a part of it that you no 
longer see it. The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: see and learn 
to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, 
give them space. 
Italo Calvino  
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Chapter 1 – International Law, Cyberspace and Social 
Movements  
 
1.1. Introduction  
Let me begin by presenting three narratives. The first, concerns a 16 year old boy living 
in Croatia, the second, a woman in her fifties living in a conservative family in Palestine, 
and third, an Iranian man living in the UK in the aftermath of the 2009 Presidential 
elections in Iran.1  
a) Marko is a quiet boy, who rarely speaks in the presence of adults, spending most of his time on his 
phone and his laptop. You might become curious about his daily life and slightly worried about his 
apparent lack of social interaction and seeming reclusiveness if you were to spend any time with him. If 
you ask him about his daily habits and routines, what would you find out about his social life? In fact, 
Marko can introduce you to an uncharted space of social interactions, friendships and experience. He is 
neither reclusive, nor a-social, but indeed has a diverse world of communications and connections that 
show no sign of physical/territorial limitation. In addition to membership of social networking websites, 
such as Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, etc., which largely revolves around his school friends and the 
resulting extended network of feeds and interactions, the range of other means and “spaces” of 
communications used by him proves eye opening. He speaks of his friends in Norway, a “girlfriend” in 
Minnesota, or finding an old childhood friend of his who moved to South Africa through her Tumblr 
page. You are also impressed by his experience of playing web-based games or massively multiplayer 
online role-playing games (MMORPGs), where participants take on characters and perform roles 
within an “online environment”. They become members of groups and social groupings involved in a 
range of “activities”, from war, to agriculture, to exchange of “goods” and “money” amongst a very large 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The “stories” I present are fictional, but based on my observations of similar existing 
examples.  
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number of players. The way Marko speaks of these social interactions is indicative of how he is 
experiencing them as real and important social relations in his life. He tells you of positive and negative 
stories, of both the perks and dangers in these forms of social relationship. It is also clear from your chat 
that, even though he acknowledges that these players are real people somewhere in the world, connected to 
the Internet through their computers, the territorial location of these people is not of much concern (of 
course so long as they spoke Croatian or English).    
Next, consider Zaynab, a woman in her fifties in Palestine from a conservative Muslim family. She 
lives with her husband and two children. Her daily social interactions scarcely go beyond her home, 
extended family and the local market. She spends the majority of her time in the private space of her 
home, looking after her grandchildren. When male guests (her husband’s friends and acquaintances), 
visit the house, she withdraws further to the areas of the house which are only accessible to the immediate 
family, creating a public/private divide inside the house. After preparing the tea for her husband’s 
guests, she sits behind the computer in their bedroom, signing in to Facebook under a different name, 
with an image of a flower as her “profile picture”. She has recently learned to type and has a number of 
friends and extended family members dispersed around the world, with whom she regularly interacts, 
sharing day to day experiences and hearing stories and news from different localities. Meanwhile she 
reads the news on a number of Arabic news websites, sometimes writing comments in the “comments” 
sections, engaging in conversations about a range of topics, with people that she would not normally be 
able to interact with easily. She visits websites that give instruction to Muslim women on marriage, on 
dress and on pray, participating in conversations initiated far from the territory of Palestine. The 
sociality that she experiences in the “privacy” of her bedroom is anything but private. Her ability to 
have an anonymous identity online enables her to interact with “strangers” (male or female) going 
beyond the limitations imposed on the types of social interactions she can perform through her role as a 
Muslim housewife. If she wants to, and has access to the Internet, neither her physical location, nor the 
location of the other participants in the interactions, hinder her ability to experience sociality beyond the 
usual physical, religious, or ethical boundaries.              
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Finally, think of Arash, a young Iranian man who moved to London to do a university degree in law 
and politics. He has studied, and is studying, international human rights and is involved in the Green 
Movement (a social movement that ensued in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections in Iran). 
Dubbed the “Twitter Revolution” by some,2 participation in the Green Movement, like many other 
recent/contemporary social movements, involved a great deal of online activism (i.e. membership in 
special social networking groups, following Twitter “trends”, blogging and a great deal of “street 
journalism”). Arash divided his time between participating in rallies in London and maintaining a 
strong “online presence”. He posted articles on Twitter and Facebook and was involved in many debates 
and social interactions on a wide range of topics with numerous strangers (Iranian or otherwise, located 
inside Iran or outside). To his surprise, he realised that what he understood by international human 
rights was evolving the more he engaged in conversations. Arash became aware of the differences of 
opinion on the meaning, applicability or feasibility of certain rights within the Iranian context: often he 
observed common meanings and understandings (and equally disagreements and misunderstandings) 
developing between people within Iran and those outside. But this understanding belonged to a social 
space which was not territorially limited to either his socio-spatial context (Iranian diaspora in the UK) 
nor to Iran (as a territorially bounded socio-political space). This non-territorial social space was 
affecting his understanding of something that he was taught was “international”.   
In the “digital age”, the age of “mass-self communication”, our social relations are 
becoming more and more international, but not through our governments, international 
institutions or NGOs. Instead, this is happening through our everyday interactions, in 
the space of daily life. Individuals and groups globally experience forms of sociality 
which do not follow the boundaries previously limiting the ability of people to engage in 
social relations. Of course, a large portion of people around the world still have little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example J. Keller, “Evaluating Iran's Twitter Revolution.” The Atlantic. 18 June 2010. 
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/06/evaluating-irans-twitter-revolution/58337 
(accessed September 2, 2014). 
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means, if any, to connect to the Internet. Yet, due to the exploding number of phones 
with Internet capabilities worldwide (even in remote areas of the developing world3) 
there is a real sense of increase in the availability of multiple means of communication 
beyond the old forms of spatial and temporal barriers to sociality. I call this newly 
enabled social space cyberspace.  
This thesis explores the significance of these growing forms of sociality for international 
law. The stories above provide accounts of three distinct circumstances sharing a similar 
type of social experience; they all present a break with the conventional ways in which 
sociality is experienced and lived. They also demonstrate the expansion of the possibility 
and forms of engaging in social interactions that go beyond the usual boundaries and 
limitations. Through the use of the Internet, the three individuals experience society and 
space non-territorially. I associate this non-territorial experience of sociality with 
cyberspace, as distinct from the technological structure of the Internet.4 This thesis aims 
at offering a critical re-description of international law using the socio-spatial 
experience/phenomenon of cyberspace as the framework for that critique. That is to 
say, it is a re-description primarily directed at offering an account of international socio-
spatiality which fundamentally disrupts the predominant attitudes within international 
law towards the “international”.      
Thinking about international law in “social” terms (or through the image/language of 
sociality) is important and has always had a presence in the history of international law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The use of phones to access the Internet in developing countries (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) is 
especially noteworthy, since according to some researchers more than 70% of Internet users 
access the Internet through phones, and this number is expected to increase by as much as five 
times the current rate. See D. Smith, “Internet Use on Mobile Phones in Africa Predicted to 
Increase 20-Fold.” The Guardian. 5 June 2014. 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/june/05/internet-use-mobile-phones-africa-predicted-
increase-20-fold (accessed September 8, 2014). For information and statistics on mobile 
Internet use and the penetration of the Internet through phone handsets, see generally 
www.mobithinking.com/mobile-marketing-tools/latest-mobile-stats/b#internetphone.  
4 I elaborate on the distinction between the two, both later in this chapter, and in more detail in 
chapter four.  
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especially after the decline of natural law thinking.5 Attempts were made to counter the 
transcendent detachment of naturalism, by imagining a society, or community for 
international law where laws are made, lived and experienced.6 One might argue that the 
turn to positivism in international law was with the aim of connecting law with the 
socio-political conditions of the world, while holding on to some form of “higher 
goal”.7 What I draw on in my critical account is the consistent territorial configuration 
of this sociality within the story of international law. Even the critiques of positivism, 
still often accommodate a sociality that is territorially configured. This is despite their 
criticism being directed at disrupting the centrality of the nation state through socio-
historical methods of critique. These critiques include, the turn to juridical procedure 
and institutions in the early twentieth century,8 the post WWII process oriented 
instrumentalism within an expanded institutional framework,9 and the more recent 
critical interventions in international law.10 Therefore, the thesis is partly dependent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The traditional sensibility of international lawyers, and the importance of sociality as a central 
element, is reflected in the work of scholars such as James Crawford. He argues that 
“international society is no exception to the maxim of ibi societas, ibi ius: where there is social 
structure, there is law.” See J. Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law. 8th. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.   
6 This is probably best articulated by looking at any textbook or edited volume of international 
law that starts by immediately locating international law within an “international” society or 
community. For examples, see M. N. Shaw, International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003: 2; or  A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. This is also visible through the doctrine of sources, both with 
respect to state consent (as a member of a wider society consenting to the norms) or customary 
international law (which envisions a norm developing through the “social” relations of nation 
states through time).   
7 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument [hereinafter 
“From Apology to Utopia”]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
8 L. F. L. Oppenheim, The Future of International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921. 
9 See for instance, M. Reisman, “The View from the New Haven School of International Law.” 
Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (American Society 
of International Law), 1992: 118-125; or M. S. McDougal, and M. Reisman. “The Prescribing 
Function in World Constitutive Process: How International Law is Made.” Yale Studies in World 
Public Order 6 (1980): 249. For an insightful analysis see I. Scobbie, “Wicked Heresies or 
Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law.” In International law, edited by Malcolm 
D. Evans, 58-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
10 For instance, see D. Kennedy, Inernational Legal Structures. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987; or 
M.Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. Supra note 7. 
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upon demonstrating that a consistent element of international law has always been to 
locate law within a (limited/territorial) conception of society and sociality.  
I am going to use two modes of analysis to look at law as a way of exploring the issues 
described above, namely, logos and nomos. The contrast between these two ‘modes of 
analysis’ or ‘conceptions of law’, highlights critical aspects of the relationship between 
law, the “social” and the “spatial” both generally, and more specifically in international 
law. My argument, ultimately, is that nomos facilitates an attentiveness to the 
fundamental question of sociality, which has nearly always been present in accounts of 
(international) law but which is often disguised, or underplayed, in accounts that assume 
logos as the central framework for thinking about law. I will demonstrate the limitations 
of logos as a mode of analysis for international law and will explicate the necessity of 
accommodating the forms of sociality captured by nomos.  
In order to offer a tangible illustration of the critique of my thesis, I look at one form of 
criticism directed at the standard organisation of international law, which comes 
through the medium of social movement theory. The literature that I will refer to as 
“social movements and international law” (SMIL), successfully disrupts the 
conventional account of the life and development of international law’s socio-legality, 
through emphasising the often-ignored role of social movements. However, I will 
suggest that this disruption is only partial. This is because it tends to reinforce an 
account of sociality which is again limited by the socio-spatial logic (of logos), which I 
argue is hardwired in the predominant accounts of “international” in international law. 
This critique is important, since one of the key characteristics of contemporary social 
movements is the value they place upon cyberspace as a medium for the organisation of 
national and transnational activism. As a consequence, relying on the conventional 
analytics will not capture the fundamental non-territoriality of experience woven into 
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their operational fabric. Therefore, it is argued that if social movements theory is to 
carry the form of disruptive critique at which it aims, then it needs to pay more 
attention to the different forms of socio-spatiality that are exemplified through 
cyberspace.     
My critical use of cyberspace in this thesis, seeks to further the insights of scholars such 
as Sundhya Pahuja, Louis Eslava, Hilary Charlesworth, Anthony Anghie and Bhupinder 
S. Chimni in arguing for a connection with spaces and experiences of everyday life 
and/in international law.11 For instance, Eslava, with a focus on the Global South, holds 
that the “international” is part of daily, local experience, tied to the materiality of 
people’s activities in the organisation of the urban environment. Holding on to the idea 
that international law is very much surrounding us in the process of living our day to 
day lives, I seek to demonstrate that it is a mischaracterisation to think about 
international law as a set of relations conducted within diplomatic forums and 
international institutions, or amongst the scholars and experts. In doing so, I present 
cyberspace as a socio-spatial field of experience, which helps demonstrate how 
international law is working in different ways and “through” different spaces. In 
presenting cyberspace as an important and arguably indispensable part of our daily life, I 
argue that an analysis of cyberspace, and the critical possibilities it presents international 
law, is indeed a timely and necessary measure.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 S. Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law.” London Review 
of International Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 63-98; L. Eslava, “Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the 
Everyday Operation of International Law.” London Review of International Law 2, no. 1 (2014): 3-
47; H. Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis.” The Modern Law Review 65 
(2002): 377-392; A. Anghie, and Bhupinder S. Chimni. “Third World Approaches to 
International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts.” Chinese Journal of 
International Law 2, no. 1 (2003): 77-103. 
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1.2. Theoretical/Methodological Preliminaries  
1.2.1.  On Internat ional  Law  
In challenging the predominant approaches to the “international” in international law, 
through demonstrating the socio-spatial overlap between international law, cyberspace 
and social movements, it is essential to first locate my approach within the field of 
international law. Whilst later sections of this thesis are dedicated to the analysis of 
international law’s predominant conceptual framework regarding the “international” 
(through a socio-spatial analysis), in this part of the introduction, I will briefly reflect on 
the predominant theoretical approaches to international law, pointing to their 
differences, and more importantly their similarities. Through this, in interrogating the 
conceptual possibilities and limitations of the discipline, I situate my thesis within the 
(broadly speaking) critical tradition of international law.  
As Alan E. Boyle and Christine Chinkin point out in The Making of International Law,12 
while it is important to define one’s understanding of international law, identification of 
an overarching theoretical framework is not as easy as it used to be. Rosalyn Higgins 
argues that “international law has to be identified by reference to what the actors (most 
often states), often without benefit of pronouncement by the international court of 
justice, believe normative in their relations with each other.”13 Although this definition 
is more inclusive and more process-oriented and relational than the traditional 
(doctrinal and positivist) approaches,14 other schools of thought within international law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A. E. Boyle, and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007. 
13 R. Higgins, Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use it. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994: 18. 
14 A traditional definition of international law is, for example, offered by Oppenheim’s opening 
sentence which reads as: “Law of Nations or International Law (Droit des gen, Völkerrecht) is the 
name for the body of customary and conventional rules which are considered legally binding by 
civilised States in their intercourse with each other” L. F. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A 
Treatise. Edited by Hersch Lauterpach. Vol. 1. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1953: 4.  
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view the situation differently. Approaches include, but are not limited to, natural law 
thinkers (identifying international law with “superior law”),15 positivists (seeing 
international law as rules and principles between states emanating from sovereign 
consent of international actors),16 realists (treating international law as only one factor 
affecting international decision making, with power and politics as the main drive),17 and 
New Haven or Yale School of international law (seeing international law through a 
largely instrumental lens).18 All these approaches tend to presuppose a territorially 
configured sociality for the “international”, ordered through rules and norms developed 
from and applied to the members of the “international society”, largely seen as 
territorial states.  
In contrast to the above approaches, critical thinkers and New Stream theorists 
(NAIL),19 such as David Kennedy, Martti Koskenniemi, Costas Douzinas,20 in addition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For examples of this, see A. E. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law. Supra 
note 12, at 11. 
16 For a quintessential positivist account of international law, see H. Kelsen, Principles of 
International Law. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 2003. 
17 For examples of a contemporary realist analysis of international law, see J. L. Goldsmith, and 
E. A. Posner, The Limits of International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. For a 
more traditional outlook see H. J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and International 
Law.” American Journal of International Law 34 (1940): 260. 
18 For a clear analysis of the New Haven school of thought, see M. Reisman, “The View from 
the New Haven School of International Law.” Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law (American Society of International Law), 1992: 118-125. For an 
analysis see I. Scobbie, “Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International 
Law.” In International law, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 58-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. 
19 New Stream is also referred to as New Approaches to International Law. For an original 
reflection, see D. Kennedy, “A New Stream of International Law Scholarship.” Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 7, no. 1 (1988): 1-49. For a recent analysis see A. Rasulov, “New 
Approaches to International Law: Images of a Genealogy.” In New Approaches to International 
Law: The European and the American Experiences, edited by David Kennedy and José María 
Beneyto, 151-191. The Hague: TMC Asser-Springer, 2012. 
20Taking up a critical outlook enables the questioning of the basis of arguments and inherent 
assumptions in international law, as thinkers have done in a number of fields within the field of 
international law such as Costas Douzinas on human rights, Martti Koskenniemi on the 
structure of arguments within international law and David Kennedy on humanitarian action. See 
C. Douzinas, The End of Human Right. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000; M. Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia. Supra note 7; and D. Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
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to many feminist21 and TWAIL (Third World approaches to international law)22 scholars 
show their scepticism towards “law as rational, objective and principled by exposing the 
indeterminacy of and contradictions inherent in legal rules.”23 These critical approaches 
challenge assumed fixed subjectivities and structural biases supporting the apparent 
objectivity of laws. However, the fundamental category of the “international”, rarely 
engaged with substantively and critically, in a way acts as a disciplinary comfort zone for 
even the critical scholars. In my project, I adopt a similar scepticism to these critical 
perspectives, and yet offer a re-conceptualisation of the way international law views its 
own legality, spatiality and sociality through the fundamental category of the 
“international”. Hence, this thesis examines the failure of the discipline to interrogate 
the “international” as a category. In an effort to move away from the conglomeration of 
territorial states as the understanding of what constitutes the “international”, I construct 
an alternative theoretical space for understanding the concept, building on the insight of 
critical (legal) geographers.24 As such, I bring together the scepticism of critical, NAIL, 
TWAIL and social movements theories alongside the re-conceptualisation of space 
understood through the twinning of social and spatial theories. In turn, I use the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Feminist scholars direct their critical attention towards different forms of structural bias 
(gender, race, etc.) within international law. For instance, see C. Chinkin, and S. Wright, “The 
Hunger Trap: Women, Food, and Self-Determination.” Michigan Journal of International Law 14 
(1992-1993): 262-321; or H. Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis.” The 
Modern Law Review 65 (2002): 377-392; or G. Heathcote, The Law on the Use of Force: A Feminist 
Analysis. New York: Routledge, 2012.  
22 For examples of TWAIL scholarship, see importantly, amongst others, B. S. Chimni, “Third 
World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto.” International Community Law Review 8 
(2006): 3-27; A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. New York: 
Cambridge University Press , 2005; D. P. Filder, “Revolt Against or From Within the West? 
TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law.” Chinese Journal 
of International Law (OUP) 2, no. 1 (2003): 30-76; and L. Eslava, and S. Pahuja, “Between 
Resistance and Refrom: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law.” Trade, Law and 
Development 3, no. 1 (2011): 103-130. 
23 H. Charlesworth, and J. S. Watson, “Subversive Trends in the Jurisprudence of Interntional 
Law.” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 86 (April 1992): 
125-131. 
24 Explained further in this chapter.   
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sociality of cyber-based contemporary social movements as a motif for a conception of 
international law that is able to encompass and re-imagine the “international”.  
My focus on the “international” is not rooted within an inherent internationalism as 
seen in the works of international lawyers such as George Scelle, Hersch Lauterpacht, 
and Alejandro Alvarez, who argued faithfully towards the possibility of an ordered 
international realm.25 Instead, I direct my critique at the “international” and its socio-
spatial fabric. Despite this, my work remains inspired in many ways by the said scholars 
because of their sociological sensibility.26 This thesis also offers a fundamentally 
sociological intervention in international law, even though this intervention is different 
from what is broadly referred to as “sociological approaches to international law.”27 
This project is different in two ways; theoretical and methodological. The first 
difference is that I do not view the sociality of the “international” as limited to what 
Koskenniemi refers to as “a tribe living somewhere between First and Second Avenues, 
around 45th and 50th street, New York, and compelled to negotiate with other tribes in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
[hereinafter “Gentle Civilizer”]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 63-67.  
26 Scelle belonged to the tradition of the thinkers called “French Solidarists” who believed in an 
international order, with solidarity between a plurality of communities. For analyses of the 
‘French Solidarists’, see ibid., at 266-352. For a more specific focus on George Scelle, see H. 
Thierry, “The Thought of George Scelle.” European Journal of International Law, no. 1 (1990): 193-
208; and A. Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle's Theory of "Role Splitting" (dedoublement 
fonctionnel) in International Law.” European Journal of International Law, no. 1 (1990): 210-231. 
Lauterpacht, on the other hand, had a more Kantian internationalism, with a 
liberal/cosmopolitan perspective. For examples of Lauterpacht vision towards international law, 
see H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community. New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd, 2000; and H. Lauterpacht, “Westlake and Present Day International Law.” 
Economica, no. 15 (November 1925): 307-325. Or for a thorough analysis of his work and 
thought, see M. Koskenniemi, Ibid., at 353-412.  
27 For an analysis of one of the earliest accounts of this approach by Max Huber, see J. 
Klabbers, “The Sociological Jurisprudence of Max Huber: An Introduction.” Austrian Journal of 
International Law 43 (1992): 197-213. For a more recent reflection, see J. Delbrük, “Max Huber's 
Sociological Approach to International Law Revisited.” The European Journal of International Law 
18, no. 1 (2007): 97-113. For an analysis of sociological approaches to international legal history, 
see A. Orford, “On International Legal Method.” London Review of International Law 1, no. 1 
(2013): 166-197. 
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terrain that remains a no-man’s land.”28 Neither do I simply see the sociality as limited 
to an “invisible college of international lawyers”29 or a community of experts.30 Through 
the latter view, the sociality of states is transformed into one of experts, who are still 
detached from the everyday life of law and the life of people around the world who are 
affected by such laws. Instead, I seek to construct a theoretical framework where the 
“terrain” does not remain a “no-man’s land” anymore, but is perceived as a socio-spatial 
fabric, with experiences of sociality going beyond the limited version imagined by 
international lawyers so far.  
Internat ional  Law, Global isat ion and Cyberspace  
The discourse of globalisation is a common theme within the framework of 
international law, where most common theorisations of cyberspace could be 
understood as part of the globalisation process and the regulatory challenges facing 
international law. Globalisation is believed to pose a continuing challenge at the 
traditional territorial state-centred nature of the international order. Amongst many 
articulations, David Held defines globalisation as “those spatio-temporal processes of 
change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking 
together and expanding human activity across regions and continents.”31 In addition, 
themes such as “interdependence”, “transnationalism” and “homogenisation” have 
often characterised the descriptions of this process.32 Others, such as Anthony Giddens, 
emphasise the social aspect of globalisation by pointing to the “‘lifting out’ of social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 25, at 515-516. 
29 O. Schachter, “The Invisible College of Internetional Lawyers.” Northwestern University Law 
Review 72, no. 2 (1977): 217-227. For a socio-historical analysis of international lawyers and the 
development of their “collective” mind frames (such as French Solidarists, or Cosmopolitanists, 
etc.), see M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 25.  
30 D. Kennedy, “Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance.” Sydney Law 
Review 27 (2005): 1-24. 
31 D. Held, et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999: 15.   
32 See for instance, H. Shams, “Law in the Context of "Globalisation": A Framework of 
Analysis.” International Lawyer 35, no. 4 (2001): 1589-1626. 
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relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite 
spans of time-space.”33 The definitions of globalisation that emphasise “social change”, 
point out changes to the socio-spatial fabric of life as are experienced by an increasing 
number of us. This is similar to what I point to in my thesis regarding the experiences 
of “non-territorial socio-spatiality.” However, I differentiate my project from the 
predominant characterisation of globalisation in international law literature.  
In facing these “spatio-temporal processes of change,”34 a central theme in the 
relationship between international law and globalisation is the “withering away” of the 
state as the prime actor in the international sphere.35 Instead, the role of “non-state 
actors” and institutions are emphasised in an increasingly interdependent world.36 The 
“networked” operations of these actors in their plurality, are seen to pose a challenge 
for the largely (territorial) state-oriented view of international law making (and 
application).37 Even though I acknowledge the significance of this regulatory challenge, 
these accounts often seem to collapse back on conflict of laws principles, treating the 
non-state actor as located within a territorial jurisdiction, having international or 
transnational operations. A tendency in these formulations is to then re-deploy a 
territorially configured analysis of law and regulation, which is largely formed by a state- 
oriented framework, albeit indirectly. Therefore, I do not find the literature on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Stanford University Press, 1991: 21. 
34 D. Held, et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Supra note 31. 
35 The term “withering away” is taken from Martti Koskenniemi quoting Friedrich Engels 
saying “[t]he government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and by the 
conduct of processes of production. The State is not abolished. It withers away.” See M. 
Koskenniemi, “The Wonderful Artificiality of States.” Proceedings of the 101st Annual Meeting 
(American Society of International Law), 1994: 22. On the relationship between international 
law and globalisation, see amongst a wide range of analyses, D. J. Bederman, Globalization and 
International Law. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan , 2008; or P. S. Berman, “From International 
Law to Law and Globalisation.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2005): 485-556.  
36 For a recent analysis, see N. Bhuta, “The Role International Actors Other Than States Can 
Play in the New World Order.” In Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, edited by 
Antonio Cassese, 61-75. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.   
37 A.-M. Slaughter, and D. Zaring, “Networking Goes International: An Update.” Annual Review 
of Law and Social Science 2 (2006): 211-229. See also, P. S. Berman, “From International Law to 
Law and Globalisation.” Supra note 35. 
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globalisation and international law particularly useful, since it still fails to fundamentally 
challenge the conceptual frameworks of international law in viewing its own socio-
spatial fabric (the “international”). 
Within international law scholarship, cyberspace and the Internet most often appear as a 
central component of globalisation, posing regulatory difficulties for international law 
due to their cross border characteristics. In other words, globalisation and international 
law scholars are often concerned with the technological challenge to the regulatory 
frameworks available to international law.38 Most importantly, these are jurisdictional 
challenges, mostly dealt with within the rubric of conflicts of laws.39 Issues such as 
international cyber-security and cyber-warfare,40 cybercrime,41 cyber-terrorism,42 right to 
access43 and the like, have taken centre-stage in international law’s attempts to face new 
regulatory challenges posed by cyberspace.44 My thesis does not dismiss the importance 
of these challenges, yet views regulation and regulatory challenges as only one (small) 
aspect of the wider sociality of the “international” which is challenged and re-described 
through the analysis of cyberspace. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Comingt to Grips the Present Dangers.” In 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, edited by Antonio Cassese, 496-507. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. J. Kulesza, International Internet Law. Translated by Magdalena 
Arent and Woloszyk Wojciech. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
39 See for instance, P. S. Berman, “Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: 
Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153 
(2005): 1819-1882. See also J. L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy.” University of Chicago Law 
Review 65, no. 4 (1998): 1119-1250.  
40 See generally, M. N. Schmitt, Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013. See also Schmitt, Michael N. “Cyberspace and 
International Law: The Penumbral Mist of Uncertainty.” Harvard Law Review Forum 126 (2013): 
176-180; and O'Connell, Mary E., and Louise Arimatsu. Cyber Security and International Law. 
International Law: Meeting Summary, London: Chatham House, 2012.   
41 See discussion in chapter 2.  
42 Y. Shiryaev, “Cyberterrorism in the Context of Contemporary International Law.” San Diego 
International Law Journal 14 (2012): 139-192. 
43 M. B. Land, “Toward and International Law of the Internet.” Harvard International Law Journal 
54, no. 2 (2013): 393-458. 
44 For an overview of these topics, see generally J. Kulesza, International Internet Law. Supra note 
38.  
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In addition, a focus on globalisation sometimes invokes a binary between what is global 
and what is not. This, in turn, brings the non-global (“local”) to the fore of the 
argument. For instance, Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s analysis operates on the basis of an 
important (spatial) (di)vision; a perspective which presupposes a duality between “two 
contradictory processes” of globalization and localization.45 Globalisation is seen as 
“driven primarily by economic [and institutional] factors,” and localisation is 
characterised by a “turn to devolution and autonomy within nation states” and through 
the “emergence of global cities with their own material and symbolic sovereignty.”46 In 
chapter six, I demonstrate why this perspective reinforces the territorial sensibility that 
scholars of globalisation seem to be challenging in the first place. In this thesis, I offer a 
criticism which avoids bringing territorially configured spaces to the fore of the 
argument, by directing my attention to the fundamental socio-spatial framework(s) 
through which international law views the “international” more generally.  To move 
beyond this binary, I work to move the study beyond the creation of a global space, in 
opposition to the local and to rely on a fluid understanding of space (society and law) 
provided in critical geography scholarship.  
Therefore, while identifying cyberspace as a contemporaneous and global phenomenon, 
the work is largely distinct from discourse of globalisation in international law.  
Scholarship has thus far not turned observations regarding cyberspace back on to 
understandings of the fundamental categories of international law. More specifically 
there is a lack of scrutiny for the conceptions of the socio-spatial fabric of the 
“international” in the face of a phenomenon (cyberspace), which is in fact more than 
just a technological innovation, filled with cross border data. It is the failure to access 
and theorise the non-territorial spatiality of cyberspace that I seek to remedy in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistence. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 267.  
46 Ibid., at 267-268. 
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thesis. Therefore, this thesis is a step towards becoming aware of the “discursive 
framing of the spatiotemporal options” of international law.47  
1.2.2.  On Space and (Internat ional)  Law  
If my concern with the socio-spatial fabric of international law positions me apart from 
the mainstream literature on globalisation and international law, it also runs against the 
current of much critical legal studies (CLS) literature. Nicolas Blomley, a renowned legal 
geographer, points out that CLS has largely taken temporality as the central mode of its 
critique, and argues in favour of a move away from history.48 For Blomley, despite the 
“powerful, provocative and political” use of history in (critical) legal scholarship, a focus 
on time as the organising principle of critique “fail[s] to recognize the profound 
importance of space in the regulation of social life and the subversive potential of what 
might be called a geographic critique.”49 The aim of his critique was not necessarily to 
debunk time as an important critical method, but rather to bring the attention of 
scholarship to the central and intertwined nature of space with regards to social and 
legal phenomena. Following Blomley’s insight, while acknowledging the importance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 I am borrowing this phrase from R. B. J. Walker. See R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International 
relations as Political Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993: 6.   
48 Nicolas Blomely associates the prioritisation of time in critique to “historicism” as a mode of 
thinking. However, historicism is not just one mode of thinking and encompasses a range of 
approaches and methods of theorisation. For instance, Karl Popper in The Poverty of Historicism, 
critically defines the term as “an approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical 
prediction is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 
‘rhythms’ or the ‘patterns’, the ‘laws’ or the ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of history.” K. 
Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge, 2002: 3. While prediction seems to play a 
central role in Popper’s view of historicism, it is not a focus shared by all critics. Nonetheless, 
regardless of the specificity of the definitions and approaches, it is generally agreed that time is 
the central organising concept facilitating access to “history”, and arguably to a critical reflection 
on the “present”. 
49 N. Blomely, Law, Space and Geographies of Power. New York: The Guilford Press, 1994: 25. See 
also E. W. Soja, Post-Modern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: 
Verso, 1989: 10-32.   
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temporality, my thesis emphasises and highlights the ways in which we can complement 
the temporal dimension,50 with a rethinking of space in international law. 
The question of space as a category, concept, or straightforward fact, plays a central role 
in the development of this thesis, both theoretically and methodologically. In 
questioning the territorial configuration of sociality in international law, I draw on the 
insights of theorists of space such as Blomely, David Delaney and Irus Braverman, for 
whom “the world of lived social relations and experience, aspects of the social that are 
analytically identified as either legal or spatial are conjoined and co-constituted.”51 In 
other words, the social is not only the context in which law happens, or to which it is 
applied, but which co-constitutes law, space and sociality simultaneously. So, if one imagines law, 
space and society forming a triangle, the area of that triangle forms that “world of lived 
social relations and experience.” My thesis, thus, is concerned with a re-description of 
the “international” in international law through the optic of cyberspace in order to bring 
into play this co-constitutive relationship.   
The “Spatial  Turn” 
In order to demonstrate the importance of the relationship between law and space, it is 
essential to first highlight how space relates to society (and sociality) more broadly. 
Within the last half century or so, social theory has experienced a turn to space as an 
important category of critique. Scholars such as Henry Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, 
Edward Soja and Doreen Massey, are amongst the critics who have played a crucial role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For the last century or so the bulk of critical focus in international law has been framed 
around the temporal questioning of law. An early example is Roscoe Pound’s reflections on 
legal history in 1923. See R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1923. For analysis of the role of temporality in international legal critique, see 
C. Landauer, “Regionalism, Geography, and the International Legal Imagination.” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 11, no. 2 (2010-2011): 557-595. Alternatively for a collection of 
reflections on the role of history in international legal analysis, see M. Craven, et al. (eds.), Time, 
History and International Law. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. 
51 I. Braverman, et al., The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography. Stanford University 
Press, 2013: 1.   
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in this ongoing development. Before this “spatial turn”, phenomena were explained 
either in socio-temporal isolation/abstraction, or their inner contingencies were 
revealed by the application of a historical sensibility.52 Space was seen as detached from 
socio-temporality, as “an emptiness to be ‘filled up’ by people and things.”53 In addition, 
this physical “emptiness” was coupled by its “mental” or “abstract” equivalent, which 
consistently acted as the space of subjective ideas, utopias and dreams.54 It is this 
conception of space that I associate with the socio-spatial logic of logos. In other words, 
logos as a mode of analysis, is characterised by a conceptual distinction between space 
and society, coupled with understanding law as fixed and detached in relation to society 
and space.  
Lefebvre’s theory of The Production of Space was instrumental in highlighting the intrinsic 
connection between society and space.55 This theory initiated an important trend in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The later 19th century and the twentieth century saw an important transition in the intellectual 
sensibility of the social sciences. Especially with the rise of the Marxian critique of Hegelian 
philosophy, and the emergence of historical materialism, critical schools of thought developed 
around specific conceptions of materiality and temporality in order to theorise social and political 
phenomena away from historicism towards a materialist conception of history. Amongst the 
most notable schools of thought is the Frankfurt School (comprised of many distinguished 
scholars across range of time). One could point to the influential contributions of thinkers such 
as Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer as examples of reflection on the then recent historical 
sensibility. See for example, W. Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” In 
Illuminations, by Walter Bejamin, edited by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn, 253-264. 
New York: Schocken Books, 1968; M. Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essay. New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 2002.    
53 J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Columbia Law Review 107, no. 1 (January 2007): 227. 
This way of thinking about space was influenced by important thinkers such as Euclid, 
Descartes and Newton. An in depth analysis of the kind of spatiality theorised by the 
aforementioned thinkers is outside the scope of this chapter. It suffices to say that Euclid 
presented Western thought with a way of analysing the physical world. In turn, it was Descartes 
which provided us with a codified way of measuring the location and distance of objects. 
Finally, it was Newton who, through his concept of absolute space, associated change with time 
and stasis with space, and theorised the all important distinction between time and space which 
until very recently informed much of social theory. See generally, M. R. Curry, “Discursive 
Displacements and the Seminal Ambiguity of Space and Place.” In The Handbook of New Media, 
edited by Leah Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone, 502-517. London: Sage Publications, 2002. 
54 See generally, E. Soja, “Postmodern Geographies and the Critique of Historicism.” In 
Postmodern Contenstions: Epochs, Politics, Space, edited by John P. Jones, Wolfgang Natter and 
Theodore R. Schatzki, 113-136. New York: The Guilford Press, 1993. 
55 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991. 
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challenging the physical(material)/mental(discursive) binary of space.56 He argued that 
spaces are the products of processes which include physical, mental and social 
relations;57 in his famous words, “(social) space is a (social) product.”58 Lefebvre saw space as 
much a product of material practices, as it is a product of discursive relations of (socio-
spatial) production. Despite this insight, space and society still remained in a relation of 
production and constitution, rather than co-production and co-constitution.59 In other words, even 
though a relation of production is acknowledged between the two, space and society 
were treated as distinct. 
Building on the legacy left behind by Lefebvre, I build on the work of three important 
scholars of space, namely Foucault, Massey and Delaney. What these thinkers share is 
an approach to space that reflects on the fluid and complex relation between space and 
society (and by extension law). For instance, Delaney argues that social space is 
continuously reproduced and transformed through how it is performed. He spells out his 
theory of space and its relation to law, arguing that the field of law and geography is 
facing an “impasse”.60 Delaney characterises this impasse as a continuing divide between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Edward Soja pointed to the existence of these binaries, and associated them with the 
“modern” perspectives on space and society. For his influential critique, see E. Soja, Post-Modern 
Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 1989; and  E. Soja, 
“Postmodern Geographies and the Critique of Historicism.” Supra note 54. 
57 D. Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet. London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002: 2.   
58 H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space. Supra note 55: 26.  
59 My understanding of co-production is also inspired by Shiela Jasanoff’s Science and 
Technology Studies terminology. According to Jasanoff, “co-production is shorthand for the 
proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) 
are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it. Knowledge and its material 
embodiments are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms of social life [...].” 
See S. Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-Production.” In States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science 
and Social Order, edited by Sheila Jasanoff, 1-12. London: Routledge , 2004: 2. [Emphasis added] 
Even though my work is not a Science and Technology project, I find the concept of co-
production extremely valuable in thinking about the relationship between law, space and society. 
An important scholar who questioned Lefebvre idea of “production” was Soja. For his critique 
of Lefebvre’s theory of production of space, see E. W. Soja, “The Socio-Spatial Dialectic.” 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70, no. 2 (1980): 207-225. 
60 D. Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making: Nomospheric Investigations. 
New York: Routledge, 2010: 12. 
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physical and abstract conceptions of space. Moreover, according to Delaney, other 
binaries, most importantly law/space and material/discursive, are preventing legal 
geography from “connecting the physical and the mental with the social or lived 
character of space” and providing “an account of how space [...] is produced through 
human agency.”61 Delaney’s attempt at creating this connection is crucial to the theory of 
nomos (developed in detail in chapter three), and hence, plays an important role in the re-
description of the relation between cyberspace and international law as a non-territorial 
experience of international sociality.   
What is evident with these thinkers is that space and society are seen as inseparable. 
This inseparability is arguably the result of theories which characterise space as neither 
purely physical (material), nor mental (discursive). These theorists offer a theory of 
space as always already in a process of fluid co-constitution with the material and the 
discursive, hence becoming one (or at least inseparable) with social life and experience, 
imagined as a multiplicity of performative acts, relations and spaces.62  
The theorists of space who view society and space as co-constituted and inseparable are 
particularly important in this thesis for two reasons. First, they are crucial for the way I 
characterise cyberspace as an experienced and lived space which co-produces everyday 
non-territorial socialities. This characterisation is informed by scholars such as Dianna 
Saco, Julie E. Cohen, and Massey who see cyberspace as not just a product,63 but instead 
inherently involved in producing and transforming other spatialities, subjectivities and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Chris Butler quoted by Delaney, ibid. For other analyses of the problematic nature of the 
law/space relation see, for example, N. Blomley, “From 'What?' to 'So What?': Law and 
Geography in Retrospect.” In Law and Geography, edited by Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison, 
17-33. Oxford University Press, 2003. 
62 In this reflection I am borrowing multiplicity from Massey and theories of the performative 
nature of space and society from Delaney, which I expand on in chapter 3.   
63 Richard Ford also alludes to the idea of cyberspace as a product. See R. T. Ford, “Against 
Cyberspace.” In The Place of Law, edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Merrill 
Umphrey. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2003: 178, note 8. 
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socialities.64 This way of describing the spatiality of cyberspace, moves away from 
theories that either characterise cyberspace as a space by relying on territorial/bordered 
metaphors,65 or deny it any spatiality altogether.66 The socio-spatially co-constituted and 
experienced view of cyberspace also allows one to look at content not just as filling a 
“container-like” space, but as part of a socio-spatiality which is neither experienced as 
purely material, nor completely virtual: much like Marko, Zaynab, or Arash’s experience 
of cyber socio-spatiality described above. This is the socio-spatial framework through 
which I seek to demonstrate the role of cyberspace in international law scholarship 
away from discourses of detached regulation and control, but rather critical engagement 
and reflection.  
Second, by viewing cyberspace as such, coupled with the insights of critical legal 
geography, our everyday experiences of cyberspace become part of a much larger non-
territorial social space shared by an increasing number of people around the world. This 
is in stark contrast to the rather common position of international lawyers, offered by 
the opening sentence of Antonio Cassese’s International Law, which states that “we all live 
within the framework of national legal orders.”67 By conceptualising everyday socio-
spatial experiences in people’s lives non-territorially (i.e. not necessarily conceivable as 
happening within the territorial framework of a national legal order), this understanding 
of cyberspace prompts a re-consideration of the “international”. In other words, the re-
description of cyberspace is presented as a cause to problematise the assumed 
territoriality of the international socio-spatial order.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64D. Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet. London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002; J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Columbia Law Review 107, no. 1 (January 2007): 
210-256; D. Massey, For Space. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005: 90-98.  
65 See especially, D. R. Johnson, and D. Post. “Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace.” Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 1367-1402.  
66 See for instance, J. L. Goldsmith, "Against Cyberanarchy." University of Chicago Law Review 65, 
no. 4 (1998): 1119-1250; and A. R. Stein, "The Unexceptionalist Problem of Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace." International Lawyer 32 (1998)  
67 A. Cassese, International Law. 2nd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 3. 
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Internat ional  law and space  
My contributions regarding the relationship between international law and space builds 
on an already existing, yet limited, scholarship on the topic.68 Indeed, space has always 
been an important topic of analysis for international lawyers, especially since the whole 
field, at least in its “traditional” sense, revolves around conceptions of jurisdiction and 
legality directly (or indirectly) authorised by the territorial and bounded nature of states 
as the subjects of international law.69 However, a move parallel to the spatial turn of 
social theory (post-Lefebvre), i.e. moving away from the fixity of space and recognising 
its social/produced character, is at its nascent stages in international law. For example, 
authors such as Pahuja, point to the fact that space is something that is part of the 
fundamental conditions of international law produced through the operations and 
development of international law itself.70 By treating space as something which is 
“produced”, contemporary scholars pose a challenge to the predominant views 
regarding the “pre-existence” of some conditions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For two influential Feminist reflections on the spatiality of international law, see Z. Pearson, 
“Spaces of International Law.” Griffith Law Review 17, no. 2 (2008): 489-514; Z. Pearson, 
“Feminist Project(s): The Spaces of International Law [hereinafter “Feminist Project(s)”].” In 
Feminist Perspectives on Contemporary International Law: Between Resistance and Compliance?, edited by 
Sari Kouvo and Zoe Pearson, 47-68. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011; and D. Buss, “Austerlitz 
and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries [hereinafter “Austerlitz”].” In 
International Law: Modern Feminist Approaches, edited by Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji, 87-104. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005. For a remarkable TWAIL oriented approach to spaces of 
international law, see T. Mahmud, “Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial 
Mapping.” Santa Clara Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (2007): 525-561. See also, C. Landauer, 
“Regionalism, Geography, and the International Legal Imagination.” Chicago Journal of 
International Law 11, no. 2 (2010-2011): 557-595.  
69 For a recent account of the intersection of geography and international law, see D. 
Bethlehem, “The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the 
Challenge to International Law.” The European Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2014): 9-24. 
See also Koller’s response to Bethlehem’s piece, D. Koller, “The End of Geography: The 
Chaning Nature of the International System and the Challenge to International Law: A Reply to 
Daniel Bethlehem.” The European Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2014): 25-29. 
70 See S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of 
Universality . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
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Amongst international law theorists, feminist and TWAIL scholars have absorbed a 
spatial sensibility for critique more than others.71 Inspired by the need for criticising and 
opening up the power dynamics behind fundamental categories and characteristics of 
mainstream international law, these scholars have taken on spatial analysis (sometimes 
in parallel to historical analysis) as a method of critique. For examples, in Spaces of 
International Law, Zoe Pearson aims at “reimaging[ing] the conceptual borders of the 
discipline and scholarship to include particular spaces within our conceptions of 
international law.”72 Pearson emphasises the “mutual constitutive nature of law, space 
and society,”73 and argues that:  
The concept of space assists these critical endeavours [critical scholarship in 
international law] because of the rich, multidimensional and dynamic picture it 
suggests of how the spaces of international law are perceived, conceived and 
lived, and how the spaces of international law must be understood as being 
made up of each of these dimensions.74  
In addition to Pearson, scholars including Carl Landauer and Tayyab Mahmud point 
towards the spatial component of our legal imagination and the narratives of 
international law.75 Others, such as Ruth Buchanan, engage with questions of space in 
international law as a direct response to the dominant narratives of globalisation.76 
However, with the exception of a few, including Pearson and Doris Buss, scholars 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See note 68 above.  
72 Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Supra note 68, at 489.  
73 Z. Pearson, “Feminist Project(s).” Supra note 68, at 66 
74 Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Supra note 68, at 508. I am in general agreement 
with Pearson over the significance of space in critical analysis. However, I depart from the 
analysis in the way that she still characterises social spaces within specific bounded spaces, 
whereas I seek to use cyberspace as a fluid spatiality which is non-territorial and made into a 
space through our experiences and social interactions.  
75 C. Landauer, “Regionalism, Geography and the International Legal Imagination.” Supra note 
68, at 595. (Arguing for attention to be paid to the parallel operations of spatiality and 
temporality in the operations of international forces and “the local's own layers of past 
interactions, intrusions, and assimilations.”); T. Mahmud, “Geography and International Law: 
Towards a Postcolonial Mapping.” Santa Clara Journal of International Law 5, no. 2 (2007): 525-
561. 
76 See, for instance, R. Buchanan, “Border Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and 
the Politics of Place.” In The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space, edited by Nicolas 
Blomely, David Delaney and Richard T. Ford, 285-297. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001. 
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seldom direct their spatial analysis to the concept of the “international”, challenging it 
using the socio-spatial experiences and practices of everyday.    
By accepting the fluidity of space and law, Pearson seeks to critically reflect on the 
normative spaces of international law, which broadly aligns with the intention of this 
thesis. However, a familiar territorial logic of space (embedded in the concept of logos) 
still brings the attention of these insightful scholars back to societal contexts in which 
law operates and which are often characterised in terms of physical (territorial) spatial 
contexts such as “the local” or “the (global) city”. On the contrary, theorists such as 
Buss, seek to do the exact opposite by arguing for “a reading of ‘the international’ of 
international law as reflecting ‘ideas about what is right, just and appropriate’.”77 Yet, 
both their approaches to space still fall victim to the limited territorial socio-spatial 
configuration of the “international” in international law, since they reach out to either 
physical or mental space in order to make the bridge to the everyday life of the 
“international”. In this thesis, I identify that the perspectives provided by the spatial 
critics of the “international”, tend not to make room for lived spaces which are neither 
local, nor ideational but are fundamentally international, a sensibility already explored 
through cyberspace. In other words, this thesis uses the conception of space 
exemplified through cyberspace as a theoretical method for offering a critique of the 
predominant conceptualisations of international law’s social-spatial fabric, the 
“international”. 
1.2.3.  On Internat ional  Law and Soc ia l  Movements   
I use social movements and their place in international legal literature as a way of 
illustrating the importance of accommodating the non-territorial socialities of everyday 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 D. Buss, “Austerlitz.” Supra note 68, at 88. Buss is quoting T. Cresswell’s, In Place/Out of Place: 
Geography, Ideology, and Transgression. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota , 1996: 8.  
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life in international legal thought.78 I do this by exploring the overlap between the 
connection drawn between international law and social movements by SMIL, and the 
indispensible role the Internet (and the socio-spatial experience and life of cyberspace) 
plays in contemporary social movements. What I seek to demonstrate is to see how a 
shift in our analytical frameworks of socio-spatiality of the “international”, by extension 
of cyberspace, will affect the frameworks of engagement with social movements for 
international law. In order to do so, I will provide a short overview of the literature on 
SMIL. 
Julie Mertus, in her review of SMIL literature, sees social movements as either “spurring 
international law” or “spurning it.”79 In this view, international law is either opposed 
(e.g. anti-globalization campaigns) or promoted (human rights and/or development 
oriented action(s)) by social movements around the world. As such, the relationship 
becomes limited to the way international law serves (or does not serve) social 
movements’ goals and purposes. Others however, take a more reflective position with 
regards to this relationship by analysing the “conceptual role of social movements” for 
international law.80 In doing so, similar to the trend in other forms of critical social/legal 
theory (and in international law), a number of scholars, including Neil Stammers,81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78Diani defines social movements as “networks of informal interaction between a plurality of 
individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural confl ict on the 
basis of a shared collective identity.” See M. Diani, “The Concept of Social 
Movement.” The Sociological Review 40, no. 1 (1992): 13. These forms of informal interactions 
take different forms and are classified into categories depending on characteristics such as 
membership, geographical distributions, agenda or collective identity. What I am particularly 
intersted in are contemporary social movements, for whcih cyberspace is a central component.  
79 J. Mertus, “International Law and Social Movements: Towards Transformation: Analyzing 
Social Movements and Internationl Law.” American Society of International Law Proceedings 97 
(2003): 295. 
80 E. Rubin, “The Conceptual Role of Social Movements.” Amercian Society of International Law 
Proceedings 97 (2003): 296-299. 
81 N. Stammers, “Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights.” Human 
Rights Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1999): 980-1008. See also N. Stammers, “Social Movements, Human 
Rights, and the Challenge to Power.” American Society of International Law Proceedings 97 (2003): 
299-301. 
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Vasuki Nesiah82 and Buchanan83 promote a socio-historical approach, in order to 
highlight the role of time/history in the development of the conceptual link between 
social movements and international law. In the illustration of my thesis, I particularly 
focus on the scholarship of Rajagopal as the pioneering scholar of SMIL, who arguably 
offers a combination of the above analyses.84 
What all SMIL scholars share is an attempt to destabilise the state/institution oriented 
narrative of the socio-legality of international law and consequently challenge both the 
sociality and spatiality of international law. Providing a counter-narrative to the 
mainstream accounts of international law through social movements is important for 
SMIL and my thesis, since it imagines an active role for people, individuals and their 
sociality (often in their collectivity), rather than a passive role as “bearer[s] of human 
rights.”85 SMIL scholars think of social movements as an important part of the 
international normative structure, a role that according to scholarship should be 
acknowledged. Through illustration of the overlap of social movements and cyberspace, 
I argue that the SMIL critique can/should be taken a step further, in order to challenge 
the socio-spatial framework (of logos) in the context of which social movements are 
being embedded.    
Given the centrality of communications to social movements, it is no surprise that there 
is a huge and growing scholarship examining the effects of the Internet on the 
operations of social movements. Even though since the early 2000s the Internet has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 V. Nesiah, “Resistance in the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending Investigation.” 
Third World Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 903-922. 
83 R. Buchanan, “Writing Resistance into International Law.” International Community Law Review 
10 (2008): 445-454. 
84 For Rajagopal’s most influential contributions to the field of SMIL, see B. Rajagopal, 
International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistence [hereinafter 
“International Law from Below”]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. See also B. 
Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
Development as a Third World Strategy.” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 767-783. 
85 L. F. Damrosch, et al., International Law: Cases and Materials (4th Edition). West Group, 2001: xv.  
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proven to be an important tool for communication for many, it is really in the past five 
or six years, that activism and the Internet (especially “social media”) have become 
virtually inseparable. The Internet has added to the “repertoire of collective action” for 
social movements, old and new, domestic and global.86 Scholars have in the past few 
years paid close attention to the possibilities and limitations of the Internet mainly as a 
“tool” which is both enabling new forms of collective action (e.g. online petitions, 
online discussion forums, etc.) and enhancing the scope of possibilities for more 
traditional forms (e.g. allowing faster spread of information and increased awareness, 
organisation of simultaneous protests at different locations, etc.).87 One of the most 
prominent scholars of the “information age” is Manuel Castells, who in his analysis of 
the recent social movements, argues that the Internet “made possible the viral diffusion 
of videos, messages and songs that incited rage and gave hope” to social movements in 
a variety of circumstances.88 Put in the vocabulary of this project, it is the non-territorial 
and fluid (both in terms of form and content) forms of (cyber) sociality that were key to 
the realisation of “hope”. It is this quality of many contemporary movements that I seek 
to find access to, and incorporate in SMIL and international law more broadly.  
Rajagopal announces that “international law simply does not have the theoretical 
framework or doctrinal tools to make sense of [the complex reality of globalization and 
resistance to it],” which are thought to be “emerging along different spatial orderings.”89 
It is exactly by further demonstrating this gap that I am directing my critical framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Charles Tilly defines the “repertoire of collective action” as the “set of means which is 
effectively available to a given set of people.” See C. Tilly, “Social Movements and National 
Politics.” Centre for Research and Social Organization Working Paper 197 (1979): 15.  
87 See for example, J. Van Laer, and P. Van Aelst, “Internet and Social Movement Action 
Repertoires: Opportunities and Limitations.” Information, Communication and Society 13, no. 8 
(2010): 1146-1171. 
88 M. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012: 28.  
89 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Supra note 84, at 270. 
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at the “international” through considering the non-territorial socio-spatiality of 
cyberspace as nomos, which is conceptually significant for international legal critique.   
1.3. Outline of the Thesis 
Having provided the theoretical and methodological backdrop for the discussion of my 
thesis, I will now provide an outline of the thesis chapter by chapter. Given the central 
role of cyberspace to the argument, in the second chapter, through a largely 
descriptive/historical method, I discuss the current/predominant relationship between 
law and the Internet, with a particular focus on international law. I highlight that the 
role of international law in this story is rather ambivalent and at best limited to offering 
a possible remedy for the regulatory difficulties faced by individual states. Through this 
chapter, I point to the absence of a socio-spatial engagement with the Internet 
(infrastructure (form) and content) by international law. As I will highlight, international 
legal engagement with cyberspace is often shorthand either for technology or the space 
containing content in need of regulation.     
In the third chapter, I elaborate on and construct an understanding of two common 
frames of analysing and thinking about law, logos and nomos. These two concepts serve as 
the central frameworks of my critique, namely, of cyberspace (and international law), 
the “international” and social movements. Drawing on the historical development of 
these concepts, I initially construct a conceptual image of logos as an attitude which is 
associated with the fixity of law (authority) outside the social and spatial context, while 
seeing space through the binary of physical/mental spatiality. In this mode of analysis, 
sociality only happens “within” the boundaries of physical space (by entities with an 
identifiable “body”). In contrast, I define nomos as a diametrically different concept to 
logos in its conceptualisation of law, space and society. By reading the scholarship of Carl 
Schmitt and Robert Cover, in light of the insightful reflections of critical (legal) 
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geography, I develop nomos to provide a conceptual framework where law, space and 
society are not categorically distinct, but forming a fluid multiplicity through which they 
are co-produced. Nomos in fact becomes this co-production.  
In the fourth chapter, given the background provided to the different ways of 
conceptualising the relation between the “legal”, the “spatial” and the “social”, I revisit 
cyberspace and international law’s predominant engagement with it. Initially, I observe 
that this engagement reflects the characteristics of logos. Accordingly, international law is 
seen as detached from the form and content of the Internet, yet the non-territoriality of 
cyberspace as a social experience is ignored. In the remainder of the chapter, using the 
insights of Delaney, Foucault and Massey, I (re-)describe cyberspace as nomos, 
emphasising the non-territorial and lived social spaces of using and interacting through 
the Internet.  
The (re-)description of cyberspace demonstrated in the fourth chapter, acts as the 
central element of the critique I pose at the understandings of socio-spatiality 
predominant in international law, a topic to which I turn my attention in the fifth 
chapter. In this chapter, I analyse the predominant ways international law conceptualises 
the socio-spatial fabric of the “international”. Having gone through different 
perspectives, I demonstrate that the “international” is either seen territorially or 
abstracted away into a “space-less” realm, with an absent sociality. I associate this 
duality with the physical/mental binary of logos, and I proceed to highlight the way this 
duality is hardwired even into the most critical accounts of the indeterminacy of the 
international legal argument. 
Having elaborated the main elements of my thesis through an analysis of cyberspace 
and pointed out the territorial configuration of the “international”, I proceed to the 
sixth chapter, where I further illustrate the importance of nomos as a mode of analysis. 
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By pointing to the socio-spatial narrative of SMIL, especially the common reliance on 
categories such as “from below” and the “local” in producing critique, I highlight 
analytical continuities with logos in SMIL literature. I argue that by shifting to nomos, the 
territorial configuration of the “international” at the heart of SMIL will be 
fundamentally disrupted. As I demonstrate, this disruption is necessary and timely, if 
SMIL is to capture the nuances of contemporary social movements and their role in the 
co-production of the broader socio-spatial fabric of the “international”. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I first explore the further potentials and 
consequences of my thesis for the ways in which the sociology of international law is 
understood and perceived. Further, I reflect on how a re-consideration of international 
sociality affects the long standing emancipatory dreams often attached to international 
law. To conclude, I consider how my attempt at bringing seemingly disparate forces and 
ideas together in this project, may prompt and require the critical international lawyer to 
revise her research agenda beyond the boundaries – spatial and temporal – imposed on 
the discipline. 
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Chapter 2 – Regulation of the Internet and International 
Law  
  
The scholarly debate over the proper regulatory approach to cyberspace reflects not richness but poverty of 
imagination. 
          J.E. Cohen 
2.1. Introduction  
It is the central goal of this chapter to provide an account of the range of legal 
engagements that have materialised since the beginning of the commercialisation of the 
Internet.1 I would like to highlight and contextualise the so far limited and controversial 
role of international law in the wider context known as “Internet governance”.  In this 
process, I consider both institutional and intergovernmental forms of international law. 
As the Internet and its role in our day to day lives expanded rapidly through time, so did 
the numerous institutions and legal (and quasi-legal) bodies involved in governing and 
regulating this phenomenon. Therefore the best way of engaging with these governing 
mechanisms is to put them in their historical context. Hence it is essential to undertake 
a historical approach. This will provide a descriptive image of the changing/developing 
relationship between law and the Internet across time, and allows me to situate the 
difficult role of international law in a wider institutional and legal context. 
As I will explain further in the final section of this chapter, international law is 
increasingly being seen as the solution to a number of Internet governance issues. Even 
though most of these issues are content related, international law (in its traditional inter-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Internet specifically refers to the network of computers and servers which is enabled 
through networking protocols such as TCP/IP, through a wider, decentred interconnected 
telecommunications structure. See appendix for the discussion of the formation of the Internet 
and its characteristics.  
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governmental forms) is sought in order to ensure more control over the Code and 
infrastructure of the Internet for territorial states. This is despite the fact that most 
regulation of the Internet is national.   
Before proceeding to the discussion of this chapter, I should note that law (at least in its 
traditional state oriented sense) and the Internet have always had an uncomfortable 
relationship. Lawyers and legal scholars from the early days of the widespread 
availability of the Internet2 have faced difficulties regarding the regulation of the 
Internet because of the cross border availability of information and data. While some 
dismissed the legitimacy and possibility of state regulation of the Internet and called for 
exceptional legal treatment of cyberspace (known as cyber “exceptionalists”),3 many 
others argued for the applicability of domestic law to the Internet (content) with the 
help of conflict of laws principles (known as cyber “non-exceptionalists”).4 It is 
important to consider the content of this chapter, and arguably my further analysis of 
cyberspace, within the context of the running debates regarding the possibility, 
feasibility and desirability of regulating the Internet.5 However given that this thesis is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For a brief history of the Internet see Appendix 1.  
3 A classic exceptionalist approach to cyberspace is J. P. Barlow, A declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace. February 8, 1996. https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (accessed 
1 August 2012). Exceptionalist literature on cyberspace governance includes D. R. Johnson, and 
D. G. Post, "Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.” Stanford Law Review 48 (1996): 
1367-1402; and D. G. Post, "Against "Against Cyberanarchy.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17 
(2002): 1-23; D. G. Post, In Search of Jefferson's Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009; H. H. JR. Perritt, “The Internet is Changing the Public 
International Legal System.” Kentucky Law Journal 88 (2000); J. R. Reidenberg, "Governing 
Networks and Rulemaking in Cyberspace.” Emory Law Journal 45 (1996): 911-930. For an 
influential pro-regulation yet exceptionalist perspective on law and cyberspace see L. Lessig, 
Code: Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books, 2006. 
4 For influential non-exceptionalist literature, see J. L. Goldsmith, "Against Cyberanarchy.” 
University of Chicago Law Review 65, no. 4 (1998): 1119-1250; A. R. Stein, "The Unexceptionalist 
Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace.” International Lawyer 32 (1998); J. L. Goldsmith, 
“Regulation of the Internet: Three Persistent Fallacies.” Chicago-Kent Law Review 73, no. 4 (1998): 
1119-1132; and J. L. Goldsmith and T. Wu. Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a 
Borderless World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.  
5 For an insightful overview of these debates see D. R. Johnson, et al., "The Accountable 
Internet: Peer Production of Internet Governance.” Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 9, no. 9 
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ultimately not about Internet regulation, I will not be expanding further on these 
debates.  
I proceed with the content of this chapter in the following way. In the first section I 
focus on the early development of regulatory and legal forms with regard to the Internet 
(mid 1980s to 1998). Given that this was pre-commercialisation and pre-mass access, 
most of these governance structures concerned themselves with standardisation and the 
development of network infrastructures, with the emergence of content regulation as a 
legal issue towards the end of the period.  
The second section of the chapter considers the development of new models of 
Internet governance which, since the establishment of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), became largely characterised by 
multistakeholderism. The period under consideration (1998-2014) saw an expansion of 
regulatory frameworks on the national and international levels. Most significantly, 
multistakeholderism was consolidated through international organisations, such as the 
UN, as the central method of international Internet governance. Moreover, this period 
saw the birth of treaty regimes concerned with content regulation.  
In the final section I will consider the current period as a time of increasing uncertainty 
regarding the future of Internet governance. On the one hand there has been an 
expansion of the multistakeholder framework in parallel with national regulation of 
Internet content, and on the other hand I point to increasing dissatisfaction with the 
multistakeholder approach and louder calls (mainly by developing countries) for an 
intergovernmental regulatory regime.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2004): 1-33. For a recent defence of the exceptionalist approach see D.G. Post, In Search of 
Jefferson's Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace. Supra note 3.  
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I will conclude this chapter by observing that the international legal engagement with 
the Internet in all of its forms is most often regulatory, and that the significance of non-
territorial human interaction, communication and social associations through the 
Internet are largely ignored – with the exception only of what is referred to as “content 
regulation”.  The discourse of international law predominantly focuses on the Internet 
as this allows international lawyers to deal with technology and content separately for 
regulatory purposes. The place/role of international law in relation to cyberspace is 
largely seen through dealing with “new technology”,6 and content seen as something 
filling cyberspace, something to be dealt with largely through the language of criminal 
law through the mechanisms of treaty making and state implementation.7 The 
observations of this chapter are crucial for the wider project since the remainder of this 
analysis reflects further on the relationship between international law and the Internet 
(sometimes also referred to as “cyberspace” but rarely going beyond the Internet) from 
a theoretical perspective, seeking to provide international law with a theoretical 
framework that enables it to recognise or comprehend the non-territorial character of 
social relations enabled through the Internet and experienced as cyberspace.  
2.2. Birth of “Internet Governance”: Mid 1980s to 1998   
From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the Internet underwent a transitional period. 
Institutional hierarchies, private ownership and internationalisation changed the face of 
this technological phenomenon from a site/tool of research, innovation and geeky 
conversations, to a sought after, largely privatised global technology available to the 
mass public, subject to growing governance and regulation. In this section I would like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See for instance M. Land, “Toward and International Law of the Internet.” Harvard 
International Law Journal 54, no. 2 (2013): 393-458. 
7 See for instance Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime [2001] ETS 185.  
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to trace this development which occurred on a dichotomous basis, focusing on 
infrastructure and Code on the one hand, and content on the other.   
Initial developments of governance mechanisms were generally concerned with the 
physical and the “logical” layers (infrastructure and Code), the content layer only 
becoming important towards the end of the 10-15 year period discussed in this section.8 
Here I would like to focus firstly on the former two layers. This is because it was the 
innovations (both technological and in terms of governance) of these two layers that 
initially distinguished the Internet from previous telecommunications tools (television, 
telegraph or telephone), as a result making many-to-many communication possible on a 
scale that eventually required governance of the content layer as well. 
In the early days of the Internet, the term “governance” was used to refer to the 
technical management, coordination and control of the structure and standards of this 
“network of networks”, and name/number assignment, in addition to the all important 
forms of online community governance. The term “governance” was used instead of 
“government” because states (with the clear exception of the US) had very little role in 
it, and it was mainly the academic research community who took a leading role in the 
development of the technology and its relevant standards. Even the role of the US 
government is still questionable and the topic of many debates.9 As is clear from the 
disagreements between important academics such as Jon Postel and the US Department 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Yochai Benkler introduces the idea of ‘layers’ of Internet communications in Wealth of 
Networks. He suggests three layers: the physical layer, the logical layer, and the content layer. The 
former two include the technical and software aspects of communications. The latter (content 
layer) is defined as “the set of humanly meaningful statements that human beings utter to and 
with one another.” See Y. Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom. London: Yale University Press, 2006: 392. See also J. Kulesza, International 
Internet Law. Translated by Magdalena Arent and Woloszyk Wojciech. New York: Routledge, 
2012: 125-126.  
9 See J. L. Schenker, “Nations Chafe at U.S. Influence Over Internet.” The New York Times. 8 
December 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/08/technology/08divide.html (accessed 
August 9, 2014). See also M. Muller, “Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis for 
American Control of the Internet.” Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 15, no. 3 (2005): 709-748.  
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of Commerce (DoC) in the 1990s, the research community were rarely following orders 
from the government officials.10 In fact the Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 
(ARPA)11 success in operationalising ARPANET was partly due to the autonomy given 
to them by the Department of Defence (DoD) at the beginning of their research.12 In 
this period, the meaning of Internet governance carried on its “management”, 
“coordination” and standardisation theme, with the addition of national and 
international (inter-state) regulation of content towards the mid 1990s.   
2.2.1.  Infrastructure ,  Networks and Standards 	  
Until the mid 1980s the technical and infrastructural governance was mainly performed 
by academics and researchers involved in the ARPANET project though circulated 
documents called Request for Comments (RFCs).13 These documents were responses to 
specific problems emerging through use and the governance system was largely ad-
hoc.14 Although the form of standards and Code governance remained mostly ad-hoc 
for some years to come, probably the first seed of institutionalisation of standard 
setting, albeit informal, was the formation of the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), which to date remains the most important standard setting body for the 
Internet.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For an account of such disagreements especially regarding management of the domain name 
level which eventually led to the establishment of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), see W. Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance.” In 
Governing the Internet: Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region, edited by Christian Moller and 
Arnaud Amouroux. Vienna: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2007: 46-
50.  
11 The name of ARPA was changed to Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1972.  
12 M. Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflection on the Internet, Business, and Society [hereinafter “Internet 
Galaxy”]. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001: 31. Of course the other part being the flow 
of funding made available to the researchers and developers.  
13 The first RFC’s were used in 1969. These documents would then become technical standards 
through the Network Working Groups (NWG), which was later disbanded in 1970s after 
ARPANET became operational.  
14 M. Castells, Internet Galaxy. Supra note 12, at 31. 
15 I should however emphasise here that IETF is by no means the only standard setting body 
for the Internet. Given the many aspects of Internet Code governance, from applications such 
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IETF was founded in 1985 under the umbrella of The Internet Advisory Board (IAB) 
established in 1984 (later changing to the Internet Activities Board, and finally changing 
to the Internet Architecture Board in 1992).16 This task force was open to anyone and 
practiced decision making on a rough consensus basis amongst the engineers and 
researchers involved. An often quoted phrase by one of the early participants regarding 
their approach to standard setting and governance is: “We reject kings, presidents and 
voting. We believe in rough consensus and running code.”17 This quote embodies 
important aspects of the ethos of the pioneers of the Internet who were involved in its 
governance from the beginning. Orly Lobel describes IETF as “an unincorporated 
association with constantly changing members, [which] operates to set standards 
through negotiations open to all.”18 IETF receives comments on their technical 
proposals from bodies such as the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) and of 
course the Internet Architecture Board (IAB).19  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as the World Wide Web, to the telecommunications infrastructure needed for the operations of 
international network, other organisations such the International Telecommunications Union, 
and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) are in constant liaison regarding different aspects 
of their governance endeavours.  
16 The IAB was started in 1994 from another bottom up standard setting board established in 
1979 called “Internet Configuration Control Board” (ICCB). Similar to the ICCB, the IAB was 
made up of “engineers and other groups involved in the development of the Internet at that 
time.” See generally W. Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance.” Supra note 10, at 
44. Currently IAB is “composed of twelve members selected by the IETF Nominations 
Committee, the IETF Chair (also selected by the IETF Nominations Committee), and several 
ex-officio and liaison positions.” For details see http://www.iab.org/about/iab-members/ 
(accessed August 9, 2014). 
17 See M. Ziewitz and I. Brown. “A Prehistory of Internet Governance.” In Research Handbook on 
Governance of the Internet, edited by Ian Brown. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2013: 25. For a good introductory account of IETF operations within ISOC, see also P. 
Hoffman, “The Tao of IETF: A Novice's Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force 
[hereinafter “The Tao of IETF”].” Internet Engineering Task Force. 2 November 2012. 
http://www.ietf.org/tao.html (accessed August 9, 2014). 
18 O. Lobel, “Renew Deal: the Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought.” Minnesota Law Review 89 (2005): 436.  
19 According to Hoffman, “the IAB is responsible for keeping an eye on the "big picture" of the 
Internet, and it focuses on long-range planning and coordination among the various areas of 
IETF activity.” See P. Hoffman, “The Tao of IETF.” Supra note 17.  
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Even though the open and “bottom-up” ethos carries on until today and governmental 
bodies usually don’t have a privileged role in the formation of Internet Code and 
standards, institutional hierarchies are in place in the operations of the different groups 
and task forces. Such hierarchies were especially formalised after the establishment of 
the Internet Society (ISOC) in 1992, where each body or working group was assigned a 
special task under the supervision of the internally appointed administrative staff and 
volunteers.20 The transfer of authority to ISOC in 1992 was an important step towards 
international participation on standard setting and the privatisation of the institutional 
arrangements, even though the institutions continued to be based in the US for some 
time to come.21  
Given that the Internet requires the international telecommunications framework as its 
physical backbone, the role of one of the oldest international organisations, the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), especially its “Standardization Sector” 
(ITU-T), in Internet regulation is noteworthy.22 Through its wide ranging membership 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ISOC is the international non-profit organisation in charge of the financial and legal aid for 
the operations of IETF, IESG, and Internet Architecture Board. For an overview of the 
institutional hierarchy in place within ISOC, see P. Hoffman “the TAO of IETF.” Ibid., at  
Section 2.2.  
21 The IETF met in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in July 1993. This was the first IETF 
meeting held in Europe, and the US/non-US attendee split was nearly 50/50. The IETF first 
met in Asia (in Adelaide, Australia) in 2000. Until 1995, the US government maintained most 
legal and financial responsibility of the Internet core resources, albeit through changing 
departments and institutions.  
22 ITU operates as a specialised agency of the UN, and its role in regulating international 
telecommunications is really important. This is especially the case since the deregulatory 
movement regarding the telecommunications industries, where national control over 
telecommunication has largely been removed internationally. See J. G. Wexler, “International 
Telecommunications Law in the Post-Deregulatory Landscape--Foreword.” Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, 2002: 737-738.  
It is in this deregulated and denationalised framework that the role of institutions such as ITU 
gains importance. I should however note here that this deregulation and privatisation of 
telecommunications was not universal and there are exceptions to the trend. In many countries 
like Iran, China and Russia direct and indirect control over telecommunications has grown. For 
a brief overview of ITU’s international vision and mandate see 
http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/vision.aspx (accessed August 9, 2014). 
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(including states, sectors and associates23), it develops “non-binding technical 
recommendations serving as standards within all telecommunication fields.”24 ITU’s 
role seems to be gaining in importance in recent years, especially since the rapid growth 
in wireless communications, and broadband services. Yet ITU remains the only UN 
body with indirect regulatory control over the Internet infrastructure, a role which is 
often (increasingly) promoted by many state actors for increased intergovernmental 
control. 
Since the beginning of the Internet (i.e. inter-networking of computers and networks 
through TCP/IP), numeric identifiers were needed for the protocols to operate, and the 
body in charge of their assignment was the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA).25 In addition, the registry of the assigned addresses was performed by the 
Network Information Centre (NIC) at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). By the late 
1980s and the early 1990s the IANA/NIC arrangement was under a significant amount 
of pressure, with dramatic increases in the number of hosts connected through/to the 
Internet and the expansion of the Domain Name System (DNS).26 In 1991, through a 
proposal by the IAB, the functions of NIC were delegated to Government Systems 
Inc., which in turn outsourced to a private company called Network Solutions. 
However the move by IAB to outsource registry to a private company was combined 
with probably the most important invention in the history of the Internet, the creation 
of the World Wide Web (WWW), which caused a great stir in the institutional 
arrangements within the US regarding the governance of DNS.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “Associates” refers to equipment companies and manufacturers, and ICT providers.   
24 J. Kulesza, International Internet Law. Supra note 8. 
25This function was fulfilled mainly by John Postel in the Information Science Institute (ISI), 
under a contractual arrangement with the Department of Commerce.  See V. Cerf, “IAB 
Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identifier Assignment [RFC 1174].” IETF. 
August 1990. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1174 (accessed August 11, 2014). 
26 The Domain Name System is an addressing system used for turning IP addresses (which are 
composed of a series of numbers) into alphanumerical addresses which are easier to remember 
and access.   
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With the creation of the WWW at the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN) in 1990,27 came an unprecedented potential for the Internet to be available to 
people’s homes and businesses. Tim Berners-Lee and his associates developed the first 
versions of Internet browsers and Web servers.28 Although before 1995 the number of 
Web servers grew gradually, the availability of the Internet backbone to private carriers 
caused an explosion in the number of servers from 200 in 1992 to over two million in 
1999. Needless to say, with the increase in the services and information provided online, 
the number of users grew rapidly as well, not just within the US, but internationally.29 
With this increase in numbers came an increase in the DNS registrations, and hence an 
increased pressure on ISI and the newly outsourced NSI. This in turn led to more 
institutionalisation, as standards for further development and accessibility of this 
application were sought. The result was the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), a 
non-profit organisation based in the US with offices around the world, which “seeks to 
promote standards for the evolution of the Web and interoperability between WWW 
products.”30 Although it is deemed “industry specific”, W3C plays (to date) an 
important role in ensuring smooth, everyday access to the Internet as we know it.   
The creation of WWW and the need for expanding the DNS led to an institutional tug 
of war which (albeit unsuccessfully) brought ITU and WIPO close to the uncharted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The World Wide Web is often wrongly treated as a synonym of the Internet, whereas it is an 
application which links documents and information available on the Internet. In other words it 
operates via the Internet. For an accessible and relatively non-technical account of the World 
Wide Web, in its inventor’s words, see T. Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and 
the Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web. New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2000.     
28 Web servers are the hardware and software that are used in the process of delivering content 
through the Internet.  
29 The number of world Internet users grew from 16 million in 1995 to 248 million in 1999. 
This rapid growth was due to the expansion of the “information superhighway” by a number of 
states during the late 1990s. For statistics on Internet user growth rates see Internet World Stats. 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (accessed August 9, 2014). 
30 A. Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment [hereinafter “Regulation of 
Cyberspace”]. New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007: 88 , note 46. I should also point out that 
W3C was not a purely American institution and was a result of cross Atlantic cooperation 
between MIT Laboratory for Computer Science in the United States and the Institut national de 
recherché en informatique et en automatique in France. 
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territory of direct Internet governance. In 1994, Postel proposed the considerable 
expansion of the Top Level Domains (TLDs) under the general management of the 
newly established Internet Society;31 a move which was strongly opposed by NSI and 
the US government.32 Faced with a strong opposition, Postel moved to the 
International Telecommunication Union as a base for bringing together, a form of 
private-public partnership on Internet governance. This is arguably the first attempt at a 
multistakeholder approach to Internet governance. Yet again this move was also 
opposed by the US government, even though a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
was signed by an Interim Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC),33 through which a Policy 
Oversight Committee was to be in charge of management of Internet core resources. 
Even though the role of ITU in regulating the Internet as a traditional international legal 
body was short lived, the ITU secretary general saw it as a “turning point in 
International law.”34   
Following the US Government’s move to block the IAHC’s MoU, the former proposed 
the privatisation of the management of the Internet’s core resources. The EU was also 
behind the US in this, even though they opposed the sole dominance of the US in this 
“privatisation” and argued that “international interests” should be taken into account.35 
The Green Paper proposing this privatisation had principles of stability, competition 
and bottom-up policy development at its heart,36 and with Postel’s support led to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Top Level Domains refer to dominant domain names such as .com, .org and .net.  
32 Given that until then the management of the Root Server and the main gTLDs was given to 
Network Solutions Inc. (NSI), Postel’s move was not welcomed by the US government. 
Lobbied by NSI, the DoC interfered and stopped the expansion of the gTLDs under Internet 
Society. 
33 The Committee consisted of the ITU, IAB, IANA, ISOC, and WIPO. 
34 W. Kleinwachter, “Beyond ICANN vs. ITU: Will WSIS Open New Territory for Internet 
Governance?” In Internet Governance: A Grand Collaboration, edited by Don Maclean. New York: 
United Nations ICT Task Force, 2004: 36. 
35 See generally F.C. Mayer, “Europe and the Internet: The Old World and the New Medium.” 
European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000): 149-169. 
36 NTIA. “A Proposal to Improve Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses 
(The "Green Paper").” NTIA. 30 January 1998. 
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establishment of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN). 
States were kept out of direct control over ICANN as it was conceived as a 
multistakeholder organisation under private sector leadership. However UN member 
states were given the opportunity to give advice through the medium of the 
Government Advisory Committee (GAC).37 ICANN until today is primarily responsible 
for the standardisation of the DNS and the Internet’s addressing infrastructure and as a 
result it holds great sway over the Internet’s technical coordination and standard setting. 
This includes IP number and root name server system’s coordination, domain dispute 
resolution, and “promoting fair competition at TLD level.”38 Though its decisions were 
(and still are) consensus based and its membership consists of non-state actors, 
ICANN’s reputation (especially until September 2009 and the coming into force of the 
“Affirmation of Commitments”39) has been muddied by its historical links to the US 
government (DoC).40 This relation has often put the transnational and non-
governmental nature of this institution into question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dnsdrft.htm (accessed September 8, 2014). 
37 On the scope and scale of the GAC’s work see generally ICANN. “About the GAC.” 
Government Advisory Committee. https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/About+The+GAC 
(accessed August 9, 2014). 
38 For an overview of the organisational details of ICANN see J. Kulesza. International Internet 
Law. Supra note 8, at 128-133. See also http://www.icann.org/en/about (accessed September 
11, 2014) 
39 This document is a significant step which “purports to recast the public-private relationship at 
the heart of the management of the domain name system (“DNS”).” For an in depth analysis of 
this document and its effect on the state of ICANN, see M. A. Froomkin, “Almost Free: An 
Analysis of ICANN's 'Affirmation of Commitments'.” Journal of Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 9 (2011): 187-234. 
40 On the consensus based decision making see M.A. Froomkin, 
“HABERMAS@DISCOURSE.NET: Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace.” Harvard Law 
Review 116 (2003): 756-757. For an example of the critique of US influence over ICANN see 
address made on 4 May 2009, by the EU Commissioner of the Information Society and Media, 
V. Reding, “The Future of Internet Governance: Towards an Accountable ICANN.” Internet 
Society: India Chennai. 4 May 2009. www.isocindiachennai.org/?p=83 (accessed September 8, 
2014).  
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Therefore the establishment of ICANN marked a significant point of departure from 
the previous efforts because of its multistakeholder and largely private organisation, 
with states acting only as advisers. The realisation of the unprecedented use of and 
participation on/in the Internet by a wide range of actors, called for a governance 
method whereby the stakeholders in the Internet take part in policy making processes. 
This approach shaped most efforts at Internet governance in the first decade of the 
twenty first century. However before looking at the important developments of the 
following decade, I shall point to the governance and regulation of Internet content, 
which mainly developed from mid-1990s onwards with a significant role for 
governmental and inter-governmental regulation.  
2.2.2.  The Emergence  o f  Internet  Content  Regulat ion 
Prior to the commercialisation and the sudden expansion of Internet users, the limited 
number of active users of computer networking meant that content was largely a matter 
of community self-regulation. Content and online interaction was mostly governed by 
(rough) consensus over shared values and online communities’ communications were 
generally (self-)regulated through what came to be known as “netiquette”.  Netiquette 
was a set of conventions amongst members interacting or contributing to online 
communities such as discussion forums and message boards, and whose origins could 
be traced back to the early days of the Internet amongst the researchers and academics. 
Although they were more formalised as a response to the new unfamiliar members in 
the early nineties,41 norms and conventions relating to content retained their form as 
soft regulation.42  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See S. Hambridge, “Netiquette Guidelines [RFC1855].” IETF. October 1995. 
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1855.txt (accessed August 11, 2014). 
42 A. Murray, Regulation of Cyberspace. Supra note 30, at 143. For an in depth analysis of 
community regulation and their role in the development of cyberspace see 126-164.   
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Even though netiquette remains important in cyberspace,43 the widely accessible (at least 
within the developed world) and commercialised Internet content raised concerns 
amongst policy makers and scholars alike on the national and international levels. Until 
the end of the decade the main issues regarding content were largely related to 
intellectual property, harmful material and data privacy. In other words the issues of 
content regulation were framed by efforts first, to protect intellectual property, second, 
to balance free speech with the regulation of “harmful” content and third, to control 
access and use of personal data. These three areas of law proved to be areas where 
international efforts at governance and dispute resolution saw the most success in the 
years to come. 
First, with the arrival of commercial and personal use of the Internet came a perceived 
need for unique domain names, and with that an increasing number of disputes over 
these unique names. Most of the early disputes came to be known as cases of 
“cybersquatting”, which involves individuals or organisations registering domain names 
containing the exact (or similar) trademark or personal names, with the intention of 
selling them at a higher price (either back to the trademark owner or a third party). As a 
result of increasing problems with cybersquatting, courts took most of the brunt of 
dealing with such issues, relying mainly on running trademarks laws.44 It was not until 
late 1990s that specific laws such as the US Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act were passed.45 In other countries, the authorities could only apply protections to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Note that I am using cyberspace here in the context of online social interaction and 
communication which are enabled through the de-centred structure of the Internet, which are 
often referred to merely as “content”. 
44 For a piece regarding “how established principles of trademark law may be applied to 
resolve” domain name controversies see D. L. Burk, “Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First 
Look at the Emerging Law of Cybermarks.” Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 1, no. 1 
(1995). 
45 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) [1999]  
	  
	  
Page | 53 
trademark holders regarding cybersquatting of ccTLDs.46 A similar move to regulation 
was made with regards to the protection of copyrighted materials, made available 
through the increased availability of software and technology. In 1995, this concern was 
dealt with first by the US DoC’s “Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights”.  
The proposed solution was legislation to reinforce the traditional copyright laws. The 
No Electronic Theft Act (1997) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (1998) were 
US examples.47 However the main issues were just in the making towards the end of the 
decade with the increase in file sharing technologies known as “peer-to-peer” which to 
date pose serious challenges to governments and copyright holders across the globe.   
But more important than domestic regulatory developments is the role of international 
law (albeit in a limited fashion) in the nascent stages of this technological, social and 
legal field. Bodies such as the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) were most important in the regulation of copyright 
and intellectual property. Although the two WIPO Copyright Treaties (the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty) are not directly 
aimed at the Internet, they require signatories to “provide adequate and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective techonological measures that are used 
by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights.”48 These treaties are believed 
to be “indisputable example[s] of international treaty based, top down, development of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The authorities who regulate the country code TLDs are generally not-for-profit 
organizations. In some cases (e.g. Australia) these organisations grew out of the sheer expansion 
of the number of domain names by the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s and the 
failure of one person to process and manage them. Other examples of Trademark restriction on 
domain names (for preventing cybersquatting) include the Canadian Internet Registration 
Authority (CIRA). It should be noted here that this was before TLDs such as .com and .org 
became available worldwide to anyone at a set price.  
47 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act [1997]; Digital Millennium Copyright Act [1998] 
48 WIPO Copyright Treaty [1996] T.Doc. 105-17, 36 ILM 65: Art. 11; WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty [1996], T.Doc. 105-17, 36 ILM 76: Art. 18.   
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legal norms regarding the Internet.”49 Other international arrangements affecting the IP 
and copyright issues of the Internet include the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which not only sets out minimum rules 
and standards of protection, but also seeks to extend the dispute settlement regimes of 
WTO to the Internet.50 Similarly, whilst this agreement is not directed at the Internet, it 
importantly “extends the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO” to the field of the 
Internet.51	  
Second, by 1996 the filtering of indecent material, especially child pornography, became 
a concern that was to be tackled both by constitutional law and innovative technology. 
The US Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) as the Title V of the 
Telecommunications Act. CDA was meant to criminalise sending or making available of 
“comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in 
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”52 Other countries 
followed suit and adopted similar legislation. The same kind of concern regarding 
availability of (mainly) sexually explicit material to children, led to moves within the EU 
to deal with the issue. These efforts led to the adoption of the European Commission 
Communication on Illegal and Harmful Content on the Internet,53and the European 
Commission Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 A. Segura-Serrano, “Internet Regulation and the Role of International Law [hereinafter 
“Internet and Internetional Law”].” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 10 (2006): 210. 
See also J. Hughes, “The Internet and the Persistence of Law.” Boston College Law Review 44, no. 
2 (2003): 373-376.  
50 WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [1994], 33 ILM 
1197.  
51 TRIPPS entered into force in 1995, and extended “the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTO” to the IP field. This extension is argued to also apply to Internet related issues. See 
Segura-Serrano, “Internet and International Law.” Supra note 49, at 211.  
52 Communication Decency Act [1996].  
53 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions [1996] (EC) COM (96) 487 
final.  
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Audiovisual and Information Services (also1996).54 Following the lead of the EU and 
the US, other countries around the globe took steps towards bringing explicit/indecent 
material under some form of regulation.55  
Despite these initiatives, the cross border and open access availability of data and 
information online inevitably caused international disputes fraught with jurisdictional 
complexities at their heart.56 The first and often cited case of cross jurisdictional 
regulatory conflict culminated in the CompuServe case of 1998.57 This case was a clear 
example of a clash between protections of data in the state where the website is 
“located” (the US) and the legislation of the receiving state (Germany) where such data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Green Paper on the Protection of Minors and Human Dignity in Audiovisual and 
Information Services [1996] EU Com (96) 483 final. 
55 The most dramatic move in 1996 was by China which adopted a law regarding Internet 
regulation, and required “all existing computer networks to liquidate and re-register all Internet 
providers, and to route these through the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.” Another 
interesting take on this is the French example where the State preferred the Internet to be 
regulated as a broadcasting medium. Until the year 2005, the only example of a regulation for 
access providers in France was their “obligation [...] to offer technology to their customers to 
filter content.” For an overview on the early attempts (or lack thereof in the case of India) at 
regulating “obscene publications” see A. Kamal, The Law of Cyberspace: An Invitation to the Table of 
Negotiations. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2005: 121-127.    
56 Debates surrounding jurisdiction were central to the early (and continuing) debates between 
exceptionalists and non-exceptionalists. See notes 2-5 of this chapter and the accompanying 
text. More generally on jurisdiction and the “global era”, see P.S. Berman, “Towards a 
Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a Global Era.” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153 (2005): 1819-1882. 
57 The first case filed in Munich by the public prosecutor at the end of 1995, was regarding 
“provision by CompuServe Deutschland (a 100 per cent subsidiary of CompuServe U.S.) of 
access to publicly available violence, child pornography and bestiality” accessible via the 
“newsgroups” in Germany. See G. Grainger, “Freedom of Expression and Regulation of 
Information in Cyberspace: Issues Concerning Potential International Cooperation Principles 
for Cyberspace.” INFOEthics ‘98: Ethical, Legal and Societal Challenges of Cyberspace. Monte Carlo: 
Australian Broadcasting Authority, 1998: 21. CompuServe initially blocked access to the 
newsgroups globally, and faced criticism from within the US of “having infringed the freedom 
of speech and the freedom of the press.” Access was restored after parental control software 
was provided to subscribers. However given that the access of such content by adults was also 
unlawful, Felix Somm, the managing director of CompuServe Germany at the time, was 
convicted and a two year suspended sentence was imposed. However this sentence was later 
appealed and overturned as the judge was understood to have misapplied the appropriate 
German Internet legislation which frees service providers from criminal liability from content 
stored on their servers. See LG München (Munich Court of Appeals) [2000] 1051 NJW 53. On 
the challenges of this case for law see U. Sieber, “Criminal Liability for the Transfer of Data in 
International Networks - New Challenges for the Internet - Part 1.” Computer Law and Security 
Report 13, no. 3 (1997): 151-157.   
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might be deemed illegal, indecent and prohibited. Even though conflict of laws are 
inevitable in some situations of cross border information access, regulation of (harmful) 
content was not unique to cross border jurisdictional issues and considerable 
uncertainty existed even on a national scale. This became most visible in the US 
Supreme Court’s first Internet related case, Reno v American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
1997, in which the anti-indecency provisions of the CDA were dismissed and were 
deemed unconstitutional due to the protection bestowed on free speech by the First 
Amendment.58 The consequences of this decision had international importance. Since 
the Internet’s main infrastructure and data originated in the US, domestic legislation 
regarding “harmful content” had implications for users beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of US. Indeed, it made international regulation of Internet content 
(especially aspects related to freedom of speech) extremely difficult, since data stored on 
a server within the US enjoys First Amendment protection.59  
Third, a final area of regulatory concern in the period discussed here is the issue of 
privacy. Although the challenges of technologies and computers have for a long while 
been a subject of widespread interest, the Internet posed novel challenges for privacy.60 
The widespread availability of personal computers by the mid1990s meant that issues 
such as profiling and data mining, using personal data stored online for commercial or 
personal purposes, became massively important as a public policy concern. Each 
country (or region in case of EU) had (and still has) a different approach towards 
protection/regulation of privacy, and this was no different when dealing with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [1997] 521 US 844.   
59 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Coming to Grips with the Present Dangers 
[hereinafter “Uses and Abuses”].” In Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, edited by 
Antonio Cassese, 496-507. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
60 For early accounts of privacy concern, see for example H. Jr. Kalven, “The Problems of 
Privacy in the Year 2000.” Daedalus 96, no. 3 (1967): 876-882. (Predicting normative changes as 
a result of technological expansion). See also A. Miller, “Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: 
The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information Oriented Society.” Michigan Law Review 
67, no. 6 (1969): 1089-1246. 
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Internet. In the US the vision was formed by the combination of First Amendment 
principles,61 and a market based approach promoting sector specific self-regulation,62 
whereas the EU treated privacy largely as a civil rights issue requiring protection and 
empowerment through the State, hence a whole array of data protection laws.63 Even 
though such long lasting approaches to privacy existed, there were a number of 
important developments in this period as a result of the expansion of the Internet.  
Even though most of the regulation of privacy occurred on a domestic level, this period 
also saw the development of some legal arrangements with an 
international/extraterritorial scope. Most important was the move by the European 
Community’s Data Protection Directive prohibiting data transfer from EU to “third 
countries” unless “an adequate level of protection” of personal data is provided.64 This 
was significant since whilst addressed to European states, its effects went beyond 
European boundaries and included, most importantly, the flow of data to the US. 
Strictly speaking this is not a development in international law per se, but, as shall be 
explained, was an initiative important for further developments of the international legal 
framework concerned with the Internet. To sum up this section, the initial engagements 
of law with the Internet and cyberspace were of a largely regulatory nature.65 On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 According to the First Amendment of the US Constitution “Congress shall make no law [...] 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press [...]” The US Constitution can be accessed on 
www.constitutionus.com (accessed June 6, 2014) 
62 On the early articulations of the US approach see generally J. R. Reidenberg, “Resolving 
Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace.” Stanford Law Review 52 (1999): 
1315-1371. 
63 For example one can point to the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data [1981] ETS 108 (US not a 
signatory). For an early analysis and overview of the European (both country specific and 
regional) data protection regulations see P.M. Schwartz, “European Data Protection Law and 
Restrictions on International Data Flows.” Iowa Law Review 80 (1995): 471-496.  
64 Council of Europe and the European Parliament Directive (EC) 95/46/EC on the Protection 
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data [1995] OJ L.281.   
65 The regulation of the Internet from the states or institutions are in addition to industry 
specific standards and community self governance. See generally D. Tambini, et al., Codifying 
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side of Code and infrastructure, the period from 1985-1998 was characterised by a need 
for further infrastructural, technological and institutional expansion framed by efforts 
within the US (government and business sector) to keep standard setting and backbone 
management an American affair. This was done through mostly private entities, purpose 
built institutions and the research community. In other words Code became more and 
more institutionalised, standardised and regulated; a considerable change given the 
previously ad-hoc management of the Internet. Even more important for my analysis is 
the relationship between law and Internet content and the logic of the legal engagement 
behind it. In situations where conflict of laws does not apply as a method of application 
of national laws, states tend to target certain forms of content through direct and 
indirect regulation. The period under analysis in this section is one where censorship (or 
filtering) of content is largely absent from states’ agendas.  
During the period discussed in this section (1985-1998), initially in domestic law and 
consequently international law, content was treated as a problem requiring a regulatory 
response. This was dealt with through a combination of court cases (nationally), dispute 
settlement mechanisms (internationally), and national and inter-governmental 
regulation. In the following decade or so, the initial trends of legal engagement with the 
Internet largely continued. Institutional expansion persisted and took a 
“multistakeholder” and global tone to it, while a dramatic expansion in the scope and 
scale of global Internet, also meant more issues to deal with and manage legally in terms of 
content on the national and inter-state levels. In other words efforts at offering a better 
regulatory framework continued to inform most legal engagement with the Internet and 
international law only appeared rarely and around areas where shortcomings of national 
regulation were felt. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cyberspace: Communications Self-regulation in the Age of Internet Convergence. New York: Routledge, 
2008. 
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2.3. “New” Understandings of “Internet Governance”: 1998 to 2012  
2.3.1.  Consol idat ion o f  Mult i s takeholder i sm 
By 1998, a transnational yet disjointed Internet governance mechanism (institutional, 
national and at times international) was in place. But given the increased number of 
institutions in charge, the unprecedented expansion of governmental, commercial and 
personal use around the globe,66 and the growing concerns over its management, an 
inclusive form of cooperative governance was needed.67 With the growing speed of 
expansion (especially in the developing states) and a “bottom-up” ethos present in the 
regulation and standardisation of Code since very early days, centralisation of 
governance was neither a viable nor a desirable option. In other words as a result of 
seeing the Internet as a technology that can bring both cross-border harm (cybersecurity 
concerns) and benefits (development), and cyberspace as a space where governments 
and/or the private sector are clearly not the only stakeholders/participants/users, a 
multistakeholder approach to Internet governance  emerged. Marzouki argues that the 
multistakeholder approach “acknowledge[s] that [production and application of Internet 
norms] are both parts of a continuous and dialectic, mutually transforming process.”68 
Multistakeholderism as a governance model culminated in the establishment of the 
Internet Governance Forum in 2005 and continues to play an important (and disputed) 
role to date.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See supra note 29.  
67 Jeremy Malcolm calls the governance system before multistakeholderism “an odd patchwork 
of United States government fiat, decentralised private action and ad hoc national and 
international regulation.” For an in depth analysis of the reasons behind the multistakeholder 
approach and its development see generally J. Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the 
Internet Governance Forum [hereinafter “Multistakeholder Governance”]. Perth: Terminus Press, 2008.  
68 M. Marzouki, “European Internet Policies Between Regulation and Governance: Issues with 
Content Regulation.” In Internet Governance and the Information Society: Global Perspectives and 
European Dimensions, by Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bauer and Matthias C. Kettemann (eds.). 
Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2008: 134.  
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After the burst of the dot-com bubble in the year 2000,69 the coming to power of the 
Bush Administration and the September 11 attacks, the face of Internet governance 
changed in the US and so did the relationship between the GAC and ICANN. This 
change was towards more national concerns about cybersecurity (a legacy which still 
haunts many governments’ relationship with cyberspace and the Internet to the day). 
The result was a rebalancing of power from the private sector, towards governments in 
GAC. Even though governments in general were given some more de facto rights with 
respect to ICANN decisions, the US still kept renewing the MoU with ICANN, and 
effectively kept an oversight over its actions and decision. This renewed US dominance, 
in addition to the growing concerns over the economic, security and content related 
aspects of the Internet, resulted in reactions mainly from developing countries, initiated 
by China.70 Reactions from the EU regarding increasing American control were also 
present.71 These controversial debates became explicit in the running up to the UN 
sponsored World Summit on Information Society in 2003, which marked a significant 
moment in the history of global Internet governance.   
In the run up to the First WSIS Conference in Geneva,72 and in reaction to the 
increased powers of ICANN under the new by-laws, China and the majority of 
developing countries called for an International Treaty Body and the formation of an 
International Internet Organisation.73 At this stage there was no unified definition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 The dot-com bubble refers to a speculative bubble that was based on the expansion of new 
Internet based companies 1997-2000. This rapid expansion was partly because of the invention 
of the WWW. Between late 1999 and 2001, a significant number of these companies ceased to 
be traded on the stock exchange simply due to running out of capital. For an analysis of the 
events and aftermath see C. Alden, “Looking Back on the Crash.” The Guardian. 10 March 2005. 
www.theguardian.com/technology/2005/mar/10/newmedia.media (accessed August 10, 2014). 
70 D.P. Fidler, “Internet Governance and International Law: The Controversy Concerning 
Revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations [hereinafter “The 
Controversy”].” ASIL Insights 17, no. 6 (February 2013). 
71 Ibid.  
72 The first World Summit on Information Society was organised by the International 
Telecommunications Union.  
73 D.P. Fidler, “The Controversy.” Supra note 70  
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Internet governance, and it was then that the narrow/broad methods of regulation were 
branded.74 In the Geneva process US and EU supported a narrow, Code/infrastructure 
focused approach, whereas China and the Group of 77 wanted Government leadership 
in a broad sense,75 i.e. making Internet content and use a matter of governmental and 
inter-governmental public policy. In the end both sides compromised on the 
establishment of the “Working Group on Internet Governance” (WGIG) to provide a 
definition of IG and identify roles and responsibilities of the main stakeholder groups. 
The majority of members were non-governmental. WGIG proposed that the Internet 
should not be governed by a single entity and promoted a multistakeholder approach 
that has been hailed as “setting a new norm of customary international law.”76 It further 
proposed the formation of the “Internet Governance Forum” (IGF) as a discussion space 
for Internet governance.77 However, WGIG did not agree on the role of US 
government and its oversight over ICANN and TLDs.   
Eventually the WGIG proposals became the basis for the Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom3) for the Tunis Conference in 2005. Before the new negotiations however, 
the US used the rhetoric of “security and stability” to justify and maintain its control 
over the core Internet resources. So far the only aspect of Internet governance which 
has been relinquished to the sovereign state is the management of the ccTLDs, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Narrow regulation refers to the regulation of infrastructure and Code, whereas broad 
regulation/governance includes both infrastructure and content. On different models of 
regulation, see L.B. Solum, “Models of Internet Governance.” In Internet Governance: Infrastructure 
and Institutions, edited by L. A. Bygrave and John Bing, 48-91. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009. 
75 Group of 77 is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1964 at UN, by seventy 
seven developing members of the UN. For a full description see The Group of 77. About the 
Group of 77. www.g77.org/doc (accessed August 11, 2014). 
76 J. Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the Internet Governance Forum. Perth: Terminus Press, 
2008: 322.  
77 WGIG. “Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance.” Château de Bossey, 2005. 
http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf (accessed August 20, 2014).  
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the US recognised before the negotiations.78 This recognition played a vital role in 
easing the developing countries’ worries regarding the US’s control over the national 
Internet policies. As a result, China, Brazil and India (three of the main players of the 
developing world) stopped insisting on an international Internet treaty/organisation.  
During all these negotiations, the US voiced a fear of a UN “take over of the Internet” 
(a “fear” which is alive to date).79 This was not just in reaction to proposals by the 
developing countries. This reaction was also visible in relation to the EU’s proposals for 
an increased role for governments at the “level of principle”.80 As a result, heated 
debates occurred at the highest political and diplomatic levels, and it took many 
meetings, letters and declarations against the idea of a “UN takeover” (inter-
governmentalisation of Internet governance) to ease the tension and make way for the 
final negotiations in Tunis. The emergence of the Tunis Agenda, through the second 
phase of the WSIS, was a clear consolidation of multistakeholder approaches to Internet 
governance, with two important achievements, the establishment of the IGF, and 
agreeing on a definition of Internet governance.81    
The request by the Summit to the UN Secretary-General to convene the Internet 
Governance Forum in an open and inclusive process was the most important outcome 
of the WSIS process. It was significant for two main reasons. First, IGF was meant as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Country-code Top Level Domains are TLDs which specific to each country and their 
administration is given to “a manager that supervises the domain names and operates the 
domain name system in that country.” See J. Postel, “Domain Name System Structure and 
Delegation [RFC1591].” IETF. March 1994. https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1591.txt (accessed 
August 11, 2014). 
79 Given the bottom up sensibility behind the governance of the Internet, especially in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, the persistent calls for the UN/governmental oversight of 
the Internet have raised alarms amongst many, especially in the Western/developed world. 
These fears have certainly been exacerbated by the recent grown role of the ITU in the Internet 
governance process. See D.P. Fidler, “The Controversy.” Supra note 70. 
80 See W. Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance.” Supra note 10, at 59. See also 
Appendix 1.     
81 The process of coming up with such a definition dated back to before the WSIS 2003, and 
especially the WGIG report.  
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substitute for the proposed (and failed) intergovernmental body demanded in the 
negotiation process, which recognised the role of governments in Internet governance. 
Secondly, it became a multistakeholder (high level) platform, with no decision making 
capacity, the messages of which could be used by different organisations (private and 
public) in charge of decision making.82 Instead of a mandate for decision making and 
direct regulation, the role of the IGF was to be facilitative, advisory and promoting 
regarding a wide range of issues, ranging from security and robustness of the Internet, 
to public policy regarding everyday use and misuse of the Internet. Even though IGF 
did not have any direct law making capacity, it was embedded in the larger “regulation 
obsessed” sensibility behind multistakeholder governance, as a mechanism through 
which the regulators and standard setters meet and make their regulation better suited 
to the global character of the Internet as a technological challenge. 
The sensibility behind the establishment of the IGF was also visible in the second most 
important achievement of the Tunis Conference, i.e. agreement over a definition of 
Internet governance. According to the 2005 Tunis Agenda, “a working definition of 
Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet.”83 In this mechanism, the responsibilities of the bodies and institutions 
mentioned in the previous section to regulate and make policies were reaffirmed with 
the IGF as a forum where all stakeholders make contributions to the wider decision 
making processes. In addition, governments were given a somewhat conditional 
responsibility for Internet governance in times when “ensuring the stability, security and 
continuity of the Internet” is at issue. This was in addition to the explicit recognition of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 ICANN, IETF (standards and Code), ITU (infrastructure), UNESCO (multilingualism).  
83 WSIS. Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E, Tunis: ITU, 
2005. http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (accessed August 20, 2014) 
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their “rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues,”84 
which in effect delegated content regulation to national (and at times international) 
authorities.85    
In WSIS, actors showed that they were open to compromise to some extent and this 
made the future of global Internet governance look promising, in terms of possible 
“enhanced cooperation” within the multistakeholder framework. Moreover in the years 
following the Tunis meeting, ICANN’s relationship started a process of transformation 
which eventually came to an end in 2009 with ICANN becoming fully independent.86 In 
other words government control was removed from the core resources of the Internet, 
including the root servers and DNS management. ICANN also began creating regional 
offices/liaisons, entering into relations with the ccTLD managers and regional 
organisations. This was with the intention of improving its relation with the GAC (UN 
member states advising ICANN; non-binding). Even now that the direct influence of 
the DoC has been removed, the continued registration and existence of the institution 
in California might put a shadow of doubt over the political and cultural independence 
of its technical duties. However, ICANN’s role in Internet governance is best 
understood as an example of hybrid governance.87	  
It is noteworthy that in the process of development of Internet governance and the 
multi-stakeholder approaches, certain discourses were more prominent. On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Ibid., at par 35(a).  
85 See next section.  
86 ICANN finally achieved “full independence” in October 2009 by signing the Affirmations of 
Commitments. See ICANN “Affirmation of Commitments.” ICANN. 30 September 2009. 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en (accessed 
August 11, 2014).   
87 Currently this hybrid is mainly seen as one between self governance and 
international/transnational regulation. However before AoC was signed in September 2009, 
many scholars counted ICANN as a three way hybrid which included national (US) control and 
influence as well. See for instance A. Segura-Serrano, “Internet and International Law.” Supra 
note 49, at 200. See also H.H. Jr. Perritt,. “The Internet is Changing the Public International 
Legal System.” Kentucky Law Journal 88 (2000): 954.  
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hand, international Internet governance took a clear developmental tone to itself in 
both Geneva and Tunis Agendas, which put it in line with similar trends within 
international law regarding global development (economic, environmental, etc.).88 Focus 
on issues such as equal access, “digital divide” and telecommunications infrastructure in 
developing countries are indicative of this turn.89 On the other hand, Internet security 
and cyber warfare became a central concern for governments worldwide. However 
regardless of how many “categories” of actors were included and how many areas were 
addressed, multistakeholder approaches to governance only reinforced the regulation 
oriented approach of law towards the Internet and cyberspace. Clearly one area in 
which multistakeholderism has not yet made its presence solidly felt is in dealing with 
content, which is still largely seen as desirably and feasibly within the reach of national 
government regulation and enforcement. What this section demonstrates is that 
regardless of whether we see it as purely “inter-governmental” and rules based, or more 
inclusive and diversified, international law is sought as a solution to the expansion of 
technological innovations as objects of regulation.  
2.3.2.  Content  Regulat ion  
Even though issues regarding content appear here and there in the IGF process as 
matters of public policy, most content regulation, as with the previous period analysed, 
remain within the framework of domestic law, and jurisdictional disputes are resolved 
through conflict of laws. However since my focus is mainly on issues of transnational 
and international governance, apart from the continuities and the emergence of 
important court cases, one should also point to the developments (albeit limited) in the 
role of international law (specifically intergovernmental) in the regulation of online 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 This was parallel to the development and unfolding of the Millennium Development Goals in 
the early 2000s.   
89 A glance at the agendas of each IGF meeting and the topics of their working groups will 
demonstrate this nicely. For example see IGF. IGF 2012 - 'Internet Governance for Sustainable 
Human, Economic and Social Development'. Baku: United Nations, 2012. 
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content.  Although this period saw an expansion of regulation into new areas (e.g. e-
commerce),90 I will focus again on developments regarding the three areas of content 
discussed in the previous section. Developments in these areas are indicative of 
changing approaches regarding data and content regulation.  
Copyright and intellectual property continued being major issues for regulation. The 
expansion of file sharing and widespread availability of copyrighted material on 
different websites available to all added to the complications. The only implementable 
solution for governments continued to be either blocking and filtering websites and 
softwares that make illegal access to copyrighted material possible, or to leave the 
copyright disputes to the courts.91 Even though there is a modicum of international 
consensus over the importance of protecting intellectual property, to date regulation 
and legal approaches have proved very ineffective in preventing large scale access to 
copyrighted materials on the Internet. Despite all the difficulties however, copyright 
remains an area where scholars seem optimistic about a possible role of some sort of 
international legal harmonization.92   
The continuing (and growing) significance of American stakeholders in the Internet, 
gives court cases involving American actors a global significance. Probably the most 
significant series of cases occurred in early 2000s and they are often referred to as the 
Yahoo! case(s).93 These cases concerned a dispute between a French anti-racism 
campaign group (LIRCA) and Yahoo! Inc. regarding the availability of Nazi 
memorabilia on the latter’s auction website. Sale of memorabilia from the Nazi period is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See for instance Council of Europe and the European Parliament Directive (EC) 
2000/31/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178. [Hereinafter “the E-Commerce Directive”]  
91 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. [2001] 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir) 
92 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses.” Supra note 59, at 507. See also A. Segura-Serrano, “Internet 
and International Law.” Supra note 49. 
93 For an insightful set of reflections on the Yahoo! Case with respect to different conflict of 
laws issues see the collection of papers in Special Feature on Cyberage Conflicts Law in Michigan 
Journal of International Law 24, no. 3 (2003): 663-766.  
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illegal in France. Therefore, the LICRA sued Yahoo! and following expert advice the 
court ordered Yahoo! to block access to the web pages displaying the banned goods for 
French users.94 This decision was challenged by Yahoo! in the US and the District Court 
found that the French court had no jurisdiction over Yahoo!.95 The decision was reversed 
in 2004 by the Court of Appeals,96 which argued that “the California Court had no 
personal jurisdiction over French parties and the France had every right to hold Yahoo! 
accountable in France.”97 In this process, important principles regarding the applicability 
of domestic laws to online action and content developed. In this case France’s right to 
apply its national laws to the occurrence of the harmful events inside France was 
recognised. In other words the application of the laws of the “receiver country” was 
recognised. This is also of international significance since a similar approach has been 
taken by other countries.98  
In the same period (the early 2000s), probably one of the most significant developments 
in the role of international (intergovernmental) law in Internet (content) regulation 
occurred. The 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the Budapest 
Convention) was the first content related intergovernmental treaty attempting to 
harmonise national law regarding cybercrimes. To date, this is the only treaty directly 
dealing with Internet content, even though its effective scope is limited to the 
production and distribution of child pornography.99 In addition to the Budapest 
Convention, and in the early years of the decade, the EU passed a number of other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 LICRA & UEJF v. Yahoo! Inc. [2000] T.G.I. Paris (Dalloz) 
95 Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA [2001] 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal.) 
96 Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA [2004] 379 F. 3d 1120 (9th Cir.) 
97 A. Segura-Serrano, “Internet and International law.” Supra note 49, at 203.   
98 An example of this would be the 2002 Gutnick case, where the Australian Supreme Court 
found jurisdiction over a defamation claim by an applicant in Australia, regarding content 
sourced from New Jersey. See Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick [2002] 210 CLR 575.  
99 Convention on Cybercrime [2001] ETS 185.  
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content related directives regarding copyright (2001),100 privacy (2002)101 and e-
commerce (2000).102 These regionally binding instruments are examples of the increased 
legal effort of bringing content and public use under some sort of governmental 
regulatory oversight.  
International developments regarding privacy are noteworthy in this period and are of 
significance. Following the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive, imposing restrictions 
on data transfer to “third countries”, and given the large amount of data exchanged 
between the US and the EU, they reached a compromise through a “Safe Harbour” 
agreement (SHA) in 2000, through which certain certified US companies would not be 
subject to EU limitations anymore.103 Although it is a soft law instrument, enshrining an 
important and rare compromise, SHA is widely questioned for its value in privacy 
protection.104 Concerns regarding personal information and data are even more 
widespread today, especially since the recent revelations of governmental (mainly the 
US) surveillance and encroachments of privacy of not only citizens, but also high 
ranking officials.105  
Censorship is perhaps the most widespread form of content regulation/control on the 
national level and this practice became increasingly widespread in the twenty first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Council of Europe and the European Parliament Directive (EC) 2001/29/EC on the 
Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 
[2001] OJ L167, implemented the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty in the EU, which in effect also 
adds to the influence of international law on the conduct of content regulation by the states in 
question.  
101 Council of Europe and the European Parliament Directive (EC) 2002/58/EC Concerning 
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic 
Communications Sector [2002] OJ L201. 
102 EU E-Commerce Directive, Supra note 90. 
103 This agreement allows US companies who want to do data exchange with EU to sign up 
(purely voluntarily) to the rules set by EU protecting their customers. 
104 For an argument questioning the value of the compromise (especially in defence of the 
European privacy values), see J. R. Reidenberg, “E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy.” 
Houston Law Review 38 (2001): 717-749. 
105 Here I am referring to the recent developments surrounding the NSA’s surveillance schemes, 
revealed by Edward Snowden.  
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century, a time where availability of content deemed harmful became a concern of 
governments around the world. Governments are facing an unprecedented expansion 
of global social networking and increasing cultural and political exposure of citizens to a 
vast array of information and communication media.106 Therefore, in addition to directly 
legislating on “harmful content” hosted within their borders, they also limit the 
availability of certain websites and services within their borders through imposing laws 
on the national Internet infrastructure, mainly the ISPs.107 This was important for two 
main reasons. First, this was the first time in the history of the Internet that 
governments brought parts of the Internet infrastructure such as ISPs under their 
regulatory framework and imposed obligations on them for the purposes of content 
regulation. Second, on a transnational and institutional level, the regulation and 
standardization of Internet infrastructure so far pointed to maintaining the de-
centralised network. Even though most telecommunications industries were privatised 
worldwide,108 and transnational and international institutions (e.g. ITU) played a vital 
role in their standardisation, almost all countries took regulatory measure to manage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 It is important to note that it was during this period (since 2006) that Wikileaks also changed 
the face of the hierarchy of information available to everyone online, and in turn this arguably 
changed the Internet for some time to come. See M. L. Sifry, Wikileaks and the Age of 
Transparency. New York: Or Books, 2011. 
107 Internet filtering happens in most countries globally. There are endless examples a few of 
which would suffice for the purposes of this chapter. For in the UK for example, certain 
websites are inaccessible because Internet providers, servers, or  are “requested” to block 
websites (or web pages) for infringement of copyright, promoting terrorism or child 
pornography. In the case of terrorism see for instance BBC. “Google Reveals 'Terrorism Video' 
Removals.” BBC. 18 June 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-18479137 (accessed 
August 11, 2014). A similar case-specific approach exists in many other countries. However in 
some Asian countries such as Singapore, media (including Internet) are under the control of 
government bodies (in the case of Singapore the Media Development Authority) who create 
media specific Codes of Practice, binding on service providers. Such codes of practice also do 
exist in other countries (e.g. UK and New Zealand) but are not always binding. See generally J. 
Kulesza, International Internet Law. Supra note 8, at 109-124.          
108 The move towards the liberalisation of the telecommunications, started in the United States 
in 1960s, and was more or less followed by the majority of the developed world around two 
decades afterwards.  
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infrastructure and content centrally.109 However even in the strictest regulatory 
frameworks, (e.g. China or Iran) control is far from absolute.110   
Andrew Murray’s observations in 2007 regarding Internet content regulation and the 
ultimate failure of achieving a real settlement from (international) legal instruments for 
issues at hand are important.111 Murray suggests that national, international, or court law 
only make up one node in a wide “web of regulations” which forms what is generally 
referred to as Internet governance.112  Building on these observations in a more recent 
reflection on content regulation, he emphasises the role of free expression guarantees 
applied in the Reno v ACLU case, and argues that “content may just be beyond the 
direct control of the international legal community,” which in his analysis includes 
institutions, organisations and states.113 However the reason for this failure seems to be 
understood by many countries to be the de-centralised nature of the governance 
methods, including the multistakeholder approach. As a result, in recent years, we have 
seen increasing calls in the international community for the centralisation of Internet 
governance under the all too familiar ambit of inter-state law making, giving 
governments the final say in the governance of this seemingly intrusive space. Such calls 
were most explicit in the recent WCIT talks organised by the ITU in 2012, which shall 
be the starting point of the next section of my historical analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 The most famous examples of this kind of activity are China and Iran which, through 
maintaining a monopoly over Internet backbones, and imposing restrictions on ISPs, have 
managed  to impose a great deal of national control over both Code, and as a result over access 
to content. Countries such as Iran and North Korea have gone so far as to envision and design 
national computer networks (“national Internet”), which act separately from (and parallel to) the 
global Internet. See for example J. Ball and B. Gottlieb. “Iran Tightens Online Control by 
Creating Own Network.” The Guardian. 25 September 2012.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/25/iran-state-run-internet (accessed April 23, 
2013). 
110 With regards to content regulation in China see M.B. Land, “Google, China, Search.” ASIL 
Insights 14, no. 25 (2010). (“Although the government’s control of the Internet is effective, it is 
not absolute”).  
111 A. Murray, Regulation of Cyberspace. Supra note 30, at 227-229 
112 Ibid, at 22-54 
113 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses.” supra note 59, at 507. 
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Despite the many developments and innovations in governance (multistakeholder 
representation and inclusiveness) in the period between the establishment of ICANN 
and 2012, legal engagement, as in the previous period was solely aimed at regulation. 
This also applies to the concept of “multistakeholderism” which is ultimately a 
collection of stakeholders and their views in order to have better regulation by the 
different states, organisations and institutions in charge. In other words, the different 
aspects of the Internet under governance, especially content, continued to be issues to 
be dealt with through mechanisms of social control, including authoritative rules, 
monitoring and administrative (standard setting) organisations. Moreover, and 
importantly for this thesis, the very limited instances where international law 
(understood here simply as law making based on the consent of the subjects of 
international law, predominantly states but also institutions) has been used or proposed, 
it has been to cover the regulatory shortcomings of national, institutional and 
multistakeholder policy making. As I will explain in the next section this obsession with 
regulation seems to be intensifying at present.  
2.4 The International Regulation of the Internet  
Despite the continuing role of international multi-stakeholder approaches such as IGF 
(the initial 5 year mandate renewed in UNGA for another 5 years), there are very mixed 
feelings regarding its success.114 As a result of the perceived weaknesses in 
multistakeholderism and the privileged position of the West (especially US) through the 
dominance of their private sector, in recent years, there has been a return of calls for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 For an argument in favour of multistakeholderism’s success, see J. Waz, and P. Weiser. 
“Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder Organisation.” Journal of Telecommunications 
and High Technology Law 10, no. 2 (2013): 331-350.Viewpoints against the multistakeholder vision 
are often expressed in calls for more government control over the Internet Core resources and 
international public policy issues. For a collection of such views, from the run up to the 
controversial WCIT (ITU) talks of 2012 see http://wcitleaks.org. (last accessed 13/08/2013) 
See also W. Drake, “Multistakeholderism: Internal Limitations and External Limits.” MIND: 
Co:llaboratory Discussion Paper Series , September 2001: 68-73. 
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international law and interstate governance,115 even though ICANN, IETF, IAB, ISOC 
and W3C continue controlling the Code layer of the Internet on an international level. 
Although most content issues are dealt with through national law (using both Code and 
law),116 and jurisdictional issues through conflict of laws approaches, there seems to be a 
growing belief that (public) international law and intergovernmental cooperation has a 
vital role to play.117 Probably the most prominent areas where inter-governmental law is 
in place and actively enforced are intellectual property (WIPO Treaties) and child 
pornography (EU convention of Cybercrime). Given the effects of Reno v ACLU in 
providing First Amendment protection to Internet content stored in the US, national 
content regulation is bound to have little option but to filter/censor. This difficulty, in 
addition to the seeming consensus over Lawrence Lessig’s “Code as law”, calls for 
increased governmental and intergovernmental control over the Code.       
Different authors see a growing potential for international law,118 especially in the form 
of treaties and intergovernmental institutions but also using principles and concepts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 See for instance D.P. Fidler, “The Controversy.” Supra note 70. 
116 With global expansion of the Internet, regulatory issues regarding content are bound to 
increase. This is also not just on an international level, as even within domestic setting, new 
phenomena such as “Cyberbullying” and electronic harassment are added to the continuing 
issues such as pornography and indecent material. See for instance Dilley, Sean. “Cyberbullying 
Laws 'Failing To Keep Up'.” Sky News. 17 August 2014. 
http://news.sky.com/story/1319935/cyberbullying-laws-failing-to-keep-up (accessed August 
18, 2014).  
117 So far cooperation is mainly in areas of cybercrime, intellectual property and privacy. 
Scholars started promoting international cooperation and international legal remedies to the 
jurisdictional issues early on in the governance story. For early remarks see McGregor, Heather. 
"Law on a Boundless Frontier: The Internet and International Law.” Kentucky Law Journal 88 
(2000): 967-986. Another example is Franz C. Mayer’s proposal that given the central 
importance of Code in the governance of the Internet, public international law in the form of 
multilateral decision making should be used. For Mayer this was the only way ‘the international 
community’ could make sure “code is not hijacked by powerful private vested interests or by 
countries more advanced in computer technology.” See Mayer, Franz C. “The Internet and 
Public International Law - Worlds Apart?” European Journal of International Law 12, no. 3 (2001): 
617.  
118 For early views on the potentials of international law see generally N. Weinstock Netanel, 
“Cyberspace Self-Governance: A skeptical View from Liberal Democratic Theory.” California 
Law Review 88 (2000): 398-498. See also A. Segura-Serrano, “Internet and International law.” 
Supra note 49; and J. Kulesza, International Internet Law. Supra note 8; and A. Murray, “Uses and 
Abuses.” Supra note 59.   
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international law such as Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) and International 
Spaces, to play a role in governing and regulating the Internet.119 In addition there is a 
continuing application of human rights instruments such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which indirectly impose obligations on states in the way they 
treat content providers and users. For instance according to Molly Land “although 
Article 19 (ICCPR) does not guarantee a right to the ‘Internet’ per se, it explicitly 
protects the technologies of connection and access to information, and it limits states’ 
ability to burden content originating abroad.”120 Of course not all states read their 
human rights obligations as Land does and enforcement of human rights is the primary 
responsibility of states. However, most states that seek increasing control through 
international law, hope to realise this control not necessarily through increased 
obligations but through more control over the Internet Code and infrastructure.   
Old calls for intergovernmental bodies overseeing different aspects of Internet 
governance have recently been combined with calls by almost the same group of 
countries calling for an intergovernmental body in 2012, for more national power over 
Code and infrastructure. This could partly be that the multistakeholder approaches to 
governance after around a decade of negotiations and compromises seem to fail in 
achieving certain solid results for countries with concerns supposedly different from the 
developed countries. Even though multistakeholderism is seen by many others as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 The principle of Common Heritage of Mankind and the “international space” analogy has 
been used by many scholars as a possible strategy of dealing with the regulation and 
management of cyberspace under international law. See for example D. C. Menthe, “Jurisdiction 
in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces.” Michigan Telecommunication Technology Law 
Review 4 (1998): 69-103. In the fifth chapter, I will expand more on international spaces in 
international law and the way it characterises international law’s spatial orientation.  
120 M. Land, “Toward and International Law of the Internet.” Harvard International Law Journal 
54, no. 2 (2013): 393-458. 
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“largely successful,”121 one can witness increasing problems arising regarding the 
output/process, diversity/participation, and clarity of outcome.122 Ten years after the 
2003 WSIS, the first review summit (WSIS+10) was held at the UNESCO (United 
Nations Educational, Scientific Organization) headquarters in Paris, and according to 
observers, confirmed a number of the weaknesses of the multistakeholder approach.123 
Multistakeholderism needs to find mechanisms to deal effectively with the wide range 
of national approaches regarding the regulation of Internet and to answer to the 
concerns regarding the domination of US actors even in the multistakeholder 
processes.124 Even though most national regulatory concern is regarding Internet 
content and security, following Lessig’s influential theory, countries are seeking more 
control over the infrastructure and backbone of the Internet and international law 
seems to be the preferred language.   
A clear example of the above is the 2012 World Conference on International 
Telecommunications convened by ITU to amend the 1988 international 
telecommunications regulations (ITRs) given the new environment, with the Internet 
spreading with little direction from intergovernmental processes. Even though the 
Internet was not supposed to be the subject of the conference, it became the 
centrepiece. The debate was between proponents of the multi-stakeholder and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See for instance J. Waz and P. Weiser, “Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder 
Organisation.” Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law 10, no. 2 (2013): 331-350. 
122 I should note that WSIS is not the only multistakeholder process in Internet Governance, 
and not all multistakeholder institutions suffer from the lack of clarity on objectives or 
outcomes. ICANN continues to be important in pursuing a relatively well defined agenda 
through a multistakeholder approach.  
123 It has been suggested by Francesca Musiani that the WSIS/IGF process is (and has been) 
out of touch with “the ‘nitty gritty’ details, day-to-day struggles, and material constraints of who 
participates, when, for what reasons, and how the practical results of this participation can be 
measured and leveraged for concrete next steps.” F. Musiani, “WSIS+10: The Self-Praising 
Feast of Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance.” Internet Policy Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 5.     
124 According to Was and Weiser “many governments in both the developed and developing 
worlds perceive that the United States—directly or indirectly—‘runs the Internet’ through the 
dominant participation of its companies and stakeholders in multistakeholder organizations.” J. 
Waz and P. Weiser, “Internet Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder Organisations.” Supra 
note 121, at 3.  
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decentralised approach (generally Western/developed countries), and countries which 
wanted to use the UN body to bring Internet governance under states’ control.125  Even 
though no binding resolution was reached, the conference raised concerns for the US 
and EU of a growing sensibility (at least amongst a majority of ITU members) regarding 
a need for an increasing role of governmental and inter-governmental bodies in Internet 
governance.126 It unveiled a deeply divided and fragmented regulatory environment 
around the governance of the Internet which has been referred to as a “digital cold 
war.”127    
The calls for increased governmental influence over the different Internet layers have 
only to be intensified given the recent developments regarding global data surveillance; 
a revelation which according to many highlights and intensifies the differences of 
approach internationally,128 and threatens principles of openness and freedom rooted in 
its design.129 These revelations even brought the EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Russia for instance proposed an article on the Internet, giving “equal rights” to all member 
states in the management of Internet core resources and its infrastructure. There were also 
other proposals regarding spam, addressing and security. After many negotiations the newly 
proposed ITRs had provisions on the Internet (especially the non-binding resolution 3 which 
resembled the Russian proposal in saying that “all governments should have an equal role and 
responsibility for international Internet governance.” See D.P. Fidler, “The Controversy.” Supra 
note 70.   
126 Ibid.  
127 The revised ITRs enter into force between members who sign it by January 2015. The 
countries that do not sign will not be bound by the new regulation but only the old 1988 ones. 
This is the nature of an emerging fragmentation in this area of law. See Global Partners and 
Associates. Internet Governance: Mapping the Battleground. Global Partners and Associates, 2013. 
128 An example of this would be the different approaches towards Internet privacy in the US 
and the EU. The American companies use “notice-and-consent” as a method of gaining access 
to data for the purposes of “data processing”, whereas this self regulatory method is not 
favoured in the EU, where scepticism towards “consent” is evident in them requiring formal 
legal authorisation (whether EU law or other forms of authority) for accessing information 
normally protected by privacy laws. For an insightful analysis of privacy in the time of cloud 
computing see P. M. Schwartz, EU Privacy and the Cloud: Consent and Jurisdiction Under the Proposed 
Regulation. Privacy and Security Law Report, The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 2013.  
129 J. Naughton, “Edward Snowden's Not the Story. The Fate of the Internet Is.” The Guardian. 
28 July 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/28/edward-snowden-death-
of-internet (accessed August 18, 2014). 
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brink of collapse.130 In a situation where cloud-computing has become more prevalent 
than ever, and people, governments and institutions have unprecedented information 
available online, governments are bound to seek more control. As was revealed in the 
wake of Wikileaks and Snowden’s revelations, this control takes on a direct form 
through surveillance and the blurring of the public/private divide regarding 
information, a large portion of which is done through governments. However given the 
largely non-governmental institutionalisation of regulation, and the essentially cross 
border and de-centralised design of the Internet, international law (understood 
traditionally) seems to be a fitting solution for some, since it clearly privileges the state 
as the key legal personality. The recent proliferation of inter-governmental debates and 
negotiation leaves the actors in global Internet governance with a dilemma. On the one 
hand, there is multistakeholderism with all its weaknesses (especially lack of decision 
making and implementation capacities) holding on to the inclusive and decentred 
structure of the Internet, and on the other, there is international intergovernmental law 
which also faces clear limitations such as lack of consensus and dominance of 
standardising institutions with clear Western support. Despite their differences, the 
debate between these two modes of governance is solely about the best ways to regulate 
the Internet and the issues arising from content.  
ITU’s position as a negotiation forum for states and industry representatives has proven 
crucial lately, as the coordinator for the World Summit on Information Society (Geneva 
2003 and Tunisia 2005) and the World Summit on International Telecommunications 
(Dubai 2012). As noted by Ahmad Kamal, the regulation of telecommunications 
involves an “interaction of technology, economic forces, institutional settings and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 See for instance I. Traynor, “NSA Surveillance: Europe Threatens to Freeze US Data-
Sharing Arrangements.” The Guardian. 26 November 2013. 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/26/nsa-surveillance-europe-threatens-freeze-
us-data-sharing (accessed August 18, 2014). 
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constraints, and interest groups.”131 ITU’s (somewhat indirect) role in Internet 
governance will undoubtedly continue. However given its intergovernmental design, it 
has always been an unlikely candidate in taking a leading role in Internet governance 
given the currently limited role of (and consensus among) governments regarding their 
respective roles in this process. Whether international law is eventually to become the 
dominant framework for governing the Internet, it seems clear from the history that its 
role will be that of governing/regulating it as a technical medium, in which its content is 
separated from its form.   
2.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I described, from a historical perspective, the development of the 
regulatory framework which animates the relationship between law and the Internet. I 
have shown that Internet governance is largely a hybrid of institutional 
(international/transnational) governance of the Code and infrastructure of the Internet 
on the one hand, and national regulation (courts and state legislation) of content on the 
other. I paid particularly close attention to the so far limited role of international law in 
the larger field of Internet governance. With the exception of the Budapest Convention 
and the EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement, international legal bodies such as the ITU, 
WIPO, and WTO have a mostly indirect regulatory control over the Internet and 
content. 
As it can be observed in the discussion of this chapter, international legal engagements 
with the Internet rarely refer to it as “cyberspace” and even if they do, they use it as a 
term to refer to “Code-plus-content” as a decentred structure acting as a container for 
data and information, which in turn is accessed by users. What I would like to highlight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131A. Kamal, The Law of Cyberspace: An Invitation to the Table of Negotiations. Geneva: United 
Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2005: 223.  
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is the seeming absence of any engagement with what might be called “the sociality of 
cyberspace”. By this, I mean cyberspace as a socio-spatial phenomenon constructed 
through users’ social experience and interaction rather than just a technological 
phenomenon (as it is largely analysed as by international law).132 What this chapter (in 
parallel to the “regulability debate” pointed to in the introduction of this chapter) shows 
is an image of this (international) legal engagement with law, imagined and utilised to 
limit or enable certain forms of online and offline “action” in order to bring control, 
stability and predictability to the online environment. Even when scholars seek more 
engagement with the exceptionality of the space, they tend to propose exceptional 
measures in order to govern and regulate the Internet.  
In drawing attention to the limits of the regulatory initiatives, however, I do not want to 
suggest that there is therefore a need for more or less effective regulation. Rather I want 
to draw attention to what is absent from such debates and governing methods. Having 
pointed to these “blind spots” of analysis, in the next chapter of this thesis, I will turn 
my attention to two different spatio-legal frameworks for thinking about law, space, 
sociality and the relations between them; namely logos and nomos. These will then serve as 
the central conceptual frameworks for my subsequent re-analysis of cyberspace (chapter 
four), an analysis of the socio-spatiality of the “international” in international law 
(chapter five) and finally the illustration of my thesis through the discourse of social 
movements and international law (chapter six). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See chapter 4 for the detailed analysis of my socio-spatial description of cyberspace, as 
opposed to the Internet.  
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Chapter 3 – Logos v Nomos: Two Conceptual frameworks 
for Law 
 
We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of new and far, of 
side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less 
that of a long life developing through time, than that of a network that connects points and intersects 
with its own skein. 
M. Foucault 
3.1. Introduction  
In this chapter and the next, I build on the lack of attention by international law to the 
non-territorial social relations which characterise a wide range of our experiences in 
using the Internet. It is important to analyse the relationship between international law 
and cyberspace in such a fashion so as to broaden it beyond the treatment of the 
Internet as a mere object of regulation, to thinking about cyberspace not only as a space 
produced by (international) law but more importantly a space which is socially co-
produced, experienced and lived.   
What the regulation-centred approach to Internet governance suggests is a preference 
to see the users as people and persons placed in a specific location (often within the 
territory of the state) whose actions and words are treated as online content in need of 
regulation. As discussed, this approach has a blind spot in relation to the socialities of 
cyberspace. Since in this thesis, I am exploring the potentials offered by cyberspace for a 
re-conceptualisation of international socio-spatiality, it is necessary to discuss the 
limitations of the (international) legal approach to cyberspace through a fitting 
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conceptual framework; a framework which problematises law’s relationship to (and 
understandings of) people, persons, societies and spaces. In this chapter, I develop this 
framework through differentiating between two ways of thinking about law, logos and 
nomos. I particularly develop this relationship, using a combination of philosophical, 
legal and (critical) geographic scholarship, so that the concepts are differentiated on the 
basis of the relationship between the legal, the spatial and the social.   
The theoretical arguments developed in this chapter are central for connecting the 
wider analysis of this thesis regarding international law, cyberspace and social 
movements. Given the diversity of the contexts in which the concepts of logos and nomos 
are used, it is not possible to identify a single conceptual thread developing through 
different times. Instead what I wish to do is to develop a form of synthesis from 
different uses of the two concepts across time. I do this by combining the “original” 
insights with the observations of critical (legal) geography, in order to construct my own 
understanding of the concepts.  
This chapter has a simple overall structure. I use the first section to elaborate on the 
concept of logos, starting from its use in early Natural Law thinkers to the use of logos as 
Word in Christianity, to modern developments in jurisprudence, especially the 
development of legal positivism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I will then 
move to my investigation of nomos, initially focusing on Carl Schmitt and Robert Cover. 
After highlighting the spatial problematic of their theories (using David Delaney), I 
construct the crux of my understanding of nomos through the works of Delaney, Michel 
Foucault and Doreen Massey. I conclude this chapter by reflecting on the distinctions 
between the two concepts covered in this chapter, and their implications for the wider 
thesis.   
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3.2. Logos :  A Conceptual Synthesis 
The association of logos with law has a long history which dates back to early Natural 
Law thinkers such as Cicero. Moreover, equally (if not more) significant associations of 
logos have been with ideas such as speech, Word, reason and argument. Even though the 
latter are often not directly associated with law, they can be usefully synthesised to 
construct an image of law, represented by the authority (through reason or rationality) 
of command (speech). In other words, the concept of logos, developed in this section is 
one which understands law as ensuing from some “external” source, whether natural, 
divine or sovereign. Here, I will point to the main conceptual frameworks represented 
by logos, and then through conjoining different representations of the concept with 
observations of legal geography, develop my understanding of logos.   
The word logos is translated from Greek as reason or speech, and it is in ancient Greek 
philosophers that we can seek the first associations of the concept with law. For 
Heraclitus, in whose writings logos first appeared, logos “include[d] or embod[ied] 
something like a general ‘law of nature’[...]”.1 Moreover this “nature” becomes a “critical 
concept” acting as the “rational foundation of all that exists”; a foundation which “had 
something ‘objective’ about it,” even though the radical divide between subject and 
object was yet to be fully developed.2 Further use of the concept by the Stoics directly 
associated law with logos, through the notion of “right reason”, which shares Heraclitus’ 
notion of logos as a “rational” account common to everything.3 In other words, both the 
pre-Socratic and Stoic understandings of logos seek an “eternal” or “universal” law, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1982: 59 
2 C. Douzinas and A. Gearey, Critical Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice. Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2005: 80, 83.  
3 J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers. Supra note 1. For an account of the Stoics’ understanding 
of logos as law, see M. A. Jackson-McCabe, Logos and Law in the Letter of James: The Law of Nature, 
The law of Moses, and the Law of Freedom. Boston: Brill, 2000: 29-86 
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they establish this through the authority of reason and rationality associated with and 
embedded in “nature”. 
Another important use of the word/concept in ancient Greece was by Plato who also 
associated logos with reason and/or nature. For him, logos is the “reasoned account 
(argument)” through which one can gain “true knowledge” about a thing. Put in his 
own words “if one cannot give and receive a logos of anything, one has no knowledge 
of that thing.”4 There is a difference between Plato’s use of the concept and that of 
Heraclitus and the Stoics described above. Unlike the latter two, Plato locates logos as 
“external” to the thing about which true knowledge is to be gained,5 thus locating the 
authority of reason not in its commonality to everything, but rather in its full availability 
to “a god” who has access to “a definitive account of [...] matters.”6 This 
“externalisation” points to an essential spatial element of the image of logos. The 
detachment of logos from the thing signals a detachment of law from materiality both in 
its physical and discursive forms. In other words, logos is separated from the socio-
spatial setting about which it is to provide true knowledge, or if seen as law, separated 
from the space/object to which it is applied.  
A representation of logos which shares characteristics similar to those of Plato’s analysis 
is in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Bertrand Russell, in his famous History of Western 
Philosophy, makes a connection between Plato’s logos, as the “intellectual element” in the 
latter’s religion, and the identification of Christ with logos by the “author of Saint John’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Plato cited in R. C. Cross, “Logos and Forms in Plato.” Mind 63, no. 252 (1954): 433. 
[Emphasis added] 
5 This detachment is also visible in Plato’s general philosophy. The duality between “reality” or 
“true knowledge”  and what we observe and have access to is clear in his famous “Allegory of 
the Cave” and the Sun metaphor presented in his book Republic (Book VII). See generally 
Plato. The Republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Internet Classics Archive, 360 B.C.E. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html (accessed April 11, 2013).  
6 A definitive account of these matters eludes humans (29d1) and is available only to a god 
(53d4–7). See ibid.  
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Gospel.”7 It was following this latter use of logos, and other observations through 
Platonic philosophy, that St. Augustine famously said that “In the beginning was the 
Word, and the word was with God, and the word was God [...].”8 Here logos is directly 
associated with the divine source of authority detached from the material and discursive 
base of everyday life. However, more important is the addition of a conception of logos 
as an “argument” or “rationality”, which is fully or in part accessible (and necessary) for 
any “true knowledge”, of a form of command ensuing from an external source. As with 
Plato’s “argument”, for the Christian tradition, logos (Word) also seems to operate on the 
basis of a binary between a transcendent God (Plato’s realm of reason) and everything 
else (Plato’s object of true knowledge).  
Perhaps a more recent use of logos helps crystallise the nature of the “externalisation” 
which is at the heart of logos, namely, Jacque Derrida’s important linguistic critiques of 
what he calls logocentrism.9 “Logocentric” theories, according to Derrida, operate on three 
levels. On the first level, a structural distinction is assumed to exist between signifier and 
signified.10 On a second level, logos is characterised as signifying a “transcendental 
signified” (still assumed to be structurally separate) towards which an “irresistible 
desire” for signification is present.11 Finally, logocentric theories see speech as the primary 
mode of signification, with the written word only signifying the spoken word (another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from 
the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948: 313. Russell 
speaks of logos in the Christian sense to mean “reason”, when he says that “Logos should be 
translated “reason” as the translation of nous.”  
8 St. Augustine, “Book Seven.” In The Confessions of Saint Augustine, by Saint Augustine, translated 
by Edward B. Pusey. Rockville: Arc Manor, 2008: 88.  
9 See generally J. Derrida, Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri C. Spivak. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. 
10 For an original structural analysis of linguistics and the distinction between the signifier and 
the signified see generally F. De Saussure, “On the nature of Language.” In Structuralism: a 
Reader, edited by Micheal Lane, 43-57. London: Jonathan Cape, 1970. According to Derrida’s 
reading, De Saussure argues that “the linguistic object is not defined by the combination of the 
written word and the spoken word: the spoken form alone constitutes the object.” J. Derrida, Of 
Grammatology. Supra note 9, at 3. 
11 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology. Ibid., at 49.  
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signifier).12 The most important characteristic for my analysis is the separation Derrida 
alludes to here between the signifier and the signified. The position of the signified in 
logocentrism is similar to Plato’s “True Knowledge” and of course Augustine’s God. 
Taking the former theory to law and associating logos with the word of law, furthers the 
image of law as words which signify the will/command of an “external” source (of 
authority). The image of law developed here also stands for the command of the 
sovereign, as exemplified in positivist legal thought of the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries.13        
It is the detached command of the sovereign that acts as the backbone of positive law, a 
position that was previously filled by God, through an interplay of faith and reason. 
With the increased power and authority of the sovereign in European societies, the idea 
of law as ‘sovereign command’ was theoretically detached from religious and natural 
sources of legal validity. This was formalised by positivist theorists such as Austin14 and 
Bentham15 and was maintained in later theories of positive law through the rise of 
constitutionalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.16 The latter was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the words of Jussi Backman, λόγος (logos) is seen “in the sense of an ultimate central 
‘meaning’ that would no longer refer to anything other than itself and would thus provide a self-
sufficient and permanently accessible center for discursive chains of references.” See. J. 
Backman, “Logocentrism and the Gathering Λόγος: Heidegger, Derrida, and the Contextual 
Centers of Meaning.” Research in Phenomenology 42 (2012): 70 
13 See J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. , 1998. 
14 Ibid. 
15 J. Bentham, Of Laws in General. Edited by H. L. A. Hart. London: Athlone Press, 1970. 
16 The latter include important thinkers such as Hans Kelsen who aimed at moving beyond the 
reductivist nature of classic positivist thought, from a reliance on “power and obedience” to a 
“basic norm” ensuring the authority of laws and constitutions through time and space. Of 
course such analysis is problematic for many reasons, the most important of which is the 
“presupposed” validity of the basic norm. This problem has been the subject of much criticism 
from within and outside the positivist tradition. H.L.A Hart is perhaps the most important of 
such critiques. Instead of locating the source of authority in a presupposed norm, Hart argues 
for a form of social validity (common practice and custom) amongst state and law making 
officials. For an overview of positivist theories and their interrelation see L. Green, “Legal 
Positivism.” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Spring 2009. http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-
bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=legal-positivism (accessed April 4, 2013). 
 
	  
	  
Page | 85 
especially exemplified in Kelsen’s identification of law’s “object matter”.17 A detour in 
the positivist image of law will help as a final step towards the articulation of the notion 
of logos.  
Positivist thinkers of the twentieth century helped solidify the ‘externalisation’ of the 
above uses/theories of logos into “modern” understandings of law through the concept 
of sovereignty. This concept plays (or at least played) a central role in the creation (as 
opposed to formation and evolution) of rules, ensuring their function and application to a 
society, and meting out justice. John Austin, one of the most influential and 
controversial positivist thinkers, defined “positive law” as “the appropriate subject of 
Jurisprudence” and characterised it as “law established or “positum”, in an independent 
political community, by the express or tacit authority of its sovereign of supreme 
government.”18 As pointed out by Richard Ashley and Rob B. J. Walker, sovereignty has 
an inherent relationship with “some mode of being already in place, some simply and 
self-evidently given resolution of paradoxes of space, time and identity.”19 The 
detachment of this “mode of being” from the social/political context (“paradoxes of 
space, time and identity”) was essential in order for the autonomy of law to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law starts the section on “Legal Order”, by the proposition that 
“A theory of law must begin by defining its object matter.” H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law . New 
Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2005. 
18 J. Austin, “The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence.” In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1998: 
365. See also M. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence. 8th. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
2008. 
19 See R.K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, “Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and 
the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 34 (1990): 
383. 
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ensured.20 Justifying this detachment in the absence of God (as the ultimate universal 
reference) needed a move to a different form of abstraction, i.e. science.21  
Positivists sought to give “a notion of law as a sealed logic or system,” which 
“dissimulates disembodied authority”. 22 In the twentieth century, prominent positivists 
such as Kelsen and Hart helped further the legal logic of their predecessors. They 
sought “[a] ‘science’ of law [that] could only be founded on observable, objective 
phenomena, not on subjective and relative values.”23 This line of thought, i.e. moving 
from locating law’s authority in ‘natural’ transcendence towards positive, ‘science’ 
driven law, was seen as a replacement of the word of God with that of the state, as most 
famously suggested by Friedrich Nietzsche.24  
More recently Peter Fitzpatrick utilises Nietzsche’s argument to develop a concept 
called “negative universal reference.”25 By this he is referring to the process through 
which ‘old’ transcendental sources of authority, or what he calls “positive 
transcendence” is supposedly “avoided” through “delimiting a targeted period or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This detachment still exists for Austin, even though he puts the internal acceptance of rules 
by the “independent political community.” This is because acceptance is usually of something 
which has authority and is effectively detached from the “political community” which is doing 
the accepting. For Austin’s view, see generally his series of lectures on jurisprudence in J. 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence. Indianapolis : 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. , 1998.  
21 For an analysis, see A. Orford, “Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law.” 
European Journal of International Law 25, no. 2 (2014): 369-385. An example of this move is 
Kelsen’s assumption of a “presupposed” basic norm which gives a transcendental authority to 
“the original constitution.” See generally H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law. New Jersey: The 
Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2005.  
22R. Birla, “Performativity between Logos and Nomos: Law, Temporality and the ‘Non-
Economic Analysis of Power’ [hereinafter “Performativity between Logos and Nomos”].” 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 21, no. 2 (2011): 103. See also C. Douzinas and A., Critical 
Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice. Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005. Here Douzinas and 
Gearey point to the similarity between Hart and Kelsen, where they say that Hart argues for an 
understanding of law where the “systematic interdependence [of rules] determines the existence, 
validity and values of any particular rule.” (at 6) This is a clear example of a “sealed logic” where 
rules draw their validity from their own interdependence. 
23 C. Douzinas and A. Gearey, ibid, at 6. 
24 Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, refers to the State as ‘the regulating finger of God’, and as 
a replacement for the ‘idol’ the God once was. See F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. London: 
Penguin, 2003: 76. 
25 P. Fizpatrick, “Imperial Ends.” In The Ends of History: Questioning the Stakes of Historical Reason, 
by Joshua Nichols and Amy Swiffen (eds.). New York: Routledge, 2013: 46. 
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concept such as ‘state’, or ‘civilized’ and by ascribing content to it.”26 In other words, 
this concept is essentially a process through which what the content (of the concept) is 
not, acts as a “negative universal” which identifies the concept or period in question. 
Therefore instead of being positively associated with (or validated by) something that is 
defined as transcending the content (of the concept/period), the latter is universalised 
negatively by being differentiated from what it is not. However, this process of negation 
still positions something outside of and detached from the content which acts as a 
source of authority for identification, instead of the much criticised “positive 
transcendence”. This ensures the continuing presence of an “external” source of 
authority which validates law as command regardless of whether it is done positively or 
negatively.  
There is a specific notion of spatiality in operation when the authority of the law is 
externalised through negative universalisation. Logos operates on the back of a “spatial 
cut”. This cut has been identified by legal geographers with the “closure” of law in legal 
formalism and “mainstream legal scholarship”,27 where “law must effect closure, and 
divorce itself from the “value-laden”, politicised, and mercurial conditions of social 
life”.28 With this enclosure, the socio-spatial reality of everyday life becomes detached 
from law, and effectively occurs within a physical space.29 Even in legal positivism which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 P. Fizpatrick, Ibid.   
27 Legal formalism is defined by Roberto Unger as a “commitment to, and therefore also a 
belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification [...] [that] characteristically invokes 
impersonal purposed, policies, and principles as an indispensable component of legal 
reasoning.” R. M. Unger, “The Critical Legal Studies Movement.” Harvard Law Review 96, no. 3 
(1983): 564. On the closure of law and legal formalism see generally N. Blomely, Law, Space and 
Geographies of Power. New York: The Guilford Press, 1994: 7-11.    
28 N. Blomely, Law, Space and Geographies of Power. New York: The Guilford Press, 1994: 10. Both 
positivism and formalism are amongst the “mainstream” approaches to law, widely criticised by 
critical scholars such as Blomely.   
29 Legal geographers such as David Delaney and Nicolas Blomely are not the only scholars 
criticising the detachment of law from the socio-spatial reality. As shown in the introduction of 
the thesis a range of critical legal analyses, point to the disjuncture between law and the 
operations of power and symbolism in the socio-political realm. See for instance D. Kennedy, 
A Critique of Adjudication. London: Harvard University Press, 1997. For an application of a 
similar critique to international law see M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of 
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sought to “bring law to the earth”, the socio-spatial realities formed by relations of 
power were detached from law through the powerful, yet unsustainable, separation of 
law and “politics”.  In other words, even though it was realised that law does not come 
from Nature or God, its legality was made concrete only through the institutionalisation 
of authority in the designated spaces of the parliament, the palace, or the royal courts of 
justice, and the rules applicable to a specific territory with an enclosed and delimited 
socio-political realm, conceptually (and physically) separated from spaces of everyday 
life.  
This positivist sensibility is arguably central to modern notions of jurisdiction which 
play a key role in contemporary legal imagination. For instance, contemporary 
democratic theories (such as Étienne Balibar’s) take note of space by seeing borders as 
the non-democratic condition of democracy. In these analyses, space is only accounted 
for in its most limited form, i.e. the physicality of the borders within which sovereign 
law making is to take place.30 Here logos becomes jurisdiction; speaking the law through 
authority gained by the unchallenged fixity and separation of physical borders from the 
socio-political realities of everyday life within those boundaries.31 It is separate and fixed 
because it is denied democratic process; a process which often serves as a trusted way of 
connecting experience of everyday life to the operations of sovereignty. Combined with 
the conceptual authority of sovereignty, space is detached from society. 
For logos, spaces are not perceived as socially produced. Instead physical, spatial 
delimitations either come before the law (e.g. natural boundaries such as seas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
International Legal Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. It is (critical) legal 
geography that brings my attention to the co-production of the space/social/law triad forming 
the central theoretical component of this thesis.    
30 É. Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections of Transnational Citizenship. Translated by James 
Swenson. Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2004: 117. For an analysis of the different 
theories of space, see my exposition of debates in legal geography in chapter 1.   
31 I am borrowing the idea of jurisdiction as “speaking the law” from Shaunnagh Dorsett and 
Shaun McVeigh’s recent reflection on the concept of jurisdiction. See S. Dorsett, and S. 
McVeigh, Jurisdiction. New York: Routledge, 2012.  
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mountains or rivers), or are created by law (regulation/legislation) from the detached 
position of legal authority (e.g. creation of councils, cities, provinces and even territorial 
states).32 As put nicely by Sarat et al. “positive law derives its particular form, content, 
and social administration from its rootedness in a geographically defined space.”33 There 
is a clear distinction between what the laws are, where the laws are made and to whom 
they are applied.  
The spatiality of logos is partly rooted in the way law perceives space as a container of 
material things in/to which law is applied and prescribed. However, this relation is not 
always seen through the lens of prescription and detached authority. Many legal 
geographers, especially in their early engagements with space, but arguably until today, 
view the relationship between law and space as a causal relationship,34 i.e. law producing 
and affecting material space, and material space setting certain conditions and 
determining limits for law. To put it differently, in the framework of logos, law remains 
associated with a “disembodied” form of authority which situates the law outside what 
Kelsen calls the “object matter” of law. Space is then associated with this object matter 
and “objectified” accordingly. As a result of this, space becomes alienated from both 
law, and also from its socio-discursive content.   
On a different but related note, logos operates by detaching the source of legal authority 
from the lived experiences of human society (territorially bounded). This detachment is 
characterised by one form or another of transcendence, be it in the form of Nature,35 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I will look at this further in the following chapters regarding the way (international) law seeks 
to create delimited zones of cyberspace through legal mechanisms in order to be able to regulate 
and govern content. 
33 A. Sarat, et al., “Where (or What) Is the Place of Law? An Introduction.” In The Place of Law, 
edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and Martha Merrill Umphrey. Michigan: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2003: 2.  
34 See generally D. Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making: Nomospheric 
Investigations [hereinafter “Nomospheric Investigations”]. New York: Routledge, 2010: 12-24.   
35 For the ancient Greek theorists this took the shape of a move from laws and conventions to 
Nature, so that “Natural right [...] both transcends reality as an ‘ideal’, and can be confidently 
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God (Word),36 True Knowledge (from the “thing” about which “the argument” is 
produced) or the “negative universal” category posed by Fitzpatrick (from the 
“content” ascribed to the “odolised” categories such as “state” or “civilised” and 
arguably, “law”).37 As a result of this separation of (legal) authority from the social and 
political lived reality, law is no more built into the fluidities of the socio-political 
context. Such fixity of laws is easy to see in religious commandments that take an 
ahistorical, asocial and aspatial character. Going back to the different categories of space 
outlined in chapter one, the fixity of law through logos is guaranteed by situating law (its 
authority) in a non-physical, mental or abstract space.38 
Therefore the objective form of spatiality (as in material Cartesian space) is not the only 
form of space in operation in the legal imagination of logos. The (non-)space in which 
the authority of law is situated plays an important role. As shown in this chapter 
through my analysis of different conceptualisations of logos (and later vested in the idea 
of sovereignty and positive law) the law/space and the material/abstract (mental) 
binaries play an important role for our understanding of logos. It is exactly the 
persistence of these dichotomies that characterises the relationship between law and 
space in the legal space of logos, even though the theorists who used the concept of logos 
never paid direct attention to the question of space and the relationship of law to it. 
However, since my use of the concept is more a theoretical synthesis, I will use more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discovered through observation and reasoning.” See C. Douzinas, and A. Gearey, Critical 
Jurisprudence: The Political Philosophy of Justice. Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2005: 83 
36 As seen in Augustine’s reflection on logos, Word and God were one and the same. See S. 
Augustine, “Book Seven.” Supra note 8. From this perspective, Word is law as logos, which does 
not gain its authority from the people, society or human community, but from God. In fact, 
logos is its own authority.  
37 Fitzpatrick explains through Nietzsche’s work that even though the “we killed god” as the 
ultimate positive universal, the state becomes (through negative universal reference) a “new 
idol” which “would still act like ‘the ordaining finger of God’.” If one combines this with 
Nietzsche’s claim that “there is no doer behind the deed,” then the state, which acts as the 
ordaining finger of God, becomes the new universal, the new idol. See generally P. Fizpatrick, 
“Imperial Ends.” Supra note 25.  
38For a discussion of space and the critical (legal) geographic intervention see generally, section 
1.2.2. for discussion.   
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recent characterisations by legal geographers in highlighting the relation between law 
and space, which as Nicolas Blomely points out were prevented from being reflected 
upon due to what he calls the “closure” of law.39  
Although later positivists such as Kelsen and Hart attempted to remove the reductivist 
character of earlier positivism by distancing normative language from statements of 
power and obedience (as with Bentham and Austin), they failed to fully create a 
connection between law and the body of people to which the law was directed. Kelsen 
arguably fails because of his ultimate reliance on his “presupposed” basic norm. Hart 
seeks to displace Austin (and make a sociological claim for law) by arguing that citizens 
accept rules as “standard for all who play the game” by having a “reflective critical 
attitude” towards them.40 Even though this was a significant move by a positivist to 
embrace a sociological perspective to law, he unfortunately “reaffirms the positivist 
equation of law” through his focus on the customs of “the officials”.41 This reinforces 
the fixity of law within/toward a defined socio-epistemic and normative boundary and 
hence offers a limited sociology of law at best. The form of logos is in one way or 
another essentialised and fixed through its reliance on presupposed categories and 
boundaries (both conceptual and physical). Therefore the “assumed divide between law 
and social and political life that undergrids the soi-distant objectivity of law,”42 animates 
the conception of logos.  
To sum up, logos for this project is a disembodied form of (legal) authority which 
situates the law outside what Kelsen calls the “object matter.”43 As a result, this 
understanding of law has a character of “external prescription” which sees law as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 N. Blomely, Law, Space and Geographies of Power. Supra note 28, at 7-27. 
40 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law. 2nd. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997: 57. 
41 See N. Lacey, A Life of HLA Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004: 201; and P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law. London: Routledge, 
1992: 4. 
42 N. Blomely, Law, Space and Geographies of Power. Supra note 28, at xii.  
43 See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law. Supra note 21. 
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something that is applied to the socio-political relations and realities, categorically 
separated (spatially and conceptually) from the fluid and interrelatedness of everyday life 
which are seen as existing within a bounded (territorial) entity. Therefore law and space 
become distinct from one another.44 Further, within the framework of logos there is a 
binary spatial logic in operation, one which oscillates between the necessity of the 
physical space (territorial boundedness) for the existence of the socio-political (within), 
and the detachment of legal authority through a fundamental reliance on 
mental/abstract(ed) space, often embodied in physical entities such as the palace, 
parliament, and the court. In the remainder of this thesis, I will refer to this as the 
physical/mental spatial binary of logos. Therefore in logos law becomes about rules and 
norms applied to some territorially delimited space through a regulatory mind frame, 
taking its authority from a detached entity or category which is either imagined through 
physical space or as mental space. This conception of law is fundamentally backed up 
by conceptual distinctions between law, space and society, distinctions which I seek to 
question in the following section using the concept of nomos.  
3.3. Law as Nomos : Spatial, Fluid and Lived 
In contrast to logos, nomos is a notion of law which does not locate that to be regulated 
outside itself objectively. The word nomos is often translated from Greek as “law”. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines nomos as “the principles governing human 
conduct.”45  However a glance at the origins of the word in ancient Greece gives us a 
very different notion of law that differentiates it from logos. Nomos refers to the accepted 
and conventionalised norms and values. According to Stephen Todd and Paul Millett, nomos 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I also pointed to this distinction in chapter one when discussing the development of (critical) 
legal geography. Amongst the most important observations (and points of contestation) was the 
continued conceptual distinction between law and space, causing the impasse of legal 
geography.  
45 Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/127770#eid34548697 
(accessed 19 August, 2014) 
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is a term/concept/notion where law, society and politics come together.46  This is unlike 
the modern logos, which is to a great extent a product of the separation of law 
(legislation) from society and politics.  
In The Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt looks at the etymology of the word nomos in order to 
reverse the historical collapse of the word “from a spatially concrete, constitutive act of 
order and orientation [...] into the mere enactment of acts in line with the ought and, 
consistent with the manner of thinking of the positivistic legal system, translated with 
the word law [...].”47 In other words, he argues that before it was associated with the 
notion of positive law, nomos was conceptualised as an act with a spatial orientation, 
which guaranteed the spatial specificity and concreteness of law. He identifies nomos 
with acts of “spatial ordering”, specifically “an original distribution of land.”48 By 
connecting the apportioning of space to different ‘historical epochs’, he maintains a 
form of continuity in the act of nomos which according to him has been forgotten by 
scholarship and practice. Moreover by associating nomos with ‘acts’ prior to the law (as 
ought), he is “referring to something both more concrete, and transcendental, than the 
law.”49 According to Marti Koskenniemi, Schmitt’s understanding of law was “both 
wider and narrower, and above all, more fundamental than the positive laws generated 
by [...] the legislative state.”50  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 S. Todd, and P. Millett, "Law, Society and Athens.” In Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics 
and Society , by Paul Cartledge, Paul Millett and Stephen Todd. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990: 12 
47 C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
[hereinafter “The Nomos of the Earth”]. New York: Telos Press , 2003: 78.   
48 For further elaboration on this idea by Schmitt, see C. Schmitt. 
“Appropriation/Distribution/Production: Toward a Proper Formulation of Basic Questions of 
any Social and Economic Order [hereinafter “Appropriation/Distribution/Production”].” Telos 
95 (1993): 52-64. 
49 S. Legg, and A. Vasudevan. “Introduction: Geographies of Nomos.” In Spatiality, Sovereignty 
and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of Nomos, edited by Stephen Legg. New York: Routledge , 2011: 2.  
50 M. Koskenniemi, “International Law as Political Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde?” 
Constellations 11, no. 4 (2004): 496 
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It is helpful to situate Schmitt’s understanding of nomos within his wider 
juridical/political concerns. For Schmitt, the connection between appropriation, 
orientation and law, is relevant for all forms of law. As he points out in his essay 
Appropriation/Distribution/Production, his concern is to respond to a lack of unity in the 
modern treatment of “social life” in terms of “specialisations” such as “sociological”, 
“economic” or “juridical”.51 His work on law is characterised as a response to the 
positivist approach of scholars such as Kelsen who argued for a “hierarchical order in 
which every subsumption, every development has its fixed place.”52 Schmitt argued that 
this supposed fixity and normativism of positive/liberal legal thought, results in the 
indeterminacy of law. Legal determinacy was a central concern for Schmitt for a long 
time,53 and he argued for a vision of law where the legal decision maker is contextually 
situated within the space of regulation. This achieves two things; law’s connection with 
the people (folk) is kept intact and as a result the legal decision maker can ensure the 
concreteness of law by being situated in the unified social order.54 However, for 
Schmitt, the unified social order exists within a physically delimited zone, excluded from 
other spaces and social orders through the political character of sovereignty. The nomos 
defined by Schmitt is constituted through the “link between localization and order” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 C. Schmitt, “Appropriation/Distribution/Production.” Supra note 48, at 52.    
52 I. Ley, “Which Role for Theory in International law? Report on the Workshop ‘Kelsen - 
Schmitt - Arendt: Constitutionalism in (International) Law’.” German Law Journal 11 (2010): 
1312. See also I. Augsberg, “Carl Schmitt's Fear: Nomos - Norm - Network.” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 23, no. 4 (2010): 741-757. 
53 On Schmitt and his longing for legal determinacy, see W.E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End 
of Law. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999: 15-38.  
54 Schmitt’s desire of maintaining the connection between people and law strongly resembles 
the ideas of the German Historical School of the 19th century. For example such sentiments are 
visible in the work of Friedrich Carl von Savigny who theorised about the “organic connection 
of law with the being and character of the people.” See F. C. Von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our 
Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence. Translated by Abraham Hayward. London: Littlewood & co., 
1831: 27.  For an interesting article on Schmitt’s nomos see, F. Jameson, “Notes on Nomos” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 104, no. 2 (2005): 199-204. In this piece Jameson locates Schmitt’s nomos 
between Marxian historiography and Heideggerian ‘ontological nostalgia’, and more importantly 
predicts difficulties for spatial structuralisation through cyberspace.  
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implies a zone of exclusion from law in its conceptualisation of sovereignty.55 It is within 
these zones of exception that Schmitt promoted legal determinacy. However the act of 
ordering, nomos, is primarily a political act, given the primacy and autonomy of ‘the 
political’ for Schmitt.56 It is this characteristic of ‘the political’ that gives law and nomos a 
fluidity of a political/social nature. Still, this fluidity is radically different from that 
which is imagined by positivist and romantic legal scholars who according to Schmitt 
failed to maintain the hierarchy of law without losing its autonomy to “heterarchical 
occasionalism” of liberal law.57 It is the primacy and fluidity of ‘the political’ that gives 
nomos the character of a ‘living’ law, historically and spatially in flux.       
The primacy of the political for Schmitt shows itself through two interrelated 
mechanisms; through the entire political entity (macro) and through systems within the 
structure (micro). Schmitt’s political “defines and delimits the entire political entity (for 
modern Europe: the nation-state) that protects, as it were, the structure that allows for 
these other systems.”58 In other words, by defining the state of exception, the political 
provides the structure within which other ‘systems’ can exist. This structural primacy 
also shows itself within each of the systems. According to Schmitt, “[e]very religious, 
moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis [...] transforms into a political one if it is 
sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy.”59 
Therefore, the grouping of people into systems is primarily conditioned by the 
structural necessity of the friend/enemy distinction, and hence each grouping becomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 G. Agamben, quoted by William Rasch in W. Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the 
Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political [hereinafter “Sovereignty and its Discontents”]. 
London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004: 137.  
56 For an analysis of Schmitt’s theory of ‘the political’ see, W. Rasch, Sovereignty and its Disontents. 
Ibid.   
57 Augsberg describes Schmitt’s fear of “a society no longer based on common grounds”, a fear 
which Schmitt associates with the Romanticism of liberal law. Augsberg then locates this fear in 
what he calls the “heterarchical” connectivity of networks. See generally, I. Augsberg, “Carl 
Schmitt's Fear: Nomos - Norm – Network.” Supra note 52.  
58 W. Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents. supra note 55: 10.    
59 Schmitt quoted by Rasch. Ibid.     
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a “materialisation” of the political on a “micro” level. In line with this structural 
perspective, one can expand this primacy to the realm of law. This partly explains why 
Schmitt was keen on maintaining the connection between the legal decision maker and the 
people (folk).60 Arguably, this was to make sure the determinacy of law is consistent with 
the movements of the political, while the autonomy and hierarchy of law is kept intact.  
For Schmitt, nomos is a periodising and a spatialising category, formed through the 
political act of deciding on the friend/foe distinction. Whether we agree with the 
applicability of the concept in explaining the contemporary global order, an order that 
tends to differentiate functionally rather than spatially,61 nomos still holds its character as 
a concept of law, constantly affecting and being affected by the political and social. By 
seeking concreteness, it escapes transcendence, and hence maintains the authority of 
law, not through the creation of a separate space for law, but by situating the legal 
decision maker inside the space of regulation (physically).  
Of course any concept which seeks spatial situatedness has a conception of space in the 
background, and in case of Schmitt this conception is uncontroversially a physical 
space, characterised by geographical delimitation, concretely situated in land. This 
association of space with land is on the one hand very similar to the spatial 
characteristics of logos. This is arguably because Schmitt’s notion of law, even though 
socially situated, still held on to the idea that the society or the social happens within a 
territorially bounded sovereign entity.  
My use of the concept of nomos is positioned in opposition to this notion of space, but 
holds on to Schmitt’s belief in seeking concreteness through social situatedness. Before 
explaining this in detail in the next section, I want to focus on another influential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Early on in his career, Schmitt in “State, Movement and Folk” asserts that the solution to 
legal indeterminacy is ensuring the homogeneity of folk and ensuring State’s “bindedness to the 
folk” (volksgebundenheit). For a thorough analysis of Schmitt’s discussion of legal determinacy see 
William E. Scheuerman, “Legal Indeterminacy and the Origins of Nazi Legal Thought: The 
Case of Carl Schmitt.” History of Political Thought 17, no. 4 (1996): 571-590  
61 I. Augsberg, “Carl Schmitt's Fear: Nomos - Norm – Network.” Supra note 52.  
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scholar who formulated a conception of law as nomos, which shares Schmitt’s concern 
for the significance of the social for the legal, but radically differs from it in its 
conception of spatiality.  
Robert Cover’s formulation of nomos, points even more strongly to the fluidity of the 
law “as convention, what is done and what is accepted.”62 He uses the term nomos in his 
classic piece Nomos and Narrative, where he introduces the term as the “normative 
universe” we live in.63 In this formulation of nomos, the experience of living is vested in the 
concept of “narrative”, and it is this that “locate[s] law and give[s] it meaning.”64 In 
other words, narrative and the life of narrative gives life to law, and without it, law loses 
it social meaning. Cover argues that it is through different “genres of narrative – history, 
fiction, tragedy, comedy–,”65  manifested in “corpus, discourse, and interpersonal 
commitments,”66 that legal meaning is created (“jurisgenesis”).67 This understanding of 
nomos challenges the naturalisation of the ‘liberal’ identification of ‘law’ with “the 
professional paraphernalia of social control”, which according to cover are, “but a small 
part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention.”68 This “liberal” view 
on law is very much in line with my description of logos, which, as argued above through 
Hart’s theory, relies on the detachment of the law and the “officials” who hold the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 R. Birla, “Performativity between Logos and Nomos.” Supra note 22, at 91. 
63 R.M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative 
[hereinafter “Nomos and Narrative”].” Harvard Law Review 97 (1983): 4. Cover’s analysis of 
nomos is essentially a theory in legal hermeneutics. This analysis is seen to resonate “with the 
classical sociology of Max Weber, as well as poststructuralist interventions of Foucault and 
Derrida.” See R. Birla, “Performativity Between Logos and Nomos.” Supra note 22, at 91. 
Cover’s take on nomos is also influenced by the works of the sociologist Ronald Dworkin. 
Amongst the Scholars who have used Cover’s understanding of nomos as a normative universe 
where creation of legal meaning is performed through narrative, is Frank Michelman who 
applied Cover’s theory to propose new perspectives on republican constitutionalism in his work 
“Law’s Republic.” For a more direct analysis and use of Cover’s theory, see F.G. Snyder, 
“Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory of Law [hereinafter 
“Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication”].” William and Mary Law Review 40, no. 5 (1999): 1623-
1730.  
64 R.M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative.” Ibid, at 4.  
65 Ibid., at 10. 
66 Ibid., at 12. 
67 Ibid., at 11-44. 
68 R. M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative.” Supra note 63. 
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authority from the fluidity of people’s experiences of sociality.69 Inspired by the works 
of sociologists such as Peter Berger, he sees nomos as a ‘meaningful’ order,70 taking shape 
through a “cultural medium”.71 Therefore, even though nomos encompasses the “the 
rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of 
a social order” (associated with logos), it does not limit the experience and life of law to 
the detached spaces of authority associated with logos.  
Cover’s nomos, or normative universe, is a world both “created” and “maintained” 
through two processes called paideic and imperial respectively. By the former, Cover 
refers to a body of common precepts and constituted directions, characterising the 
process through which the individual and community “work out the implications of 
their law.”72 This community oriented pattern through which “corpus, discourse, and 
interpersonal commitments” are combined, simultaneously creates and challenges 
commonalities of legal meaning established within a society. In other words a nomos 
created solely by paideic patterns is essentially unstable and arguably chaotic. In other 
words “the obvious result of all this paideic world-creation is chaos.”73 Even though it is 
out of commonality, that a paideic normative world is “created”, the “unification of 
meaning that stands at its [the paideic normative order] centre exists only for an instant, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See note 41 above and the accompanying text.  
70 See footnote 2 at R. M. Cover, "Nomos and Narrative.” Supra note 63, at 4. In his attempt to 
theorise (sociologically) the relationship between religion and what he calls “world-building.” 
Peter Berger puts the concept of nomos as “[a] meaningful order [...] imposed upon the discrete 
experiences and meanings of individuals” and argues that “the individual is provided by society 
with various methods to stave off the nightmare world of anomy and to stay within the safe 
boundaries of the established nomos.” Berger, Peter L. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological 
Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor Books, 1990: 19-24. In a footnote to his text, Berger 
further points to the origin of his use of the term nomos, the work of the late 19th Century 
sociologist Emile Durkheim. In his own words “the term “nomos” is indirectly derived from 
Durkheim by, as it were, turning around his concept of anomie.” This latter concept means a 
situation where bonds between the individual and society are broken. Nomos then is a concept 
used to theorise those very bonds which ‘order’ the relations and experiences within a society. It 
is following this conceptualisation that Cover associates a central role to narrative in the 
formation of these social bonds. One could go even further and say that the narratives are the 
bonds.  
71 R.M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative.” Ibid, at 11.  
72 Ibid., at 13.  
73 F.G. Snyder, “Nomos, Narrative, and Adjudication.” Supra note 63, at 1633.  
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and that instant is itself imaginary.”74 This is a situation where fluidity of a legal order 
tends towards normative disorder. However Cover’s notion of nomos does not end with 
perpetual instability and temporality of law.   
The second pattern present in any stable nomos is the imperial. This is a model in which 
“norms are universal and enforced by [social] institutions”;75 a system where norms are 
applied in an “impartial and neutral” way, and “discourse is premised on objectivity – 
upon which is external to the discourse itself.”76 In the normatively diverse and arguably 
chaotic world of paideic order, it is the imperial that seeks to stop the imagined order 
from disintegrating, and it does this through the “psychological motif [of] separation.”77 
In other words by imposing certain organising principles, society achieves stability at the 
price of the production of normative meaning. However, even though “the precepts we 
call law are marked off by social control [...], the narratives that create and reveal 
patterns of commitment, resistance, and understanding [...] are radically uncontrolled.”78 
In other words, the precepts go through different narrative traditions which take away 
unity of meaning from them and make them essentially contested. At this point, Cover 
argues that in a liberal society, control is disclaimed over narrative and the contested 
nature of order is ignored.79    
Significant about these two accounts of nomos in this chapter and the wider thesis are the 
shared characteristics which conceptually shape nomos. Speaking of similarities between 
Schmitt and Cover goes beyond the mere sharing of a word in their analysis. Their 
conceptual framework of nomos, or more generally their views about order and law, 
shares a sociological grounding of norms’ validity and determinacy. In addition, both 
their theories are reactions to the liberal formulations of law. Firstly, there is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 R.M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative.” supra note 63, at 15. 
75 Ibid., at 13.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., at 16. 
78 Ibid., at 17. 
79 Ibid., at 18. 
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connection between the Cover’s idea of “corpus, discourse, and interpersonal 
commitments,” and Schmitt’s much championed image of “people” (folk).80 One can 
argue that Cover’s jurisgenesis takes place within a folk as well.81 For Cover, “the 
normative universe is held together by the force of interpretive commitments – some 
small and private, others immense and public.”82 As such, the existence and the 
contingencies of society are an inherent part of both their theories of nomos.  
In addition to this, Cover clearly states that nomos and the creation of legal meaning 
“takes place always through an essentially cultural medium.”83 The mediums through 
which nomos is seen an act of spatial ordering and/or jurisgenesis, are different between 
Schmitt and Cover. However, the creative force of the social, political and/or the 
collective is recognised as the vital element in the formation of the normative universe 
by both authors. This is visible in Schmitt’s approach to both domestic law and what he 
calls “the nomos of the Earth.” As a result, they both create an understanding of nomos as 
a concept of law which escapes the transcendence of legal meaning, and seek to create a 
legal order in touch with the socio/political reality in which the law is to operate. So for 
both scholars, the space of the regulator and the regulated is to a great extent 
overlapping. This overlap is a central condition for both Schmitt and Cover for the 
validity, legitimacy and meaningfulness of law. Therefore, what they do through nomos is 
to emphasise the centrality of law as something which is more than just regulation but is 
indeed embedded in everyday social experience. They differ however, in how they 
characterise this overlap, which for Schmitt is purely physical, and for Cover 
“otherworldly”. In the next section, I will expand on this in order to distinguish my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Schmitt’s quote on the relation of “folk” and law, see note 60.  
81 Cover also refers to the centrality of “folk” as the place where the dichotomy of law as power 
and law as meaning manifests itself. See R. M. Cover, “Nomos and Narrative.” Supra note 63, at 
18.  
82 Ibid., at 7.  
83 Ibid., at 11. 
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approach to nomos from the two scholars, and thus offering a working definition of the 
concept for this project.  
3.3.1.  Schmit t ,  Cover  and the “Spat ia l” 
In an insightful observation regarding Schmitt’s and Cover’s understandings of nomos, 
Delaney argues that for the latter “the spatial and material characteristics of worlds are 
ignored or given a mystical, otherworldly inflection”, and for the former “concrete 
spatiality is foregrounded.”84 When Schmitt argues that “law is bound to the earth and 
related to the earth,” he is certainly referring to space in its most concrete sense. In his 
formulation, law is conditioned solely by physical spatiality, and social spaces are not 
explicitly recognised. For Cover nomos is a normative universe which is separated from 
“the physical universe of mass, energy and momentum”, and this is diagrammatically 
different to Schmitt’s understanding of nomos as an essentially spatial order. In Delaney’s 
words, “Cover’s [nomos] is a comparatively spectral, dematerialized and anemic 
nomos.”85 Even if these two thinkers (Schmitt and Cover) share “a largely unexplicated 
and unproblematized notion of ‘community’,” Schmitt’s reliance on a “flat, static 
inside/outside” orientation and Cover’s sole focus on dematerialised “normative 
commitments” for the generation of legal meaning, renders their nomos ambivalent 
regarding law which is always lived, performed and experienced within the socio-spatial 
materiality. This is the reason why I am in agreement with Delaney that the relation 
between spatiality and law should go beyond nomos as theorised by Schmitt and Cover. 
However, even though Delaney uses neologisms (“nomicity” and “nomosphericity”) to 
do this, I will continue referring to it as nomos; another theoretical synthesis (like logos) 
which I shall build upon and further clarify (especially regarding space) in the following 
chapter(s).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 D. Delaney, “Nomospheric Investigations.” Supra note 34, at 31-33.  
85Ibid., at 31.  
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Therefore, in this analysis, nomos is a conception of law influenced by, but also different 
from, Schmitt’s and Cover’s projects in which nomos plays a fundamental role. The first 
characteristic of nomos in this project is strongly influenced by the two abovementioned 
theories and that is an understanding of law rooted and situated within a “community” 
or social experience. This community oriented theory of law leads to the second 
characteristic, and that is normative fluidity as opposed to the fixity of logos explained 
above. In the case of Cover legal meaning oscillates through narrative traditions of the 
community, in order to create epistemic commonalities, is a state of constant flow. This 
is also seen in Schmitt’s connecting of nomos to the processes of appropriation, 
distribution and production.86 Arguably more important is Schmitt’s historical analysis 
of the international order in “Nomos of the Earth”, where he situates nomos in a spatio-
temporally fluid framework, produced and re-formulated through different eras and as a 
result of “new spatial phenomen[a]” such as the “free sea”.87 However the fluidity 
derived from Cover and Schmitt’s nomos is either spatially mystified (Cover) or is 
“contained” (Schmitt) and this is where my understanding and use of nomos is different 
and closer to Delaney’s “nomicity”.88 For this project, nomos aims to go beyond the 
concrete spatiality of Schmitt, and the Cover’s dematerialisation of the normative 
universe.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Schmitt argues that “the close proximity, the sequence and changing evaluation of the three 
basic categories of appropriation, distribution and production inherent in every concrete nomos 
and latent in all legal, economic and social systems [...].” See C. Schmitt, 
“Appropriation/Distribution/Production.” Supra note 48, at 55. 
87 C. Schmitt, Nomos of the Earth. Supra note 47, at 48.  
88 Delaney promotes the idea of “nomicity” as a concept which “is at least as concerned with 
issues of materiality and performativity as with “interpretive commitments” and normativity”, 
and is also “informed by a richer and more self-consciously problematizing spatial imaginary.” 
See D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Supra note 34, at 31. I will draw on this notion further 
in the next chapter where I expand my understanding of spatiality with respect to cyberspace 
and law.  
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3.3.2.  Beyond the Physi ca l/Mental  Binary  
Perceiving the world of law as nomos not only means seeing space as socially produced, 
performed, and materially situated, but also a concept which goes beyond the law/space 
and space/society binaries. In order to remove the aforementioned binaries, and 
connect the community oriented notion of the legal in Schmitt and Cover, with a fluid 
and co-produced notion of space, I find three theorists particularly useful, namely 
Delaney, Foucault and Massey. Apart from Delaney who is a self acclaimed legal 
geographer, the latter two do not outline their theory of space through an analysis of the 
“legal”. Nonetheless, all three theories and approaches have a key quality in common, 
and that is looking at the social through the plurality and multiplicity of human lived 
experience (performativity in the case of Delaney), and hence allowing us to further 
challenge fundamental assumptions about space, law and society, and their respective 
relationship to one another (largely dominated by logos). In the remainder of this chapter 
I shall focus on these theories in order to take the final step in the construction of nomos 
as a conceptual framework which allows us to best understand and observe the relation 
between the legal, the social and the spatial. 
Building on his critique of Schmitt and Cover, Delaney offers one of the most 
important and overarching critical engagements with the field of legal geography. As I 
pointed out in chapter one, Delaney argues that legal geography is at a critical impasse, 
which is characterised by a continuing divide between physical and abstract conceptions 
of space, and hence maintaining the conceptual distinction between law 
(abstract/mental/discursive) and space (real/physical/material).89 In his attempt to 
provide “an account of how space [...] is produced through human agency,” he develops 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 For a brief explanation of what Delaney means by the impasse, see chapter one, notes 60-61 
and the accompanying text. Alternatively see D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Ibid., at 12-24.  
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specific neologisms the most important of which is nomosphere.90 He defines this spatio-
legal term as “the cultural-material environs that are constituted by the reciprocal 
materialization of ‘the legal’, and the legal signification of the ‘socio-spatial’, and the 
practical, performative engagements through which such constitutive moments happen and 
unfold.”91 In order to further elaborate on the relation of Delaney’s theory to the notion 
of nomos used in this project, I shall briefly expand on how he offers a fundamental 
reconsideration of our understanding of both law and space through his critical strategy 
of “rotating” the terms/concepts “legal”, “spatial” and “material”. Understanding this 
critical move, especially with regards to the latter is vital to challenging (in chapter four) 
the ways (international) law perceives cyberspace as space.   
In a manner similar to a number of critical (legal) geographers (such as Edward Soja), 
Delaney wishes to move beyond the conventional association of space with the three 
dimensional, Cartesian understanding of materiality. Arguing that this is too restrictive, 
he seeks to “rotate” space by defining it as “imagined”, “discursively organised” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 This is not the first time neologisms of this sort, i.e. aimed at creating spatial categories that 
operate beyond the conventional binaries of law and space, have been used by critical legal 
geographers. A key precursor to Nomosphere, was Nicolas Blomely’s “splice” (noun) and 
“splicing” (verb), in N. Blomley, “From 'What?' to 'So What?': Law and Geography in 
Retrospect.” In Law and Geography, edited by Jane Holder and Carolyn Harrison, 17-33. Oxford 
University Press, 2003. Both these neologisms are arguably attempts at theoretically framing an 
earlier observation of the legal geography tradition, namely that ““law” and “geography” do not 
name discrete factors that shape some third pre-legal, aspatial entity called society. Rather the 
legal and the spatial are, in significant ways, aspects of each other.” See N. Blomely, et al. (eds.). 
The Legal Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001: xviii. For 
a more recent perspective see A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Law's Spatial Turn: 
Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Space.” Law, Culture and the Humanities 7 (2011): 187-
197. 
91 D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Supra note 34, at 25. [Emphasis added] One thing 
Delaney does not clarify in his theoretical voyage is what he exactly means by “performativity”, 
a term which has played an important role to post-structural thought in the past two decades 
(with the works of people such as Jacque Derrida and Judith Butler) but is not in any way 
limited to this school of thought. Importantly one should point to the founding work of 
theorists such as J. L. Austin, who arguably set the foundation of this pervasive terminology. 
Although he never used the exact term of “performativity”, he defines the performative as 
“derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb which is the noun ‘action’: it indicates that 
the issuing of the [verbal] utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought 
of as just saying something.” (at 6-7) According to Austin, performativity is the creator of the 
everyday organic world. See generally J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1962.       
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“performed”.92 The focus on performativity, discourse and imagination not only 
challenges the reduction of space to the physical, it also displaces any reliance on an 
abstracted notion of spatiality, both central to the concept of logos developed above. 
These three characteristics provide us with a framework which has speech and action as 
the fundamental determinants of the how and the what of space. In other words 
spatialities are “produced, reproduced and transformed” through human experience and 
consciousness. To put it in Soja’s words, Delaney’s rotation presents space as a 
“fundamental referent of social being.”93   
Delaney also aims to broaden the legal beyond what “conventional legal thought” has to 
offer us.94 What he calls “rotating the legal” suggests that “the legal is always happening. 
It is performed not only by those we identify as “legal actors”… but by everyone who 
acts in accordance with (or with transgressive reference to) understandings of rules, 
authority, rights, permissions, prohibitions, duties, and so on.”95 This representation of 
the legal is key for understanding the concept of nomos. On the one hand it challenges 
the detachment of law and legal authority observed in logos. By transferring the 
(authority of) the legal from the doer to the doing (the performativity of “act[ing] in 
accordance (or with transgressive reference to)”), he is re-theorising law away from the 
disembodied forms of authority which situated the law outside the “object matter” of the 
law (logos). He also broadens legality from the limited sociology of Austin (“the officials” 
or what Cover refers to as the “professional paraphernalia of social control”) to a plural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Ibid, at 15.  
93 E. W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory. London: Verso, 
1989: 119. See generally, for discussion of the shift in the development of spatial theory, section 
1.2.2.   
94 This goal is not unique to Delaney’s project. Displacing and “broadening the legal” is in line 
with most critical legal scholarship and the legal geography of the past 2-3 decades. See for 
instance, D. Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication. London: Harvard University Press, 1997.  
95D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Supra note 34, at 19.  
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and ever changing happening and doing, deeply intertwined with the sociality of everyday 
life.  
For Delaney, at the heart of changing our perception of the legal and the spatial, we 
should “rotate” the “material”. It is through a re-conceptualisation of materiality that 
Delaney completes the conceptual framework needed for overcoming the impasse 
pointed out earlier. When Delaney speaks of “cultural-material environs”, by material he 
is not referring to objectively imagined things. Instead, following the (re)definition by 
Karen Dale, materiality is seen as “imbued with culture, language, imagination, memory; 
it cannot be reduced to mere object or objectivity.”96 Moreover and crucial to the 
central role of materiality in the space, law, society triangle, is the observation that “it is 
not just that materiality has taken on social [read legal] meanings, but that humans enact 
social [legal] agency through a materiality which simultaneously shapes the nature of 
that social agency.”97 The mutual constitution of social agency and materiality both take 
place through an “enactment” or performativity which is the key to moving away from 
the binary of law and space. This notion of performativity is similar to the one 
discussed above in my analysis of Delaney’s rotated legal. Through the rotated notion of 
materiality, Delaney connects the co-production of both law and space to human 
sociality and the performative experience/space of everyday life. It is through this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 K. Dale, “Building a Social Materiality: Spatiality and Embodied Politics in Organizational 
Control.” Organization 12, no. 5 (2005): 652, discussed in D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. 
Supra note 34, at 20.   The re-conceptualisation of materiality and discursivity in terms of one 
another is a move which has its roots in many post-structural theories of the late 20th century, 
amongst which one can point to thinkers such Judith Butler and the material/discursive realm 
of her theory of performativity. Similarly Karen Barad argues that “materiality is discursive [...] 
just as discursive practices are always already material [...] the relationship between the material 
and the discursive is one of mutual entailment.” See K. Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: 
Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter.” Signs 28, no. 3 (2003): 822. I will 
expand further on this in the chapter four when I reflect on the alternative spatial imaginings 
law can embrace when dealing with the spatiality of cyberspace; i.e. in exploring the useful 
perspective in order to perform the spatio-legal rotations proposed by Delaney.  
97 K. Dale, ibid.  
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rotation, that Delaney ensures law and space are neither purely discursive (mental) nor 
material (physical). 
Building the materiality of everyday human experience in the construction of space is 
also seen in Foucault and Massey. The theory of heterotopia is a particularly important 
attempt by Foucault to construct a theory of space which is neither purely physical and 
locatable, nor completely imaginary and “utopian”.98 Foucault defines heterotopia as:  
real places [...] which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively 
enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found 
within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. 
Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their 
location in reality.99   
Foucault further elaborates on heterotopias by arguing that they are functional and their 
functions change through time and social context. Moreover, these spaces are also able 
to have a multiplicity of spaces juxtaposed “in” them. Finally an important characteristic 
of heterotopias is that it is theorised as having “a function in relation to all the space that 
remains.”100 Therefore, one the one hand, unlike utopias, it is not completely detached 
from all other spaces, and on the other it is simultaneously physically and functionally 
connected (relational), distinguishable and countering what Foucault calls “all other real 
sites”, which can themselves be heterotopias.101     
Hetherington, in an important articulation of heterotopia, understands it as “spaces of 
an alternate ordering.”102 Heterotopias, such as a mirror,103 have direct links to the “real” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 M. Foucault, Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias. March 1967. 
http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html (accessed March 
25, 2011). 
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.[Emphasis added]  
101 Ibid. 
102 K. Hetherington, The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering. London: Routledge, 
1997: 9.   
	  
	  
Page | 108 
spaces and things around us in addition to our embodied cognition. They are alternate 
orderings rooted within a locality. The experience of sociality is conceptually central to 
the construction and development of heterotopias.104 What is meaningful and 
nonsensical are decided discursively amongst people, communities and societies, 
through human interaction and communication. The centrality of discourse to social 
meaningfulness makes communications and discourse also central to the concept of 
sociality. The concept of heterotopia helps us understand “nonsensical” spatiality.105 
What might seem heterotopic to some might seem real or meaningful to others. 
Heterotopia offers us a way of questioning and challenging the binaries of spatiality 
which are not only fundamental to the concept of logos, but also to the place of the 
“spatial” within Schmitt and Cover’s theorisations of nomos. By placing the discursive 
nature of meaningfulness at the heart of spatial organisation, Foucault theorises space 
within the fluid context of everyday social experience only loosely tied to a territorial 
locale. In addition, as Dianna Saco points out, heterotopia is “a space that mimics or 
simulates lived spaces, but that in so doing, calls those spaces we live in into 
question.”106 At the centre of this is a view of space as continuously interacting with 
both the “real” and the discursive and through its perfomativity (as in Delaney’s theory) 
challenging the very essence of dichotomous approaches to space (logos). Through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The first example of a heterotopia mentioned by Foucault is a mirror, which act as a form of 
“utopia” which also “does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the 
position” one occupies.  
104  The “Realm of sociability”, it is argued, “extends beyond the family to the networks of 
friends, peers, and other social relations.” M. Castells, et al., Mobile Communication and Society: A 
Global Perspective. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2007: 91. The definition of the social, society, and 
sociality are amongst the most central concepts not only to sociology but to other disciplines 
such as law, politics and anthropology to name but a few. However, covering the depth of the 
discussions on this topic would certainly fall outside the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, I 
have so far tried to implicitly construct an understanding of sociality. My understanding 
revolves around the complex phenomenon of human communication and interaction, and the 
resulting social experiences. In other words I take sociality to include any form of interaction and 
communication either resulting in, or already part of, a community.   
105 D. Saco, Cybering Democracy: Public Space and the Internet [hereinafter “Cybering Democracy”]. 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002: 13.  
106 Ibid., at 16.  
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heterotopia, the spatial and the social come to together fill the conceptual space 
between them with a combination of social discourse and inter-relational social fluidity. 
Even though on the surface, this is not directly legal, it helps further build the 
conceptual ground for collapsing the distinction between law and space, which is central 
to my understanding of nomos.         
Finally, having a similar intention in mind, i.e. highlighting notions of spatiality which 
have co-constituted sociality at the heart of their epistemological and ontological 
production, I wish to point to the rich scholarship of Doreen Massey regarding the 
nature of space and its political implications. Massey attempts “to make the case for an 
alternative approach to space.”107 Although she humbly reminds the reader of the 
similarity between her spatial theory and the “recent anglophone geographical 
literature”, it is her explicit reliance on concepts such as “relations-between”, 
“interrelations”, and “plurality” that makes her work most useful for this project and 
distinguishes my use of nomos from the understandings offered by Schmitt and Cover. 
Similar to Foucault’s heterotopias, Massey’s understanding of space has an “in-
betweenness”, as “neither a container for always-already constituted identities nor a 
completed closure of holism.”108 According to Massey, this in-betweenness is 
characterised by interrelations amongst a plurality or multiplicity of material practices, 
which is “always under construction” and hence never “closed”.109 She highlights that:  
[i]n this open interactional space there are always connections yet to be made, 
juxtapositions yet to flower into interaction (or not, for not all potential 
connections have to be established), relations which may or may not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 D. Massey, For Space. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005: 9.  
108 Ibid., at 12.  
109 For an overview of Massey’s argument, see Anderson, Ben. “For Space (2005): Doreen 
Massey.” In Key Texts in Human Geography, edited by Phil Hubbard, Rob Kitichin and Gill 
Valentine, 225-234. London: Sage Publication Ltd., 2008. 
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accomplished. Here, then, space is indeed a product of relations [...] and for that 
to be so there must be multiplicity [...]110  
The focus on the connection between material practices par excellence and the inter-
relationality of discourse, points to a shared sensibility regarding the essential 
ingredients of the multiplicity of spatial production; a characteristic visible in both 
Delaney and Foucault’s account of space. Chris Butler reflects on this through the re-
description of Lefebvre’s notion of “spatial practice”.111 Butler argues that “Spatial 
Practice constitutes the physical practices, everyday routines, networks and pathways 
through which the totality of social life is reproduced.”112 In order for nomos to embrace 
and encapsulate the fluidity of everyday life and avoid the mental/physical binary, it is 
vital to theorise space through an interrelational connection between the physical, the 
social and the discursive through the idea of practice.  
To sum up, nomos is a mode of analysis in which the legal and the spatial are seen as 
inherently intertwined and co-constituted through the fluidity of the social. As opposed 
to logos, nomos allows us to, on the one hand, rid ourselves of the law/space binary, and 
on the other hand (and as a result), avoid collapsing our understanding of space back on 
a physical/mental binary. Within the framework of nomos, the socio-spatial and the 
socio-legal together become spatio-legal through what can be characterised as a process of 
co-production;113 a process which renders law and space fundamentally interrelated but 
yet identifiable. Nomos is space and law at the same time. Using the spatial theories of 
Delaney, Foucault and Massey, I sought to prevent the collapse of Schmitt’s and 
Cover’s theories of nomos into either territory or abstraction. In nomos, spaces are no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 D. Massey, For Space. Supra note 107, at 11-12.  
111 For a description of Lefebvre’s theory of space see C. Butler, Henri Lefebvre: Spatial Politics, 
Everyday Life and the Rights to the City. New York: Routledge, 2012: 9-54.   
112 Ibid., at 16 
113 For a discussion of how co-production differs from production, see chapter one, notes 55-59 
and the accompanying text.   
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longer “simply locations or stages upon which situations happen.”114 Nor are they “pre-
existing empty container[s] [...] into which legal meanings have been poured.”115 Instead, 
law and space are lived and co-produced simultaneously through the multiplicity of social 
experiences of everyday life.    
3.4. Conclusion  
This chapter provides my thesis with its central theoretical framework. In order to be 
able to intervene critically in the overlap between cyberspace, international law and 
social movements, I needed to find a critical language so that the legal, the social and 
the spatial are all reflected upon through two central concepts. The dichotomous 
framework of logos and nomos serves this purpose perfectly. However, in order for this 
distinction to be fit for purpose, I needed to synthesise a number of different takes on 
these concepts, since they are both widely used and differently interpreted across time.   
This project is a theoretical exploration aimed at suggesting a critical re-description of 
international law using cyberspace to demonstrate the inadequacy of current theories of 
international law to capture the increasing non-territoriality of social experience around 
the world. Therefore, as the next step of my analysis, having elaborated on the central 
theoretical framework of my analysis, I will use the two concepts of logos and nomos in 
order to provide an alternative description of cyberspace from a legal, social and spatial 
perspective. It is with this re-description in mind, and holding on to the two modes of 
analysis provided in this chapter, that I proceed with the remainder of this thesis, 
making the case for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the socio-spatiality of 
international law.   
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Chapter 4 – Cyberspace, International Law and Space: A Re-
Description 
 
Cyberspace exists insofar as it can be said to exist, by virtue of human agency. 
W. Gibson  
4.1. Introduction   
In the previous chapter, I constructed a theoretical framework around the two concepts 
of logos and nomos for conceptualising the relation between law, space and society. In this 
chapter, I utilise this theoretical framework and bring it to bear upon the (international) 
legal understanding of cyberspace discussed in the second chapter.   
This chapter is a turning point in my analysis since it is the first of three chapters, which 
apply the distinction between logos and nomos to three interrelated concepts/categories, 
namely, cyberspace, the “international” and social movements. To reiterate a point 
made in the introductory chapter, for this thesis the relation between these 
concepts/categories stems from the close relationship between social movements and 
cyberspace in the contemporary era. This observation combined with the sensibility 
provided by the social movements and international law literature regarding the co-
constituted nature of the two (e.g. by Balakrishnan Rajagopal), puts cyberspace in a 
direct relationship with international law. However, this relationship has not been 
theorised by international law scholarship so far. This chapter provides the first step to 
this analysis, which is ultimately aimed at questioning and destabilising the predominant 
ways the socio-spatiality of the “international” is treated in international law. In 
addition, this chapter importantly substantiates the difference between the Internet and 
cyberspace through the logos/nomos distinction.    
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In contrast to approaches which equate cyberspace with the Internet and treat it as an 
object of regulation, in this chapter I re-describe cyberspace using the analytical 
framework of nomos. This entails, first and foremost, dealing with “content” not as a 
filler of empty space to be dealt with by regulation, but rather a set of complex socio-
spatial phenomena to be engaged with. The re-description provided will conceive of 
cyberspace as a fluid non-territorial socio-spatiality, or a co-constituted “international” 
socio-spatial experience.  
This chapter proceeds in the following way. In the first section, I will draw on the 
descriptions of the second chapter regarding the international regulatory/governance 
mechanisms of the Internet and the debates surrounding it, in order to reflect on the 
theoretical framework they imply (logos). Following this, I will proceed to re-describe 
cyberspace beyond the Internet (logos) through the spatio-legal insights provided by 
nomos and its theoretical components. I will finally move to examining the kind of 
possibilities that a re-desciption through nomos provides international law, arguing that it 
has the potential to provide conceptual access to the non-territorial social interactions 
and experiences which characterise an increasing portion of everyday life around the 
world. I will conclude by offering some preliminary reflections on the critical 
potential(s) provided by this re-description and the socio-spatial access it provides us, to 
the wider discipline of international law.  
4.2. International Law and Cyberspace: the Dominance of Logos  
The role of international law with regards to the Internet have so far crystallised in two 
main forms; international multistakeholder institutions, and intergovernmental 
governance (both treaty arrangements and intergovernmental institutions like the UN).1 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I am using international law here in a broad sense, consistent with the observations discussed 
in the previous chapter.  
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I further emphasised, in the different sections of chapter two, that all these forms are 
characterised by what I called an “obsession with regulation” even though 
“governance” has been the preferred term for legal engagement since the earliest days 
of the Internet. The argument here is that the two types of international legal 
engagement spelled out can be categorised as logos.   
From the late 1980s, international institutions played a central role in the governance 
and development of the Internet, its standards and regulations. In other words, they 
have been the main forum through which law has engaged with the Internet on a cross-
border scale.2 The growing consensus amongst these institutions, at least since the early 
2000s,3 was and remains that a multistakeholder approach, where all stakeholders take 
an active role in the regulatory processes, is the most suitable governance method for 
the Internet.4 This consensus was partly the result of the arguments against the sole 
control of states over the Internet given the multiplicity of actors and limitations of 
state jurisdiction in an essentially borderless (at least within the definitions of 
international law) space. Although there are great merits in taking a multistakeholder 
stance, the regulatory regime takes a one directional approach toward the Internet.5 By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Consistent with the use of law in the previous chapter, I am referring to law in a broad sense 
to include rules, norms, principles, standards, etc.   
3 Multistakeholderism was not invented in the early 2000s. Especially in the case of Internet 
governance, institutions such as the Internet Society and ICANN have operated a 
multistakeholder governance system from the 1990s.  
4 I should note here that not everyone regards multistakeholderism as the best approach to 
Internet governance. The growing concern amongst many scholars is the this approach has 
many limitations, and if it is to play a continued leading role in setting the foreground for 
inclusive and transparent Internet governance, certain practical and definitional changes should 
take place. See for instance, W. Drake, “Multistakeholderism: Internal Limitations and External 
Limits.” MIND: Co:llaboratory Discussion Paper Series, September 2011: 68-73; and F. Musiani, 
“WSIS+10: The Self-Praising Feast of Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance.” Internet 
Policy Review 2, no. 2 (2013): 1-7. 
5 Of course there are other limitations to the multistakeholder approach. As shown also in 
chapter three, issues of finance, technicalities and time are amongst the many issues. In the 
words of Waz and Weiser, “not every potential stakeholder has the financial wherewithal, the 
technical expertise, or the ability to commit time and talent to participate in the large and 
growing number of multistakeholder organizations.” (at 337) For a general discussion of the 
processes of multistakeholder Internet governance see J. Waz, and P. Weiser, “Internet 
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including different actors in a regulatory authority or creating inclusive but yet selective 
forums, the relation between the law and the regulated space remains as a form of 
“external prescription”. The actors or stakeholders, who in one way or another are 
involved in the management and norm making in and about cyberspace are located 
through certain procedures and requirements in a position in which they can agree on 
or decide on norms or norm making principles. There is no better place to look for this 
than the definition of IG agreed upon in the WSIS process.  
To recall from the previous chapter, Internet governance was defined as “the 
development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in 
their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.”6 This is admittedly a 
rather vague and general definition. But seen through the practice of the IGF, the main 
characteristics of logos (fixity of the legal and the spatio-legal detachment of authority) 
come through. The existence of a specified forum (meeting in a specific place),7 through 
which decisions are made and laws/regulations/standards are fixed regarding both the 
form and the content of the Internet,8 locates multistakeholderism nicely within the 
spatial characteristic of logos. Within this system, stakeholders who have the means and 
opportunity to engage in multistakeholder governance are externalised from cyberspace, 
carrying their respective roles into a created forum such as the WGIG or the IGF, and 
treat cyberspace as a “norm object” which requires legal intervention to ensure its 
smooth evolution and use. 
However, given the fact that multistakeholder forums generally do not have a (hard) law 
making capacity and the forums act as discussion platforms rather than law making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Governance: The Role of Multistakeholder Organisation.” Journal of Telecommunications and High 
Technology Law 10, no. 2 (2013): 331-350. 
6 WSIS. Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.1)-E, Tunis: ITU, 
2005. http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html (accessed August 20, 2014) 
7 The IGF has met in different places/cities (Athens, Nairobi, Bali, etc.) each year since 2006.  
8 See sections 2.3.1. for a description, and 4.2. for a discussion of multistakeholder governance.     
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bodies, the rules and norms are still made and applied by the civil society, the private 
sector and most importantly by governments. If rules and decision making procedures 
are agreed to, they then become part of a legal regime which becomes self referential in 
nature and continues to objectify cyberspace. The multistakeholder governance 
approach is to achieve, on a transnational level, “shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures”, which will then be applied to cyberspace. Apart from the 
objectification of cyberspace either as a fixed structure or a container, the authority of 
the decision makers and the actors become fixed and detached spatially, temporally and 
conceptually from the everyday life and spatiality of cyberspace.9 This means that 
whenever cyberspace becomes the subject of international law, it is treated as an 
objectified thing, the norms and principles of which the stakeholders are to decide upon. 
The inclusivity of multistakeholderism as a transnational process only reinforces the 
detachment (both spatial and normative) of the traditional players (standard setting 
institutions and governments). By including the vague categories of “civil society” and 
“private sector” in the process, they are separated from the context within which the 
normative order is to be lived. Whether or not the multistakeholder governance is 
successful at inclusiveness and/or hard norm making, it still fits the conception of logos 
described above. 
However, as has been shown in recent debates on telecommunications regulation,10 
multistakeholderism is not always viewed as the most inclusive and desirable approach 
to Internet governance. It is often viewed with suspicion by critics of Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In the next section, I will explore the idea of cyberspace as a lived space of multiple social 
experiences, with neither an inside nor an outside but intertwined with the socio-spatiality of 
our everyday lives.  
10For example, in the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-
12). See D. P. Fidler, “Internet Governance and International Law: The Controversy 
Concerning Revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations.” ASIL Insights 17, 
no. 6 (February 2013). See also C. Arthur, “Internet Remains Unregulated after UN Treaty 
Blocked.” The Guardian. 14 December 2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/14/telecoms-treaty-internet-unregulated 
(accessed April 17, 2013). 
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dominance over issues of global Internet governance. As a reaction to such dominance, 
governance through a hybrid of national and intergovernmental 
organisations/institutions has become a favoured option by many countries within the 
“developing world”.11 Perhaps another reason for this is the relative failure of 
multistakeholderism to offer any practical solutions to certain problems, especially ones 
that involve content. Intergovernmental legal mechanisms for the Internet are very 
limited but they are certainly gaining importance in recent years with the increased 
involvement of UN agencies such as ITU and UNESCO, and the calls for the 
expansion of treaty arrangements regarding the Internet.  
Most content issues are relegated to or imagined as problems of national courts (human 
rights obligations, privacy and conflict of laws). Even in the rare occasion of having a 
proper international treaty such as the Budapest Convention, the content of the 
Internet is imagined to be stored within this container-like space which is “filled” and 
“accessed” by criminals who reside in a territorial state. Similarly in the case of the 
WTO/WIPO dispute resolution between states again, even if the sociality of cyberspace 
(resulting from content and interaction) is considered by international legal mechanisms, 
it is localised within a territorial state so that it can be brought to the dispute resolution 
forums within these institutions. Of course, there is no problem as such with this 
approach, given that there are real issues to be dealt with regarding content, and given 
the lack of enforcement mechanisms for international law, national courts (and in rare 
occasions international dispute settlement systems) end up being the last resort. 
However, this demonstrates and characterises how cyberspace is predominantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Chinese and Russian proposals during the 2012 conference were only reminiscent of 
earlier calls for increasing national and intergovernmental control over the Internet proposed 
very early in the life of the WSIS process. For a recent reflection on the resistance to the 
dominant models of Internet governance, see A. Bhuiyan, Internet Governance and the Global South. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014: 51-72.  
	  
	  
Page | 118 
understood by international law, an understanding which resonates in both recent 
proposals and scholarly engagements.   
A turn to direct intergovernmentalism for regulation of the Internet by the developing 
world (as proposed during the WSIS process) is often characterised as a move to 
legitimately bring the Internet within a system which ultimately functions by consent of 
territorial states and their governments. If multistakeholder governance, as a way of 
achieving more inclusive norm making, reflecting the multiplicity of actors and 
stakeholders involved in the Internet, is still characterised by logos, the move to 
intergovernmental governance only exacerbates the spatial detachments and legal fixities 
which characterise the concept of logos. Governments are only one amongst many 
entities using and experiencing the borderless space of the Internet, and by bringing the 
governance of the Internet under the umbrella of intergovernmental organisations like 
the UN, laws’ authority is only further detached from the actors, communities and 
spaces, which become further objectified in the eyes of law. The spatial framework 
through which governmental and intergovernmental law largely operates, is based on 
principles of exclusive national (territorial) jurisdiction, which is at best questionable 
spatial criteria when dealing with cyberspace.12 The inevitable territoriality of 
intergovernmental law making renders the user’s social experiences, interactions and 
communications largely a matter of local or national concern and hence makes it absent 
from the analytical/operational framework of law. As described by Zoe Pearson, 
“international legal regulation seeks to provide ‘accurate’, orderly and rational process 
and interpretation of the world, but in doing so draws artificially simple disciplinary and 
conceptual borders around a more complex reality.”13 This is precisely what logos entails, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See generally the exceptionalist v. non-exceptionalist debate, Chapter 2, notes 2-5 and the 
accompanying text. More specifically regarding international law, see for instance, H. H. Jr. 
Perritt, “The Internet is Changing International Law.” Chicago-Kent Law Review 73 (1998): 997-
1054.  
13 Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Griffith Law Review 17, no. 2 (2008): 489-514: 493.  
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and it is because of the “more complex reality” that a different (read complimentary) 
conception of law, space and society is required. Nomos provides that alternative.   
At times, the existence of Internet content and the difficulties of regulating it lead 
scholars to make room for an idea of cyberspace as a separate space. International law 
scholarship, from the early days of the Internet until now, fits a direct or indirect 
reliance on real space categories (through spatial analogies) when treating cyberspace. In 
Cyber-Nations by Ruth Wedgwood, we observe an early example of dealing with 
cyberspace from an international law perspective in which examples of “cyber-
countries” and the web-presence of supposedly non-territorial communities are used to 
challenge the territorial underpinning of the international imaginary. Even though her 
analysis highlights the importance of “political enterprise” for nation-hood, “nation” is 
still an imagined category, which even though is not directly associated with 
territoriality, still has a condition of boundedness at its heart.14  
A more recent example of the presence of cyberspace in international legal literature is 
the emergence of Andrew Murray’s “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace” as an official topic of 
engagement under a sub-section called “Other Global Problem Badly in Need of 
Substantive Legal Regulation”.15  In this analysis, Murray insists on the realisation of the 
spatial difference and separation of space (defined as “the lawyer’s natural [physical] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities, boldly expresses the idea that “the nation is 
imagined as limited because even the largest of them [...] has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond 
which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself conterminous with mankind.” See B. 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism [hereinafter 
“Imagined Communities”]. London: Verso, 1991: 7. Ruth Wedgwood also makes use of Anderson’s 
theory in the context of cyberspace, by stating that “territorial boundaries may extend beyond 
the limits of a community’s self conception.” R. Wedgwood, “Cyber-Nations.” Kentucky Law 
Journal 88 (2000): 965. Nevertheless, the problem exists with the requirement of “extension” of 
a boundary. This only confirms the “atavistic” nature of traditional geographic imagination in a 
discipline such as international law.    
15 I am referring to “Realizing Utopia”, edited by the late Antonio Cassese and specifically 
Andrew Murray’s reflections on the relation between international law and cyberspace. See A. 
Murray, “Uses and Abuses of Cyberspace: Coming to Grips with the Present Dangers 
[hereinafter “Uses and Abuses”].” In Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law, edited by 
Antonio Cassese, 496-507. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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environment”) and cyberspace (defined as “the global network of interdependent 
information technology infrastructures, telecommunications networks, and computer 
processing systems”).16 However valuable it is to finally have a conversation on 
cyberspace and spatiality in critical international law scholarship, Murray’s idea of 
“differentness” does not go beyond the categories of space associated with logos since he 
firmly remains in the vernacular of regulation and the creation of “de facto jurisdiction 
for cyberspace content.”17 Seen through the current international legal mechanisms and 
discussions, if the concept of cyberspace is used, what is meant seems to be Internet 
(infrastructure and Code) plus content. In this framework, users and their social 
experiences exist within the territorial setting of the state, and cyberspace is either 
explicitly or implicitly reduced to mean the Internet and its infrastructure, again located 
within the physical/real world that law detaches itself (through logos) for the purpose of 
regulation. 
Therefore, by equating cyberspace to the Internet, and treating it as merely a new 
technology used by users, international law reduces its relation to cyberspace to a 
relation characterised by logos (positioning itself in a largely regulatory relation fixed 
within a territorial spatial frame).18 As far as direct regulation goes, logos (being firmly 
based within the formalistic framework of positivism), seeks to provide certainty and 
predictability. In fact, as I have also mentioned elsewhere, the regulation of content and 
infrastructure is and has been part of the reality of the Internet especially since its 
expansion in the 1990s. However, describing cyberspace in the framework of logos 
(usually as the Internet), fails to capitalise on cyberspace as a socio-spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses.” Ibid., at 496. Murray argues that “international cooperation and 
perhaps even formalization of law through treaty obligation are likely to be successful” [Emphasis 
added] in the areas of e-commerce (UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce), 
intellectual property rights (through WIPO treaties and other similar agreements), and criminal 
law (through the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime).  
17 A. Murray, “Uses and Abuses.” Ibid., at 506.  
18 See the discussion of positivism and logos in section 3.2. 
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phenomena/concept challenging the fundamental categories and assumptions of 
international law, in particular regarding the question of what constitutes the 
“international”. Logos comes at the price of externalising law from its socio-spatial 
context. In order to perform this critical self-reflection on international law, I propose 
re-describing cyberspace using nomos as a mode of analysis, which allows us access to 
cyberspace as a space which is neither physical, nor imaginary, but experienced, lived 
and co-produced. Seen through nomos, cyberspace (as opposed to the Internet) has 
unique spatial characteristics which are absent from the account of logos. It is important 
to articulate this space if I want to use cyberspace in my critique of international law 
itself. As I will argue in the following chapter, logos does not just affect predominant 
international legal engagements with cyberspace, but characterises the way in which the 
“international” as a fundamental concept is widely perceived.    
 
4.3. Re-Describing Cyberspace as Co-Produced Space 
Space is more than distance. It is the sphere of open ended configurations within multiplicities.  
D. Massey 
In this section, I expand on the spatio-legal characteristics of cyberspace seen through 
the lens of the spatial heroes of nomos. What the combination of these scholars provides 
me with is a spatio-legal framework through which one can understand and make sense 
of the spatiality of cyberspace, so that it is not seen as an empty and detached container 
filled with content to be dealt with legally. In other words, through nomos cyberspace 
becomes more than the Internet and its “content”; not a space which is just “visited” by 
(international) law to be regulated. Through a post-disciplinary approach I argue for a 
spatial understanding which looks at the multiplicity of participants/users, and the 
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performativities they are involved in as part of a co-produced socio-spatiality which is 
located in the material/discursive realm of socio-legal multiplicity. My intention here is 
to encapsulate this realm and the modalities of co-production of space/law/society 
through the conception of law as nomos.  
There is a wide consensus amongst legal geographers that “law helps to create place, to 
give it meaning.”19 Law (in the form of Code) is a key element in the production of 
space and place (cyberspace). Therefore as initially theorised by Lessig, law (understood 
both in terms of Code, but also more broadly) has a fundamental role in the creation of 
cyberspace and setting its “boundaries” of possibility.20  However, having the critical 
(legal) geography literature (most importantly Delaney) in mind, we can see why this 
perspective might be deemed at best incomplete, since it places law and space in a one 
directional, yet still detached relationship. In the case of cyberspace, in addition to law, 
Code and the physical infrastructure, the users and their cognitive/social experience 
play a vital role in its socio-spatial production. Their sociality is constantly being made 
and remade through their socio-spatial experiences. According to Julie E. Cohen 
“[cyberspace] is produced by users, and not (in most cases) as a deliberate political 
project, but in the course of going about their lives.”21 This is an important observation 
since it puts human (social) experience at the forefront of spatial production. In other 
words cyberspace is not a space until we (socially) experience and live it as one. Without 
social experience and interactions, infrastructure, Code and software will not make a 
meaningful spatial entity. In the following sub-sections, I will look at cyberspace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A. Sarat, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha Merrill Umphrey. “Where (or What) Is the Place of 
Law? An Introduction.” In The Place of Law, edited by Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas and 
Martha Merrill Umphrey. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2003: 15 
20 See generally, L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books, 1999.  
21 J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Columbia Law Review 107, no. 1 (January 2007): 218. 
For further development of this perspective, see J. E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, 
Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice [hereinafter “Networked Self”]. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2012. 
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through the theoretical framework of Delaney, Foucault and Massey, to re-describe 
cyberspace through nomos.   
4.3.1.  Delaney and Per formativ i ty  
When Delaney points to a strategy of moving beyond the impasse of law and 
geography, we are required to theoretically and practically “rotate” space and law as two 
concepts in order to accommodate for their intrinsic performativity and materiality.22 As 
we observed above, his argument is not regarding a specific type of space and is indeed 
applicable to the category of “space” in general. As observed by Delaney (social) spaces 
are produced, not just as a consequence of social relations, but in the way that the 
spaces are themselves performed. This performativity is seen in every corner of 
cyberspace. Every time a user enters a website with “terms and conditions”, she is 
performing the legal by adhering to and at times breaking it. This is also the case for any 
form of national and at times international (inter-governmental) law that applies to the 
operations of users online. This performativity is not just on a website-specific level. 
Given the conditioning nature of Code as law, the performativity of the legal is built 
into the very fabric of cyberspace. Our experience is produced by and produces the 
socio-legal space that cyberspace is.    
If Delaney is looking for a conception of law which sees “the legal [as] always happening” 
and performed by “everyone who acts in accordance with (or with transgressive reference 
to) understanding of rules, authority, rights, permissions, prohibitions, duties and so 
on”, then that is cyberspace. Everyone who experiences cyberspace is also performing 
both space and law. Cyberspace is a materialisation of the performativity of both space 
and law. It is with this performativity that law starts moving beyond the physical notion 
of “the material”, beyond object and objectivity, towards encompassing culture, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For Delaney’s idea of “rotation” of the material, the legal and the spatial, see discussion in 
section 3.3.2. 
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language, memory, etc. It is this alternate materiality which is constructed through the 
production of cyberspace as a co-constituted space with non-territorial socio-spatiality.    
The analysis offered by George Landow who looks at the concept of “Hypertext” 
introduced by Theodor H. Nelson in the 1960s, will help demonstrate my 
understanding of the fluid and performative structure of cyberspace. According to 
Nelson hypertext means “nonsequential writing – text that branches and allows choices to 
the reader.”23 This definition does not concern itself with the content and the semantics 
involved with the text. It describes the settings in which a form consisting of words can 
embody fluidity and movement within its assumed structure. As Landow explains:  
[r]eaders move though a web or network of texts, they continually shift the center 
– and hence the focus or organizing principle – of their investigation and 
experience. Hypertext, in other words, provides an infinitely re-centerable system 
whose provisional point of focus depends upon the reader, who becomes a truly 
active reader in yet another sense.24  
The resulting fluidity allows for a countless number of shifts from a few web-pages. 
Through the use of hypertext the reader is allowed to navigate the many conditions of 
possibility in front of her and to experience cyberspace. Hypertext, made available 
through the WWW, makes it possible to imagine the “performativity” of cyberspace 
more easily. By this I mean that the use of hypertexts is one way through which 
cyberspace is constantly explored and its “dimensions” are performed. For example, 
when we read a news article online, many of the words are “hyperlinks”, the clicking of 
which will take us to another website, most probably with further hyperlinks, potentially 
exposing us to countless comments and discussions on a range of subjects. The 
comments of users and the use of hyperlinks are examples of performative action, 
possibly expanding the socio-spatial experience of all users, consequently affecting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Theodor Nelson quoted by G. Landow, “Hypertext and Critical Theory.” In Reading Digital 
Culture, edited by David Trend, 98-108. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001: 100. 
24 G. Landow, “Hypertext and Critical Theory.” In Reading Digital Culture, edited by David 
Trend. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001: 105. 
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very spatiality of cyberspace.  It is through “moving through” images from one “place” 
to another that the user, mediated through her cognition, experiences cyberspace as a 
space with sociality enabled and co-constituted through its very design.25   
Central to the idea of a performative theory of cyberspace is also the ways in which the 
identity, habits and the interests of the user(s) are affected and shaped by this 
performed fluidity. Our changing habits of communication,26 academic research and 
debate,27 and more generally the networking logic, “substantially modifies the operation 
and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power, and culture.”28 These 
performative processes of co-constitution of spaces of our day to day sociality are 
central to my understanding of the intricate relation between law, space and society 
encapsulated by the concept of nomos.    
4.3.2.  Foucaul t  and the Alternate  Order ing o f  Heterotopia  
Foucault’s heterotopia as a space of “alternate ordering” is often a spatial concept of 
choice when dealing with cyberspace and plays a significant role in my re-description of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Of course this experience is not limited to text. Hyperlinks within the WWW connect users to 
all forms of media such as video, audio, live interactive forums, and images.  
26 The effects of networked communications through cyberspace on our everyday lives are 
plentiful and beyond doubt. For instance, the increasing availability of smart phones have 
allowed simultaneous Internet access, text communication and phone use.     
27 There is a growing trend amongst academics to engage in running conversation through 
specialised blogs and websites. Often, the discussions in these forums are less formal than 
journal articles and this informality results in a wide range of topics being discussed. In addition, 
due to the informal character of the websites, scholars young and old can engage in 
conversations and exchanges that are also available to other to see and respond to. For instance                    
EJIL talk!, http://www.ejiltalk.org/ (accessed September 12, 2014) or ASIL blogs, 
http://www.asil.org/blogs (accessed September 12, 2014) are examples from the field of 
international law. These forums also often have a presence on social networking websites such 
as twitter, notifying their followers of new contributions to the blogs. This is particularly 
important since it allows the links to the contributions to circulate in the non-academic realm of 
Twitter (or any other website), hence possibly exposing such conversations and exchanges to 
people who are often excluded from the academic discussions.     
28 M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture 
Volume I. London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010: 500.  
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cyberspace through the spatio-legal framework of nomos.29 The spatiality of cyberspace 
belongs in the first place to the “real” existence of the users experiencing cyberspace 
through their connection to the Internet. However, one question still remains: what is 
“alternate” about the ordering of the “there” of cyberspace which qualifies it as a 
heterotopian space? An example will make things clearer. When a typical citizen 
(regardless of the locality of connection) experiences cyberspace, what she observes is 
unique to say the least. The possibility of “face-to-face” conversations (through services 
such as Skype) with different users in different “locales”, outside the spatial bounds of 
possibility in a “real” physical sense is not any more a utopian vision; it is indeed an 
actuality which arguably creates an alternate ordering in a non-territorial fashion. In 
addition, one can point to a news website as a heterotopia since readers are allowed to 
interact with one another debating and discussing the topic “inside” the comments 
section of the webpage in question.30 This is also the case in the case of services, such as 
Tumblr, which place the user within a fluid interactive web of texts, images and videos. 
This is an “alternate ordering” since such a discursive space allows for a non-localised 
(in terms of real world experience) sociality to occur, creating social experiences and 
cultural/ethical orderings otherwise not possible.      
Cyberspace often challenges many accepted categories of the social, private/public, 
home/work, domestic/international, etc. A range of theorists have looked at the effects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Examples where cyberspace is analysed through the lens of heterotopias include Diana Saco’s 
Cybering Democracy, and Julie E. Cohen’s “Cyberspace as/and Space.” In her analysis of the 
heterotopian perspective in cyberspatial analysis, Cohen interestingly singles out Lessig’s theory 
of “Code” as an influential approach in which cyberspace is treated as a space which enables 
(not in an essentialist way) certain forms of alternate ordering. (at 222)  It is these alternative 
potentials that drew the attention of many utopian thinkers towards cyberspace, with the only 
difference that the material situatedness of cyberspace was largely ignored by the latter. See 
generally J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Supra note 21. See also D. Saco, Cybering 
Democracy: Public Space and the Internet [hereinafter “Cybering Democracy”]. London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002.     
30 I should qualify here that not all news web pages have a comments section. However the 
point I am raising here is not to generalise the experience of “alternate orderings” to all Internet 
use, but to highlight the possibility and an example of such ordering happening in a now well 
established “comment section” of many news websites.  
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of cyberspace and more generally digital technologies on subjectivity, specifically in the 
way that they “enable new forms of subjectivity.”31 Because of the rootedness of 
cyberspace in the physical existence of its users, this in effect will challenge many 
accepted forms of sociality and common-ground surrounding the subject and hence 
affect forms of spatiality produced through the discursive apparatuses of the social. 
According to Julie E. Cohen “the ‘cyberspace’ metaphor expresses an experienced 
spatiality mediated by embodied human cognition.”32 The emphasis on the “body” 
relates the social experiences of users with “real space” (the physical) while 
acknowledging the social and legal production of cyberspace. What I am suggesting here 
is that heterotopias have a somewhat negotiated “in-between-ness” about them which 
resonates well with the spatiality of cyberspace.33 Cyberspace too, as a networked space 
of billions of users and access points, is neither purely real nor completely 
metaphoric/utopian/imaginary. It is this condition that makes “alternate orderings” a 
possibility and a “reality” beyond the physical and conceptual boundaries of everyday 
life.  
Therefore, unlike the binaristic spatial image of cyberspace adopted and promoted by 
law as logos, the theory of heterotopias provides another step in my critique of the spatial 
presuppositions of (international) law with regards to cyberspace. In the words of 
Cohen, heterotopian theories of cyberspace are “promising vehicles for exploring both 
the social construction of cyberspace and the spatiality of cyberspace as experienced by 
its users.”34 One notable example of heterotopian thinking with regards to cyberspace is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 D. Savat, Uncoding the Digital: Technology, Subjectivity and Action in the Control Society. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan , 2013: 6. See also, J. E. Cohen, Networked Self. Supra note 21. 
32 J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Supra note 21, at 226.  
33 Hetherington refers to heterotopia as a “space-between.” K. Hetherington, The Badlands of 
Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering. London: Routledge, 1997: ix. This is described further 
by Saco as “where processes of ordering reveal themselves as such by juxtaposing different 
spatial orders.” D. Saco, Cybering Democracy. Supra note 29, at 20.   
34 J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Supra note 21, at 221-222.  
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Lessig’s theory of Code as law. As we observed above, even though he took a widely 
exceptionalist approach to cyberspace,35 his theory is clearly distinguishable from 
scholars who imagine cyberspace as a detached, even utopian, space. This is in the way 
that he saw cyberspace as a sight which is conditioned by Code, in a way that enables 
(and limits) the range of “alternate orderings” (for example the criticised utopian 
dreams of libertarian freedoms). In his own words, “cyberspace is a place. People live 
there. They experience all the sort of things that they experience in real space there.”36 The 
centrality of people’s experiences in constructing the lived character of cyberspace as a 
space of “alternate orderings”, contrasts it from both the utopian and the “real space” 
theories.   
4.3.3.  Massey and Mult ip l i c i ty  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Massey’s theory of space plays a central role in the 
construction of the concept of nomos and it is inevitably central to my re-description of 
cyberspace. For Massey, space is not only the “product of interrelations [and 
interactions]” but it also “must be predicated upon the existence of plurality. 
Multiplicity and space are co-constitutive.”37 In this regard, she builds on social and 
political discourses that embrace “heterogeneity” and “difference” instead of universal 
narratives and argues that simultaneous existence of difference is not only historical but 
also essentially spatial.38 She compliments this proposition by stating that “space is 
always under construction.”39 The spatio-temporal plurality that Massey builds into the 
very concept of space is key for a re-description of cyberspace through nomos. Unlike 
the image of cyberspace presented through predominant (international) legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See chapter 2, note 4 and the accompanying text. 
36 L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. Supra note 20, at 190. [First emphasis added] See 
also L. Lessig, “The Zones of Cyberspace.” Stanford Law Review 48, no. 5 (1996): 1403-1411. 
37 D. Massey, For Space. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005: 9.  
38 Ibid., at 10.  
39 Ibid., at 9.  
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approaches to cyberspace, the material and inter-relational aspect of space does not 
allow one to describe it as a container of information (data) through “real” space 
metaphors or simply as the physical and infrastructural space of the Internet, but rather 
a continuous co-constitution that only becomes a space through material and discursive 
interactions. Moreover for Massey, this co-constitution happens simultaneously at a 
spatial level, and at the level of identities and subjectivities. Therefore, in line with a 
range of contemporary critical geographers (including Delaney), there is no detachment 
between the spatial and the social. Seen through this lens, the spatiality of cyberspace 
becomes one with the social interactions which continuously construct it as a space of 
multiplicity of users, communications and inter-relations.40  
Massey also offers a series of direct spatial reflections on cyberspace.41 She looks at 
cyberspace in the context of what she calls the “annihilation” of space by time. 
According to Massey, there is a widely held view in the contemporary era that due to 
“more and more ‘spatial’ connections, [...] there is more ‘space in our lives’”, yet, since it 
takes virtually no time to connect, and physical distance (generally seen as a 
precondition to traditional perspective on space) does not play a role in our 
connections, space per se has been annihilated by time. Massey challenges this view 
strongly by disassociating space from (material) distance, while highlighting the 
limitations of utopian thinking about cyberspace by emphasising the “significance of 
materiality (as opposed to virtuality).”42 This disassociation is significant since Massey’s 
conception of cyberspace, similar to Foucauldian heterotopias, has a quality of “in-
betweenness” configured within multiplicities. It is this quality that leads her to ask a 
question which accurately describes the central problematic of my proposed legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 P. G. T. Healey, et al., “Communication Spaces.” Computer Supported Cooperative Work 17, no. 2 
(2008): 169-193. 
41 Massey looks at cyberspace in the context of the space/time binary.  
42 D. Massey, For Space. Supra note 37, at 94.  
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engagement with cyberspace. According to her, the right question to ask with 
cyberspace (and more generally by “communications revolution”) is “what kinds of 
multiplicities (patternings of uniqueness) and relations will be co-constructed with these 
new kinds of spatial configurations.”43 The wider sensibility of my project stems from a 
similar position, and it is towards the co-constitution of and engagement with different 
spatial configuration that I wish to turn the attention of international law.   
One of the places where the production and evolution of cyberspace through users’ 
experience and interactions is most clear is in the virtual spaces/worlds that are 
instantiated in Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs). Even though for their 
existence, material conditions are required, and most virtual worlds have endless 
analogies to material/physical demarcations, the spaces are being constantly constituted 
through the (inter)actions, and experiences of the users. As prominent theorists of 
virtual worlds put it:   
[v]irtual worlds are unreal. We mean by this that they are artificial, fictitious, 
imaginary, intangible, and invented – one can find these synonymous for 
“unreal” in a standard thesaurus. Yet virtual worlds are real as well. All things 
artificial or invented do not fall entirely outside the ambit of reality.44	  
Manners of human action continue being represented and reproduced through the 
building and negotiation of this “new” world. Therefore cyberspace becomes no longer 
material but not completely immaterial either. It is often experienced as very real indeed! 
This is because neither materiality nor abstraction constitute cyberspace as a space but 
rather the lived experiences and interaction of the users in their plurality does. 
This perspective towards cyberspace, on the one hand confirms its “distinctive” 
spatiality, while at the same time situating it in our day to day lives, affecting our social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid., at 91.  
44 F. G. Lastowka and D. Hunter, “The Laws of the Virtual Worlds.” California Law Review 92, 
no. 1 (2004): 7. 
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interactions (whether positively or negatively), and most importantly, embracing a sort 
of multiplicity which goes beyond the territorial and conceptual boundaries of not only 
nation-states, but also from categories such as local, public/private, home and family.  
4.3.4.  Cyberspace and Nomos 
Within the analytical framework of nomos, cyberspace is not just a space which is 
produced through law and social interaction once and for all. It is not a space which can 
then be objectified and looked at from the outside. Neither is it a space which has an 
inside in which communications occur.45 It is lived, constantly experienced, and re-
imagined. It is true, as Lessig has pointed out time and again, that cyberspace (and the 
Internet) and the possibilities of freedom and interaction all depend on the 
infrastructure and Code, and this is by no means a natural condition; it is prone to 
fundamental changes.46 However, as demonstrated above, it is not the infrastructure and 
Code which make cyberspace essentially a space; it is the human actions and 
interactions, socialised and spatialised through human experience (collective and 
individual) that make it a space. Therefore, the significance of re-describing and re-
imagining the spatiality of cyberspace, from a “container” of content to a co-produced, 
non-territorial, socio-spatiality, cannot be overstated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For instance, observations such as “all communication between two or more parties done 
through a computer interface is performed in cyberspace” (Toni Sant), do not fall into the 
description of cyberspace through nomos, since it still relies on an inside/outside distinction 
which falls back on the use of real space analogies common with logos. See T. Sant, What is 
"Performative" About Cyberspace? October 1996. 
https://files.nyu.edu/as245/public/writings/cyberspace/leonardo/question.html (accessed 
August 20, 2014). 
46 At the time writing, I am aware of the possible changes to the nature and infrastructure of the 
Internet, due to the recent revelations surrounding the role of the US and some European 
governments in widespread global surveillance of citizens. For an analysis of the role of the 
National Security Agency revelation and the dangers they possibly pose to the future of the 
Internet, see J. Naughton, “Edward Snowden's Not the Story. The Fate of the Internet Is.” The 
Guardian. 28 July 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/28/edward-
snowden-death-of-internet (accessed August 18, 2014). Another importnat scholar whose 
warning regarding the nature of the internet and the illusion of freedom and privacy associated 
with Internet use is Evgeny Morozov. See for instance E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark 
Side of Internet Freedom. Public Affairs, 2011.   
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The triparate co-production of space, law and society is central to thinking legally about 
cyberspace. Cyberspace is neither purely produced (either legally or socially) nor simply 
a space of the materiality of “things”. The three theorists discussed demonstrate the 
fundamental and simultaneous situatedness of cyberspace within the materiality of 
everyday social interactions; through our connection to the infrastructure of the 
Internet but not gaining its spatiality solely from that infrastructure.  
Cyberspace is produced by and produces human/social experiences which are 
essentially spatial. It is this social experience which gives a technological phenomenon 
like the Internet a heterogeneous spatial character. As observed by Julie E. Cohen 
“cyberspace does not pre-exist its users.”47 As a “communication space”, it is 
qualitatively and quantitatively constituted through the interaction of its users and 
human practice.48 Cyberspace is a space which has a living sociality at its heart. 
However, the most important characteristic of cyberspace is that, since it is a space of 
multiplicities, neither purely material nor discursive, the sociality that is co-constituted is 
non-territorial and non-local. No longer is social experience and interaction limited by 
proximity and distance. Cyberspace has changed the nature of our social experiences 
and has expanded them beyond territorial and conceptual closure; a sociality which is 
understood in terms of the inter-relationality of a multiplicity of components (material, 
discursive, spatial). Communication through networks, which are not necessarily 
anymore bound by physical space, has arguably expanded our everyday social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 J. E. Cohen, “Cyberpace as/and Space.” Supra note 21, at 218.  
48 In explaining the spatiality of cyberspace, it is also useful to take note of the ways the 
constitution of cyberspace has been theorised in other disciplines. The analysis done by Healey et 
al. shows that even the concept of “place” is not sufficient to determine the patterns of 
closeness and mutual involvement observed in an online community. To account for this, 
Healey, et al. argue that you need a concept of “communication space” as distinct from both 
space and place. See generally, P. G. T. Healey, et al., “Communication Spaces.” Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work 17, no. 2 (2008): 169-193.  
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experiences, and hence the material and discursive fabric of our everyday life.49 As 
Edward T. Hall’s theory in Proxemics suggests, “individuals are surrounded by a bubble 
of personal space the size of which varies according to social relationship and setting.”50 
In other words, lived space is constituted partly by “the setting”, which can include 
physical limitations of the body, and partly by the social interactions (verbal and non-
verbal).  
With the advent of cyberspace, and given the theoretical analysis above, the direct 
connection between the local setting and the social relationships becomes marginal and 
the “bubble” grows (for example every time a hyperlink is used to connect to a forum, 
discussion page or social networking website or one receives a comment on a Twitter 
post). Thus, social relations are no longer completely limited by “the [physical] setting” 
which is imagined as spatially bound. In other words, cyberspace has significantly 
expanded our ability to communicate on a multiparty level between people and across 
socialities, on a non-territorial basis. This allows us presence in socialities while being 
physically absent from them. This presence and engagement is not territorial and its 
spatiality is only validated through the very experience of communication with/through 
a multiplicity; it has enabled a “space as always under construction”, but on a non-
territorial basis.  
The shift to nomos in our description of cyberspace resonates with the fictional 
definition offered by William Gibson who initially created the term. He refers to 
cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate 
operators, in every nation [...] Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 When I speak of “expansion” I am not referring to it in terms of physical proximity and 
boundaries, but rather a social expansion through the increased multiplicity of interactions 
(social and spatial).  
50 Hall’s theory presented by Low and Lawrence Zúñiga. See S. M. Low and Denise Lawrence-
Zúñiga. The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
2003: 49. 
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nonspace of the mind […].”51 The simultaneous reliance on the “operator”, its location 
(nation), and the consensual space of the mind, characterises the form of in-
betweenness, which is central to the conceptualisation of space in nomos. As observed by 
Saco, “in fact, the term cyberspace evokes a stronger, ontological claim that networking 
really is a kind of space, even if it is (almost) entirely a ‘consensual hallucination’.”52 
Inside this statement, there is an important element which seems to be shared with the 
notions of spatiality proposed by Foucault, Massey and Delaney. This “hallucination” is 
produced through a form of negotiated “consent” amongst the elements of this 
network (social, material, and of course legal). They are producers of this consent at the 
same time as they are themselves “networked”.53 This is where the sociality of 
cyberspace plays a decisive role both in its own production and the co-constitution of 
the “hallucinating” user and her socio-spatial experiences. 
4.4. The Possibilities of Nomos : Beyond Detached Regulation   
Building on the argument that the physical infrastructure and Code of the Internet 
could only be seen as cyberspace if we consider socio-spatial processes of co-
production captured by nomos, in this section I would like to comment on the analytical 
possibilities and challenges this argument might provide for international law. I seek to 
highlight the non-territorial socio-spatiality of cyberspace and having this spatiality in 
mind reflect on the wider socio-spatial fabric of international law. Given the 
characteristics of nomos, I point to this shift in mode of analysis (from logos to nomos) 
while acknowledging the importance and necessity of regulatory endeavours. In other 
words, my argument regarding the limits and predominance of logos with regards to 
cyberspace, does not lead to the dismissal of regulation altogether (as some cyber-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 W. Gibson, Neuromaner. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995: 67. 
52 D. Saco, Cybering Democracy, Supra note 29, at xxv  
53 See generally J. E. Cohen, “Networked Self.” Supra note 21.   
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libertarians might argue), since such a position would be unrealistic and arguably 
utopian given the multiple layers of law regulating the Internet and cyberspace. Neither 
do I seek to contribute the all important question of how (or how not) to 
regulate/govern the Internet and cyberspace. Instead my object of critique is the socio-
spatiality of international law. 
As demonstrated above, cyberspace is co-produced through our daily experiences and 
interactions through the Internet, in a way that our ways of life are also fundamentally 
transformed. Some international lawyers, ranging from feminists to critical/TWAIL 
scholars have shown interest in paying attention to everyday life processes and spaces.54  
If cyberspace is understood within the social, spatial and legal framework of nomos, then 
international law can also be located in a co-producing relationship with the fluidity and 
situatedness of human relations. It is through nomos that (international) law can access 
the Internet as cyberspace; a space not understood through analogies of territory and 
land, or reduced to territorial notions of socio-spatiality (logos), but one which is co-
produced through a multiplicity of social interactions and socio-spatial experiences. This 
space is essentially non-territorial and social, even if the physical infrastructure 
(computers, wires, nodes) and users are located in a territorial setting.55 Within the 
conceptual/analytical framework of nomos, space is co-constituted both by the material 
and the discursive, so that its socio-spatiality includes, yet goes beyond, the 
territorial/mental binary of logos. Through nomos, space is an in-between (of materiality 
and abstraction) made of sociality, materiality and discursivity (including the regulation 
oriented approached to the legal). It has neither an inside nor an outside, yet 
experienced as a space; a socio-legally fluid one for that.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See chapter 1, note 11 and the accompanying text.  
55 I understand that cyberspace is not always experienced as a non-territorial spatiality. However 
at instances that it is experienced as one, international law needs to develop a conceptual 
toolbox to access these forms of sociality.  
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As pointed out through the analysis of nomos in the previous chapter, the social, the 
spatial and the legal are not distinct realms, which then affect (even produce) each other 
in different ways; they are co-produced. This matters for my attempt to imagine and 
access the socio-spatiality of the non-territorial “international”, since the separation of 
the three categories does not allow us to imagine one as fluid, without keeping the other 
as neutral and exogenous. If they are imagined as co-produced, then this makes it 
possible for us to re-think our notions of sociality according to the types of space and 
legality that are experienced and co-produced through that sociality itself. In the same 
way, our understandings of space can then be re-thought according to the socio-legal 
relations and interactions that are experienced and co-produced through that fluid 
spatiality. 
Cyberspace is important for international law, because we have never experienced a 
space which allows the formations of communities and interactions beyond the physical 
(spatial) and temporal limitations to the extent that we observe in cyberspace. Never has 
our everyday experiences of sociality gone beyond our immediate physical limits and 
boundaries to such an extent.56 Given that within the framework of nomos, the social, the 
legal and the spatial are non-separable and co-produced, one could deduce that with the 
expansion of the socio-spatial experience beyond the territorial, the legal also becomes, 
at least partly, experienced non-territorially. This for instance, is the case for cyberspace, 
because with the non-territorial extension of our socio-spatial relations, non-territorial 
forms of legality (e.g. Code) becomes woven (in a co-productive manner) into our 
experiences of sociality and space. Given that traditionally the broad field of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Of course, there are many who argue that our social relations had extended beyond national 
or local borders long before the advent of the Internet, with the availability of telegraph, 
telephone, etc. Even though “relations” (often one to one) have existed for a long time, it is the 
extent and the decentred form of this always fluid sociality that is a special characteristic of 
cyberspace. This is in addition to the availability of different forms of communication (video, 
audio and text) in a simultaneous multi-party format.    
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international law considers socio-legal relations outside the “national” through the 
“international”, then the expansion of sociality beyond the local and the national is 
bound to provide a challenge to the way international lawyers predominantly 
understand the “international”. Therefore, Diana Saco is right in arguing that given the 
impact of the Internet on a wide range of practices (social, economic, political, personal, 
cultural, etc.), “what is needed is not just any socio-spatial theory of cyberspace, but 
one, more specifically, that can address the relationship between spatiality and social 
change.”57 I argue that, by recognizing the creative force of the socio-spatial collective 
as a vital element in the formation of the normative universe, nomos does exactly that. 
As it is highlighted in chapter one, the socio-spatial fabric of international law has 
always been a central aspect of different theories and approaches of international law, 
whether it is positivism, instrumentalism, or even New Stream scholarship.58 The 
sociality of international law is especially important, since it is from the (consent of) 
legal subjects (mainly states, but also “non-state” actors) and collectivities (international 
institutions and organisations), situated within a perceived space that (non-natural) 
international law maintains its legal character.59 If I seek to further my critique of 
international law’s socio-spatiality by using cyberspace as a means of intervention, an 
important step is needed and that is demonstrating how the spatial, social and legal 
fabric of international law are predominantly conceptualised. As Andreas 
Philapopulous-Michalopolous shows, in the wake of the “spatial turn in law”, certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 D. Saco, Cybering Democracy, Supra note 29, at 9.  
58 See sections 1.1 and 1.2.1.  
59 This is the characterisation of international law that formed after the famous critique of John 
Austin, claiming that international law is not law. For an analysis see A. Anghie, “Finding the 
Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law.” Harvard 
International Law Journal 40, no. 1 (1999): 10-16.  
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fundamental concepts need to be fundamentally questioned and challenged.60 He argues 
with respect to justice that “if the peculiar characteristics of space are to be taken into 
account, a concept of justice will have to be rethought” on a fundamental level.61 
Following a similar critical sensibility, and in line with many feminist scholars and recent 
spatial analysis of international law, I would like to present and challenge the 
fundamental concept and the most common socio-spatial referent of international law, 
the “international”, using logos and nomos as my modes of analysis. In order to discuss 
non-territoriality in international law, the “international” is the most fundamental 
concept since it seeks to accommodate law and socio-political relations beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the nation state.   
4.5. Conclusion  
The arguments and descriptions of this chapter were intended for two separate 
purposes. On the one hand, I demonstrated that the discourse and practice of 
international law with regards to the Internet and cyberspace, fits quite well in the 
category of logos. Their understanding of cyberspace operates on the margins of the 
physical/mental distinction (often through preferring the Internet and “new 
technology” as their subject matter), and the legal is only seen through the lens of 
regulation. By objectivising the Internet, international law reduces social interactions 
and communications through the Internet (either day to day conversations or social 
movement activism and mobilisation) to content, imagining cyberspace as a container 
of data and information. Even though I am critical of this approach, my critique is not 
directed at the regulatory mechanisms, etc.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a discussion of law’s “spatial turn”, see section 1.2.2. Also for a recent overview see I. 
Braverman, et al., The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography. Stanford University 
Press, 2013.  
61 A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, “Law's Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear 
of Space.” Law, Culture and the Humanities 7 (2011): 187-202. 
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In the second section of the chapter, I applied the framework of nomos to international 
law’s understanding of cyberspace and re-described the latter according to the spatio-
legal characteristics of nomos. Within this conceptual framework, the relation between 
cyberspace and the multiple socio-legal performativities that co-constitute the socio-
spatiality of cyberspace became clear. Consequently, the non-territorial experiences of 
sociality made available through the experience of using the Internet, were no longer 
reduced to content. Instead, through the surfacing of this socio-spatiality, I highlighted 
the possibility of imagining another form of relationship between (international) law and 
cyberspace, a relationship were the socio-spatial experiences are fundamentally 
intertwined with the wider normative and legal frameworks present. In other words, this 
re-description departs, yet does not dissociate, from the professional and institutional 
paraphernalia of control attached to the Internet through logos, and imagines regulation 
as only a small element within the wider socio-spatial normative universe experienced 
through and co-produced by cyberspace.  
This chapter therefore constructs the image (description) of cyberspace as an 
international yet non-territorial sociality, which I will use in the rest of my thesis to 
challenge the ways in which international law has so far predominantly conceptualised 
its own socio-spatial fabric, i.e. the “international”. In the next chapter, I will provide an 
elaboration of the range of ways in which the “international” is understood in 
international law, pointing to important consistencies in the spatio-legal configurations 
of international sociality, a category which is crucial for all projects of international law.	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Chapter 5 – Tracing Logos: International Law and the 
“International” 
 
Law is always “worlded” in some way. 
I. Braverman, et al.  
5.1. Introduction  
So far, I have been referring to the socio-spatial fabric of international law as the 
“international”. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate and evaluate the relationship 
between the field of international law and the foundational concept of the 
“international”. I explore the predominant understandings of the “international” within 
a discipline which all too often treats its own foundational categories and concepts as 
self-evident. Even though the self-evidence of the category of the “state” has been open 
to question in a range of forums, the category and understanding of the “international” 
has gone largely unquestioned at least in mainstream international legal analysis.1 
Reflection on the “international” is necessary since it, in multiple ways, carries the 
weight and scope of international law’s dreams and possibilities.  
In this chapter, through a descriptive/analytical approach, I evaluate the predominant 
understanding of the “international” in international law using the overall framework 
provided by the theoretical distinction between logos and nomos. The examination of the 
“international” in the tradition of international law is inspired by categories of spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matthew Craven, in his analysis of Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition suggests that “the 
place assumed by the “State” in international law is almost too self-evident.” (at 205) See 
generally M. Craven, “Statehood, Self-Determination, and Recognition.” In International Law, 
edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 203-251. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. My position 
with regards to the “international” is similar to Craven’s, in the sense that I take issue with the 
“almost too self-evident” character of “international” in international law.  
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imagining contributed by David Delaney.2 These categories include imagining the 
“international” “as no more than the aggregate of ‘national’ sovereign domestic 
spaces,”; “as a global space that is ‘over and above’ or at least conceptually distinct 
from, the sum of domestic spaces,”; “as spatial referent” for the international 
community, humanitarian law, human rights, etc.; as “a collection of anomalous or 
interstitial spaces”;3 or as a “condition of possibility that pre-existed most, if not all, 
extant states.”4 It is no secret that territoriality plays a key role in the way international 
law perceives the socio-spatial ordering of the world. Starting from this premise, and 
combining it with Delaney’s categories, I demonstrate the presence of a consistent 
territorial configuration within the different ways of perceiving the “international”. 
Further, I will expand on the widely held view that the “international” has no concrete 
spatiality of its own, and is “spaceless”.5 I associate this view with Delaney’s category of 
the “international” as “over and above”. Through examining the spatio-legal 
frameworks of understanding the “international” within existing approaches to 
international law, I demonstrate the operation of logos as the dominant spatio-legal 
sensibility in international law.  
This chapter proceeds in the following steps. First, I explore the dominant approach to 
the socio-spatiality of the “international” using Delaney’s insightful categories. I then 
consider two important critiques of the dominant approaches to international law, 
articulated by Martti Koskenniemi and Sundhya Pahuja, to demonstrate that despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I particularly focus on Delaney’s categorisation of the “international” firstly because of the 
crucial role his theorisations of space, law and society play in the construction of nomos in this 
thesis.  
3 See D. Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-Making: Nomospheric Investigations 
[hereinafter “Nomospheric Investigations”]. New York: Routledge, 2010: 61.  
4 Ibid.  
5 For arguments regarding the spacelessness of the “international” in international law see D. 
Buss, “Austerlitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries.” In International 
Law: Modern Feminist Approaches, edited by Doris Buss and Ambreena Manji, 87-104. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2005. See also Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Griffith Law Review 
17, no. 2 (2008): 489-514. 
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these critical challenges, their socio-spatial fabric still remains within the predominant 
characterisation derived through the application of Delaney’s categorisation. I conclude 
the chapter by indicating the need for moving beyond logos, and applying the spatio-legal 
category of nomos for a re-conceptualisation of the relation between international law 
and the socio-spatiality of the “international”. Given the dominance of logos in 
international legal accounts, this re-conceptualisation is necessary to overcome the 
conceptual limitations (separation of law/space/society and a mental/abstract spatial 
binary) that prevent international law from accessing and incorporating processes and 
instances of non-territorial socio-spatial experience within the critical projects;  
5.2. The Territoriality of the “International”  
Within the “tradition” of international law,6 territoriality is the most dominant and long 
lasting spatial lens through which scholars and practitioners have seen the world and 
envisioned its ordering. One way of demonstrating this is to look through the historical 
development of international law and to locate this spatial sensibility in the so called 
Westphalian framework.7 What can be observed through this so-called “origin” of 
(modern) international law is that it signals the existence of a European territorial 
system prior to the development of law. In other words, the dominant and much 
criticised Westphalian narrative positions the initial role of international law as (and 
arguably still does) to connect pre-existing territorial entities together while securing 
their lasting and peaceful existence as separate bodies.8 As discussed by Stephane 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I am borrowing the term “tradition” from Matthew Craven. See M. Craven, “The Invention of 
a Tradition: Westlake, The Berlin Conference and the Historicisation of International Law.” In 
Constructing International Law: The Birth of a Discipline, edited by Luigi Nuzzo and Milos Vec, 363-
403. Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 2012. 
7 The Westphalian framework generally refers to the arrangements made in 1648, between 
European polities after the Thirty Year War, and is often referred to as a paradigm shift for 
modern day international law.  
8 For an elaboration of the Westphalian narrative of the “origin” of international law, see R. A. 
Falk, A Study of Future Worlds. New York: Free Press, 1975.  For another critical reflection on 
the categorisation of the Westphalian Treaties as the origin of international law see M. Craven, 
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Beaulac in his analysis of The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy, “[t]he twin congress then held 
[at Westphalia] is deemed the forum where distinct separate polities became sovereign, that 
is, enjoying absolute and exclusive control and power over a relatively well-defined 
territory.”9 Seen from this perspective, state sovereignty in its current sense, is something 
that comes after territory, as a sine qua non of international law imagined as an inter-
relational legal system concerned with relations between pre-existing territorial entities.10 
Even though the term “international” was introduced in the nineteenth century by 
Jeremy Bentham, the Westphalian perspective strongly resembles the traditional 
description of international law as jus inter gentes, which harbours the idea of the 
“international” as between (territorially) distinct nations, with their sovereignty produced 
through this inter-relational approach to international law.11         
The territoriality of international law is also apparent through the predominant 
understanding of the “international” during the period in which state territory came to 
be significant for international law and its actors not just to delimit their spaces from 
one another (i.e. within Europe) but to delimit a notion of “international” associated 
with European territory and civilisation. More precisely I am referring to the late 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Introduction: International Law and Its Histories.” In Time, History and International Law, edited 
by Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Maria Vogiatzi. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007: 8. See also G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the 
International Legal Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
9 S. Beaulac, “The Westphalian Legal Orthodoxy - Myth or Reality?” Journal of the History of 
International Law 2 (2000): 148. [Emphasis added]  
10 This view also resembles what Martti Koskenniemi calls “ascending sovereignty,” as an 
understanding of sovereignty which has its origins in the inter-relation between identifiable 
entities. For Koskenniemi’s discussion of sovereignty and statehood see M. Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (hereinafter “From Apology to Utopia”]. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 224-302.  
11 For a discussion of international law as jus inter gentes which was “a consequence of the clear 
demarcation of self-contained territories,” see C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the 
International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum. New York: Telos Press , 2003: 129. This view 
strongly resembles Koskenniemi’s theory of ascending sovereignty demonstrated as one of two 
dominant (and constantly oscillating) perspectives on statehood in international law. The second 
one is the descending perspective which I shall discuss in section 5.3.  
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nineteenth century and the co-solidification of international law and European 
colonialism of “non-European” territory.12  
Even though the legal category of statehood was formalised in modern international law 
in the early twentieth century,13 the legacy of the “spatial othering” of European 
colonialism in the crystallisation of territory as the most important spatial category 
predates the legal category of the state in international law.14 During the late nineteenth 
century, most international lawyers clearly relied on territorial criteria of inclusion and 
exclusion in defining the theoretical and practical boundaries of international law.15 
Europe came to be seen as the central spatial unit for international law. International 
lawyers such as Westlake relied heavily on an essentially spatial (in terms of physical 
space) logic of inclusion and exclusion in defining the relationship between the 
European state(s) and the region(s) in which the natives resided.16 The “international”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 By co-solidification I am suggesting in line with a range of critical scholars of international law 
(mainly TWAIL) that modern international law and colonialism (and imperialism) developed 
simultaneously, co-producing each other. I am referring to theories that view the history of 
international law and the development of positivism and colonialism as happening 
simultaneously. See for instance A. Anghie, “Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and 
Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law.” Harvard International Law Journal 40, no. 
1 (1999): 1-80. See also J. T. Gathii, “Impertialism, Colonialism, and International Law.” Bufalo 
Law Review 54, no. 4 (2007): 1013-1066. 
13 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States [1933] 165 LNTS 19.    
14 Even though during 20th century, international lawyers have increasingly recognized the 
existence of a “spectrum” of sovereignty. Through the idea of “earned recognition,” 
international layers are then able to describe entities that are “something less than a fully 
sovereign state, but more than a sub-state entity.” (375) Even through in this formulation 
territory becomes less significant as a measure of recognition, the entities recognised are still 
seen as within the boundaries of fully sovereign territorial states, sustained by the dominant 
spatial logic of Montevideo. For an analysis see M. P. Scharf, “Earned Sovereignty: Juridical 
Underpinnings.” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 31, no. 3 (2003): 373-387. 
15 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
[hereinafter “Gentle Civilizer”]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001: 98-178. See also 
M. Craven, “The Invention of a Tradition: Westlake, The Berlin Conference and the 
Historicisation of International Law.” In Constructing International Law: The Birth of a Discipline, 
edited by Luigi Nuzzo and Milos Vec, 363-403. Frankfurt am Main: Klosterman, 2012. 
16 In his influential book Chapters on the Principles of International Law, Westlake outlines his view 
of “international society.” He pays specific attention to it especially in the 10th and 11th 
principles. According to his perspective “The international society to which we belong and of 
which what we know as international law is the body of rules, comprises – First, all European 
states [...] Secondly, all American states [...] Thirdly, a few Christian states in other parts of the 
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was seen as a society of states with clear “geographical limits.”17 Spatially speaking, the 
“international” was regarded, in this period, as the aggregate of mainly European state 
territories, which share a common European sensibility of empire.18 Within the colonial 
context of the late nineteenth century, even if the colonised regions where spatially 
excluded as peripheral to the European core (the “international” of international law), 
territory and physical spatial boundaries played a central role (alongside categories of 
“civilisation”) in demarcating this core from the Other. In The Gentle Civiliser of Nations, 
Koskenniemi argues that “late nineteenth-century textbooks normally affirmed 
international law’s non-applicability in non-civilised territory.”19 These “non-civilised 
territories” were treated as empty spaces or terra nullius and were therefore neither 
national nor international. It was the Other space which was needed for the 
“international” to be delimited and defined. In the following subsections I will expand 
on the three ways international law typically conceptualises the socio-spatiality of the 
“international”: aggregate of state territories, international spaces and institutions.  
5.2.1.  Aggregate  o f  State  Terr i tor i es  
The first way international law conceptualises the “international” is as the “aggregate of 
state spaces”, which firmly identifies it as a physical space. This perspective, which fits 
the more mainstream international law theories quite well, arguably stems from the 
position that the “international” is the spatial aggregate of its parts and that the primary 
space in the international legal system is the territorial state. To use Zoe Pearson’s 
words:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
world [...].” See J.Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press , 1894: 81.  
17 Ibid., at 82.  
18 Further in this chapter I argue that seen from a different spatial lens, the international can 
actually be seen as a sensibility which during time transformed in essence but remained within 
the ideational/mental space of international lawyers with dreams, utopias and interests.  
19 M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note: 15. Koskenniemi is referring for instance to the 
works of scholars such as Johann Kaspar, Bluntschli, Pasquale Fiore and Robert Adams.  
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[t]he space of the state is pre-eminent in international law as reflected in the 
structures and processes of international law, where states’ interactions are 
central to both the sources of international law, as well as being the primary 
subjects of international law. States and the community of states, for 
international law, are where law is created, implemented and enforced – in 
short, where law happens.20   
In other words, if you look at international law as the set of norms and rules ordering 
the relations of states, then your international is nothing but the total of the states in 
relation. It is generally acceded that the territorial sovereignty of nation states is the 
dominant jurisdictional category in operation within both public and private 
international law.21 Within international law the centrality of territory as the main spatial 
category “derives from the fact that it constitutes the tangible framework for the 
manifestation of power by the accepted authorities of the state in question.”22 What is 
often referred to as the expansion of the Westphalian state system through time (from 
the colonial to postcolonial eras) and space (from Western Europe to virtually all land 
mass on Earth) meant that a specific spatial sensibility was also disseminated across the 
world.  
The idea of the “international” as the aggregate of state spaces is in turn based on the 
permanence and the characteristics of the current form of state within the spatio-
temporality of international law. As Pahuja suggests, “for contemporary international 
lawyers, since the end of empire, the state and international law, have, for better or 
worse, both become universal, in the sense that they are everywhere.”23 This view leads 
to a “factish” view of the universality of states and their form, which then conditions the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Supra note 5, at 494 
21 As Pahuja puts it “in doctrinal terms, territory comes first in the form of the state, then comes 
sovereignty which is said to flow from statehood, then comes jurisdiction, understood as the 
rightful authority to speak the law.” See S. Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional 
Account of International Law [hereinafter “Laws of Encounter”].” London Review of International 
Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 69. For a brilliant in depth analysis of territory and jurisdiction see R. Ford, 
“Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction).” Michigan Law Review 97, no. 4 (1999): 843-930. 
22 M. N. Shaw, “Territory in International Law.” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 13 
(1982): 31. 
23 S. Pahuja, Laws of Encounter. Supra note 21, at 74.  
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way we see the world they occupy and the sort of international we as international 
lawyers are dealing with. The dominance of this form of spatial ordering is rooted in 
nineteenth century colonialism and further solidified through the emergence and 
dominance of international institutions in the twentieth century. This was especially the 
case in the “radical project of transforming colonial territories into sovereign, 
independent states,” commencing with the establishment of the Mandate System of the 
League of Nations.24 This was the point that spatial management became further 
entrenched within the rubric of international law, controversially framed under the 
“sacred trust of civilization.”25  
Process oriented and subaltern approaches (such as TWAIL) to international law 
towards the end of the twentieth century still view the spatial aspect of international as 
being quite simply about “territoriality”.26 For instance, Richard Falk, in his critical 
reflection on the New Haven school of international law, argues for a “jurisprudence of 
human dignity.”27 In his argument he directly considers this jurisprudence to have a 
temporal and spatial dimension. However the spatial element of this perspective is 
typically reduced to “territorial affiliations of citizenship” and eventually sidelined for a 
preferred “time dimension”.28 In the same manner, much of the post-decolonization 
emancipatory literature in international law was and still is to some extent focused on 
realising emancipatory potentials for peoples who are viewed through their territorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Mandate System of the League of Nations was established under Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. For a discussion see A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty 
and the Making of International Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 115.   
25 Covenant of the League of Nations [1919] 112 BFSP 13: Art 22, paras. 1-2. A number of 
scholars have quite rightly brought this civilising framework of international law under question. 
26  See section 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. 
27 R. Falk, “Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law [hereinafter 
“Casting the Spell”].” Yale Law Journal, 1995: 2008.  
28 Ibid. Note the dismissal of space and the preference of time here, which I have argued at 
different instances, characterises dominant critical positions not only in international law but 
more generally social theory.  
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affiliations to a physically delimited context.29 For example the language of self-
determination sees a people as belonging to a specific space to which (amongst other 
things) they are raising a claim. As peoples increasingly achieved independence in the 
second half of the twentieth century through self-determination claims, these groups 
joined a spatial logic already present in the dominant approaches to international law 
and its function. Even the language of human rights does not go beyond this spatial 
logic, since the legal structure behind international human rights relies on the state, and 
inevitably the territorial sensibility that accompanies it. This can be observed through 
the language of most human rights instruments, which are themselves inter-state 
treaties, which typically use phrasings such as “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant[...].”30   
What this observation shows is the dominance of a socio-spatial sensibility which places 
physical spatiality (of the state) at the centre of international legal imagination of its 
“international”. The dominance of physical space within international law also surfaces 
in accounts that portray international law as essentially “spaceless”, since there is no 
specific and delimited physical space for the “international”.  However appealing this 
observation, it only goes further to confirm my point regarding the predominant spatial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The tradition of defining people through their relationship with land is even present in the 
works of the most sociologically minded international lawyers. For instance as shown by 
Monica García-Salmones Rovira in The Project of Positivism in International Law, Karl Fricker 
proposes three ways in which territory  comes through the language of international law. In 
addition to seeing it as the property of the sovereign and a field of jurisdiction, he considers a 
third, people oriented idea of territory which puts the people in a direct relation with the 
authority of the government over a territory. Even though it is an important gesture to move to 
the “people” in characterising territory, it still fails to conceptualise people and their 
interrelations independently of territory. Social “togetherness” was imagined in space, and “The 
formation of states as a consequence of ‘togetherness in space’ was [was seen as] a 
manifestation of the social character of law. In other words, [territorial] space made the political 
aspect of states possible.” M. García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 318. 
30 See for instance International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [1966] 999 UNTS 171: 
Art 2. (1); or Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime [2001] ETS 185: Art 1.   
	  
	  
Page | 149 
logic within international law as physical. In a discourse where for the lack of an 
identifiable space, the whole spatiality of a category is dismissed, it only shows that the 
only types of spaces that international lawyers predominantly care about (and notice for 
that matter) are the physical ones, with clear identifiable boundaries to exclude. Apart 
from this, the observation of the “spacelessness” of the “international” should be read 
as inaccurate since within international law there are physical spaces which are identified 
directly as “international” which will be the focus of the next section of this chapter.          
5.2.2.  Internat ional  Spaces   
Another important instance where the “international” is conceptualised by reference to 
physical space is regarding “the collection of anomalous or interstitial spaces.”31 The 
first group of spaces which comes to the mind of any international lawyer are the ones 
which are officially referred to as “international spaces”. It is necessary to differentiate 
between spaces of the “international” (which is the broader subject of my analysis) and 
international spaces. The latter which is ironically the only place in mainstream 
international law where the words “international” and “space” are put next to one 
another, refer to the spaces where national sovereignty and state territory do not apply. 
Put differently, international spaces refer to types of space over which no one has 
territorial jurisdiction and cannot claim political/economic/social sovereignty. 
According to Oran R. Young’s definition, international spaces “are regions and resources 
that lie beyond the reach of the legal and political jurisdiction of the individual members 
of international society.”32 The history of such spaces dates back to the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, when extensive use of the seas (mainly for navigation and 
transportation, and serving colonial aspirations) gave rise to debates about the ‘right’ of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Supra note 3, at 61.  
32 O. R. Young, “Governing International Spaces: Antarctica and Beyond.” In Science Diplomacy: 
Antarctica, Science and the Governance of International Spaces, edited by P. A. Berkman, Micheal A. 
Lang, David W. H. Walton and Oran R. Young. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly 
Press, 2011: 287. 
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states to open waters.33 In addition to what is currently termed ‘the high seas’,34 there are 
two other international spaces which have attracted considerable attention to 
themselves within the past century or so; the Antarctica and outer space. Although 
there are many differences between them in terms of history, scale and legal structures 
of governance, they are connected by at least two common characteristics; lack of 
sovereignty35 and a common spatial sensibility.  
Darrel C. Menthe, in his analysis of international spaces, argues that “what makes 
[international spaces] analogous is not any physical similarity, but their international, 
sovereignless quality.”36 As a way of treating such spaces, many concepts/principles have 
been employed across the ages. In fact for around three centuries the concept of 
international spaces did not exist as such in the vocabulary of states and international 
relations. Two other (Roman) legal concepts formed the background to the debate and 
thinking about the legal relation of nation states and such non-sovereign spaces; res 
nullius and res communis. The former, meaning literally “a thing of no one”, meant that any 
state could assert its territorial jurisdiction, given a history of presence in the area. 
Eventually the latter concept, meaning “a common thing”, won the day and was 
incorporated in many treaties and legal regimes such as the Law of the Sea Convention 
(1982) and the Outer Space Treaty (1967).37 However ‘commonage’ as a concept is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Although Gentili and Suarez had attempted the issue of the seas, the credit for the innovative 
approach which later led to the discourse of international spaces is generally given to Grotius. 
See B. H. Oxman, “The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea.” The American Journal of 
International Law 100 (2006): 830. See also M. D. Evans, “The Law of the Sea.” In International 
Law, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 651-686. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 651-652 
34 The high seas are also commonly called international waters.  
35 According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “[n]o State may validly purport to 
subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” See Convention on the Law of the Sea 
[1982] 1833 UNTS 3: Art. 87.  
36D. C. Menthe, “Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces.” Michigan 
Telecommunication Technology Law Review 4 (1998): 85.  
37 See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Supra note 35, Art. 136; and Outer Space Treaty [1967] 
610 UNTS 205: Art. 136. 
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without its own nuances, and as I will argue further situates international spaces in the 
territorial sensibility of international law. 
Dating back to the writings of Hugo Grotius,38 the main concern was the use of the 
‘common’ space (high seas in this case) as a facilitator of trade and exchange between 
sovereign (Christian) states, and there was little concern over underlying resources.39 
Moreover, with the growth in concern over the depletion of natural resources and the 
global environment, the issue of (non-)appropriation grew in importance and the 
attention of modern international law was turned to such spaces. The notion of non-
appropriation as a condition of “common” spaces is visible in the text of most treaty 
regimes dealing with international spaces.40 Non-appropriation formed the basic 
background of the international spaces discourse for the years to come. This issue was 
most importantly felt in the creation and the development of the concept of “common 
heritage of mankind”, raised by Arvo Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the UN, in 
1967, and written in the text of UNGA resolution 2749 in 1970.41 However, as shown 
by Craven in the case of the Congo Basin in the later nineteenth century, non-
appropriation still does not mean that states and their economic forces do not hold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In a section titled “To the Princes and Free States of the Christian World,” taking a natural 
law position, Grotius argues that “as there are some things which every man enjoys in common 
with all other men, and as there are other things which are distinctly his and belong to no one 
else, just so has nature willed that some of the things which she has created for the use of 
mankind remain common to all and that others through the industry and labor of each man 
become his own.” H. Grotius, The Freedom of the Sea or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take 
Part in the East Indian Trade [hereinafter “Freedom of the Sea”]. Edited by James Brown Scott. 
Translated by Ralph van Deman Magoffin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1916: 2. For 
Grotius’s analysis of the common character of ‘the sea’ see pp. 22-44.   
39 This is with the exception of fishing. Grotius points out the importance of fisheries and 
navigation when he argues that “the sea is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot 
become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it 
from the point of view of navigation or of fisheries.” H. Grotius, Freedom of the Sea. Ibid., at 28. [Emphasis 
added]  
40 For examples of laws on the non-appropriation of international spaces see, for instance, 
Antarctic Treaty [1959] 402 UNTS 71: Art. 4.; and Convention on the High Seas [1958] 450 
UNTS 11: Art. 2.   
41 UNGA, Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil  
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction [1970] XXV Res 2749 
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sway over the management and extraction of the resources in the common space.42 
After all, one main characteristic of commons is that even in the absence of ownership, 
everyone is free to utilise and extract resources – a problem to which the idea of 
“common heritage” was to be a response. However, despite this, it is still territorial 
states (for instance through the International Seabed Authority) which have the 
legal/political/economic leverage over the actualisation of the “common heritage”.   
Whether one negatively identifies international spaces (spatially or conceptually), what 
one ends up with is a set of frameworks of governance which conceptually and 
functionally depend on the territoriality of the state. This type of attitude incorporates 
international spaces into a discursive scene occupied and enclosed by the territorial 
organisation of global matters. As spaces which are explicitly referred to as 
“international” in international law, they demonstrate an important characteristic of 
international law’s treatment of space and more specifically the spaces of the 
“international”. Regardless of the historical period or school of thought, the spatial 
delimitation and enclosure of international spaces by territorial space of states is consistent. 
In other words, from the perspective of orthodox international lawyers, all spaces that 
are not national are then seen as international spaces. This form of negative identification 
puts national boundaries at the centre of the spatio-analytical frame of international law 
and further territorialises spaces such as the High Seas based on a set of accepted 
notions of spatiality associated with the spatial entity of the space, fixed within a 
physical understanding of space.   
The treatment of the High Seas and their enclosure by sovereign territorial space of 
states demonstrates the logic of logos with regards to the articulation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 M. Craven, “Re-Reading the Berlin Conference: International Law and the Logic of 
Extraction.” Sir Kenneth Bailey Memorial Lecture, April 2012. Available at 
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/melbourne-law-school/news-and-events/watch-
online/matthew-craven/flushcache/1/showdraft/1 (accessed 21 August, 2014) 
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“international” in the case of international spaces. What is interesting in the case of the 
High Seas, is that in the process of the creation and production of these spaces, and in 
the process of mapping and demarcating them, spaces are also separated by the forms 
of authority exercised within them. What it produced, is an object which can be mapped 
and demarcated; an object which represents of forms of authority and jurisdiction that 
can be exercised within it. For example, not only are international spaces defined 
outside of the sources of authority (states) that define the spaces in the first place 
(international treaty), the different demarcations within them, for example the exclusive 
economic zones,43 contiguous zones,44 continental shelves45 and so on, are based not on 
demarcations but on the type of authority that can be practiced within these spaces. 
Therefore a detachment of authority from the physical demarcated space occurs while 
the same detached authority plays a direct role in demarcating the forms of jurisdiction 
in operation within that space.   
5.2.3.  Inst i tut ions  
In the third instance, the territorial sensibility of international law was further built into 
the very fabric of the post-WWII through the expansion of international institutions, in 
which the territoriality of states became (and arguably still remains) stabilised within the 
geographical mind-frame of the profession and discipline of international law. 
Regardless of the degree to which international organisations can be imagined as 
separate personalities within international law, the spatial logic of a largely state based 
system continues to govern these institutional apparatuses. Most of the members of 
international organisations are states and the constituent instruments are usually inter-
state treaties. In addition, international organisations are often bodies which are directly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Convention on the Law of the Sea [1982] 1833 UNTS 3: Part. V, Art 55.  
44 Ibid., Art. 33. 
45 Ibid., Part VI, Art 76. 
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identified with a conglomeration of territories. Institutions such as the African Union or 
the European Union are associated with a more distinct region which again consists of a 
collection of state territories. Any attempt to include more and more actors and 
personalities in a system which is spatially determined through the boundaries of its 
state members, sees the spatiality of the “international” as circumscribed by the initial 
dominance of territory.     
The importance of international institutions to the territorial logic of international law is 
not limited to the dominance of the territorial state as the most important category of 
the discipline and practice. Identifying the “international” with “anomalous or 
interstitial” spaces brings international institutions and organisations into frame as well. 
In addition to ensuring the predominance of the spatiality of states (and hence the 
“aggregate” theory of the “international”), international institutions are entities within 
international law that are at least formally distinct from the sovereign (territorial) 
prerogative, since they are recognised as legal personalities and have legal duties (and 
rights) under the international legal system. As Akande states, the immunities granted to 
international organizations,46 “preserve the independence of [an] organization from its 
member States and [secure] the international character of the organization.”47 Yet, the 
spatial significance of these so-called “bodies” of international law is that they have 
both a bodily and an “outer body” spatiality, both of which can be regarded as spaces of 
international. The very space occupied by their buildings or the occasional international 
conferences organised around the world (often in big cities) are very much spaces within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Since international organizations have a range of responsibilities and their legal personality is 
recognized by international law, they are granted a range of immunities and privileges. For an 
overview of these see D. Akande, “International Organizations.” In International Law, edited by 
Malcolm D. Evans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 271-276. For an extensive 
commentary on the nature, functions and characteristics of the United Nations, see B. Simma, et 
al. (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary. 3rd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
47 D. Akande, “International Organizations.” Ibid., at 271. [Emphasis added]  
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which the “international” happens, or exists, in a way distinct from the national or 
urban spaces. In this way, they appear as cuttings from a map which is largely 
dominated by spaces which are either strictly seen as state territories or non-sovereign 
spaces such as the international spaces.   
These spaces are also distinguished from the national space within almost all relevant 
constituent treaties, where “the premises of an international organization are to be 
inviolable” and the property and assets belonging to the organization are immune from 
any form of interference by state authorities.48 These provisions highlight the attention 
paid to the bounded space, or the “body” of the international organization. These 
spaces which are usually located within major cities of the Global North such as 
London (IMO), New York (UN), Geneva (WIPO), Paris (UNESCO), Rome (FAO) 
and Addis Ababa (AU), are officially separated from the sovereign space of the nation 
state they are located in, and hence become “international”. This understanding of the 
concept is similar to its application to “international spaces” (High Seas, Antarctica, 
etc.), the spatiality of which is negatively identified with the territoriality of nation states. 
In the case of the premises of the IOs, it is often the bounded city space which acts as 
the negative identifier of their internationality. It is here that the “international” 
becomes “visible” by being associated with a specific bounded, physical space.   
So far I have demonstrated two main categories of analysis, through which the 
“international” of international law is dominated by a territorial sensibility of space, 
namely as an “aggregate of state territories” and “interstitial spaces” (including 
international spaces and international institutions/organisations). In all the categories 
discussed, physical spatiality is the dominant form of space constructing the 
“international” in international law. However, as argued earlier, a legal framework which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See for instance Charter of the United Nations [1945] TS 993: Art. II, Sec. 3; or Convention 
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations [1946] 1 UNTS 15: Art III, sec. 9.  
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focuses on physical space (and hence assumes the logic of logos), carries with it a parallel 
commitment to “mental space”. This is an abstract space where the authority of law is 
fixed and abstracted away from the socio-political fluidity of everyday life, and through 
this law is distinguished from “politics”. International law, thus, holds onto a binary 
perspective of physical/mental space. In the next section I will expand on the 
importance of mental spaces “over and above” territoriality for international law.  
5.3. The “Over and Above” of International Law: Universals, Utopias 
and Commitments   
Utopia is a form: traditionally, a traveller's account of a visit to an imaginary country where the 
journey is either to a far-off land or to the distant future.  
K. Knop 
           
In addition to the territoriality of the “international”, Delaney points to another 
important characterisation of the “international”. This view “posits the international as 
a global space that is ‘over and above,’ at least conceptually distinct from, the sum of 
domestic spaces.”49 In this section I explore some of the different forms by which this 
global (universal) space, detached from the material reality of physical space, comes 
through in the vernacular of international law. What I am exploring here is the sense or 
understanding of “international” implied by different approaches to international law. In 
other words, I discuss the categories and conceptual frameworks through which 
international law is not only seen as law but importantly for this section as international. 
The conceptual distinction between physical (territorial) and mental (abstract) space 
maintained in this analysis, reflects the spatio-legal conceptual framework of logos.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 D. Delaney, Nomospheric Investigations. Supra note 3, at 61.  
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When thinking about “spaces over and above” the first and most important spatial 
categories that come to mind are utopias and universals. Not so surprisingly these two 
categories have a long history in international law, perhaps as long as the age of the 
whole discipline. Utopia is a concept which was created by Thomas More out of a 
synthesis of eu-topos (literally meaning “good place”) and ou-topos (literally meaning a “no 
place”).50 Karen Knop speaks of a “familiar sense” of utopia in international law which 
consists of “seeing and wishing for the emergence of an international legal community 
unified by more than just the consent of states.”51 This “seeing and wishing” can be 
associated with many aspirations to form a future of peace, prosperity and order 
amongst the “collectivity” of our societies. The aspirations reflect the projection of the 
sense of utopia in international law into a desired future. 
This utopian aspiration of international law, in imagining the unity and collectivity of all 
societies, arguably has its roots in non-consensual forms of legal thinking that have had 
a clear role in the development of international legal thought, namely Natural Law and 
the jus gentium. The latter, which has its roots in Roman law, is the law that sits above the 
collectivity of human beings,52 universally ordering their relations and conduct in its 
entirety.53 As a concept which played an important role in the theories of international 
law pioneers such as Suarez, Vitoria and Grotius, it was based on shared principles of 
human society (imagined as society in its totality) which was imagined to transcend 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See generally T. More, Utopia. Edited by George M. Logan and Robert M. Adams. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. For an analysis of utopia with respect to 
international law see K. Knop, “Utopia without Apology: Form and Imagination in the Work of 
Ronald St. John Macdonald [hereinafter “Utopia without Apology”].” Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law , 2002: 287-307. 
51 Karen Knop, “Utopia without Apology.” Ibid., at 287.  
52 The distinction between natural law and jus gentium is that the latter is specifically about 
human beings and their relation to one another. However they are both applicable to everyone 
(and everything), hence assume a universal character.  
53 For reflections on jus gentium see Shaw, Macolm N. International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003: 16-18. See also S. C. Neff, “A Short History of International Law.” In 
International Law, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 3-31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
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territorial boundaries; as if sitting “over and above”.54 Detached from the particularities 
of actual/territorial societies, the jus gentium orders relations differently from the jus inter 
gentes. While the latter involved an inter-relational (ascending) ordering of discourse 
amongst pre-existing territorial entities which constructed the “international” through 
their collectivity, for the jus gentium, the “international” becomes associated with the 
“spacelessness” (space understood physically) of an assumed universality, pre-existing 
and transcending the relations to which it is to be applied.    
This “spacelessness”, or abstract international, arguably comes through today’s 
international law, via categories ranging from humanitarian intervention, 
developmentalism, responsibility to protect, etc. For example, the responsibility to the 
protect doctrine “is built around the premises that state sovereignty is not a closing off 
of domestic space of the state.”55 In order to imagine the “international” as “open”, as 
opposed to the “closing off” of territorial sovereignty (the domestic space of the state), 
responsibility to protect locates the responsibility in a mental/utopian space which is 
not limited by the conceptual and practical limitations of the dominance of the 
territorial state. This then allows the international lawyers to look at a “situation” or 
“crisis” through an “international” lens, but an international which exists over and 
above the aggregate of territorial states in the shape of values, morals or principles. 
Even though desires to “protect” founded on such abstract premises have been widely 
criticised, especially in the last two or three decades,56 what is relevant for my analysis is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It should be noted that this society did not necessarily involve all of humanity and was largely 
imagined to be European and essentially Christian. However what is important for my analysis 
is not the content of the principles but the space they occupy in the imagination of international 
lawyers.  
55 G. Heathcote, “Splitting the Subject: Feminist Thinking on Sovereignty.” Draft Copy With the 
Author, 2013: 5.  
56 Such critiques often see utopian visions of a “good place” as only partial and unrepresentative 
of the claimed “collectivity,” merely serving as apologies for empire and hegemony. Pahuja 
summarises these positions beautifully when she argues “it is relatively clear why we should be 
uneasy with the desire to save the world [...] After the critique of the trope of salvation and the 
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how these commitments occupy utopian spaces in international law. In other words this 
demonstrates how as an essentially spatial concept, utopia has played a considerable role 
in the theory, practice and production of international law through the denial of its own 
space. Utopian ideals at the heart of international legal thought, entrenched within its 
claim to universality, only seek refuge for the “international” within a wish, a “good 
place” which is essentially a “no place” at the same time.  
The sense of utopia suggested by Knop is present every time an international lawyer 
makes a claim to universality. An association with the utopian ideals means that in order 
for something to be international, or to become international, it must have certain 
“universal” qualities.57 The act of qualifying something as “international” dates back to 
the colonial era and the shaping of the universal appeal of order on a global scale. 
Annelise Riles in her influential reflection on the role of scale and perspective in the 
internationalisation of occurrences “on the ground” (in her analysis of Fiji), argues that 
international law trains “citizens and governments who see only local events [...] to 
conceptualize them as events occurring also on an international plane.”58 Therefore the 
international lawyers’ task becomes “both to view the world in a way that makes 
possible a difference of dimension, and to maintain a boundary that delineates and 
defines the cosmopolitan space.”59 At the root of this proposition is the claim that even 
though almost everything can be so to speak “raised” to an international plane, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
identification of its tenacious hold on international law as an underlying philosophy of history, it 
is possible to see the desire to save as the continuation of the ‘benevolence of Empire.” See S. 
Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law.” London Review of 
International Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 96.  
57 I am using the term “quality” here similar to the way Sundhya Pahuja uses the term in her 
book Decolonizing International Law. See S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, 
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality [hereinafter “Decolonising International Law”] . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011: 1-44.  
58 A. Riles, “The View From the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the Architecture 
of Colonial International law [hereninafter “International Plane”].” In Laws of the Postcolonial, 
edited by E Darian-Smith and P Fitzpatrik. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999: 
134.  
59A. Riles, “International Plane.” Ibid. 
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maintenance of the “cosmopolitan space” acts as a condition for claiming the 
“international” tag. Therefore, in the process of conceptualising, events are raised to a 
mental space over and above and hence gain the quality of being “international”.  
The view of the “international” as a space “over and above”, can, furthermore, be 
identified with the works of scholars and practitioners of international law (positivist or 
not) who subscribe to Kantian ideas of cosmopolitan world order.60 Building on the 
“high liberalism of a century before” influential thinkers such as Hersch Lauterpacht 
and Hans Kelsen believed in “utopian federalism, liberal humanism, and the associated 
values of cosmopolitan individualism.”61 Fernando Teson, in his account of The Kantian 
Theory of International Law, characterises the federal cosmopolitan view of international 
law as being based on three universal, a priori, principles of freedom, due process and 
equality. Within this view, the “international” is represented by the universal values and 
principles which are the foundations of an imagined or “utopian” dream of a world 
constitutional order. To put this in spatial terms then, the cosmopolitan international 
belongs to a utopian spatial order, as distinguished from the physical spatiality of the 
world. Of course this does not mean that for the cosmopolitan dreamers, the “real” 
world did not matter. To both Kantian and non-Kantian proponents of a cosmopolitan 
world order, the state, territory and the relations between them (subjective or objective) 
were of particular importance.62 What made (and still makes) international law 
“international” for these thinkers was not the aggregation of state territories, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See for instance A. Cassese, International Law. 2nd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 21.  
61 See M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 15, at 356-357. For an account of the “high 
liberalism” of the mid 19th century, see W. Ropke, “Economic Order and International Law.” 
Recueil De Cours, 1954: 209-250. For examples of Lauterpacht’s vision towards international law, 
see H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community. New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd, 2000; and H. Lauterpacht, “Westlake and Present Day International Law.” 
Economica, no. 15 (November 1925): 307-325. Or for a thorough analysis of Lauterpacht’s life 
and thought, see M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. At 353-412.  
62 M. García-Salmones Rovira, The Project of Positivism in International Law. Supra note 29, at 189-
197.  
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individuals ordered under a federal system. The physical spaces and entities are deemed 
“international” only in so far as they are associated with the universally shared, a priori, 
values and principles.  
For the cosmopolitan visions of international law, physical space is largely treated as a 
presupposed condition, pre-existing the authority which then speaks the law, or better 
say in the name of law. Territorial space of a state is both the object of regulation and 
the “source” of international law only in so far as it reflects the utopian principles and 
values shared in the as if world constitution which constitutes the international legal 
framework. According to Monica Garcia-Salmones Rovira, for the Kantian international 
lawyers “the natural qualities of the external world, for example of the territory, the 
elements forming its reality, had nothing to do with law.”63 In this way law becomes 
independent of physical space, and the latter only appears as territory representing the 
formal distinctions of jurisdiction, conditioning the ability of actors to legislate on 
“international” matters. Individuals on the other hand become reduced to rights bearers 
(with respect to the state and wider cosmopolitan order) and/or trade partners and 
economic competitors (with respect to each other within the wider cosmopolitan 
society of human beings). One of the most important theorists who formalised legal 
matters (both national and international) to the point of almost absolute detachment 
from the social, political and spatial reality is Kelsen, for whom “all legal acts must 
derive from a single basic norm which in turn legitimizes the first positive norm, the 
constitution.”64 In this (cosmopolitan) approach, the legal “international” belongs to 
(and is derived from) the self-referential interplay between the as if constitution and the 
basic norm, neither of which have a physical/spatial ontology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid., at 191.  
64F. Teson, “The Kantian Theory of International Law.” Columbia Law Review 92, no. 1 (1992): 
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The cosmopolitan sensibility provides us with a different (and arguably complementary) 
notion of “international”, still acting as a spatial referent of international law but seen 
through a different view of space. Even though territoriality was still the dominant 
notions of space for international lawyers with a cosmopolitan worldview, i.e. they 
understood spatiality in its physical/material sense through the aggregate of state spaces, 
their claims to universality imply the reliance on detached, mental or transcendent 
criteria accessed through an abstract (shared) space. Koskenniemi points out that 
“universalist conceptions of international law represented by Enlightenment jurists” did 
not fall “due to the rise of ‘positivism’ in the late nineteenth century,” but continued to 
affect international lawyers in the form of “morality and natural law.”65 This was the 
means through which actors otherwise territorially excluded, became included through a 
reliance on an “international” which consisted not primarily of sovereign bounded 
states, but of values and principles of treating humans alike from a position of 
neutrality. As Koskenniemi shows, the non-applicability of international law to non-
civilised territory was “not without provision made for the universal validity of 
humanitarianism and natural law principles or human rights.”66  It is this perspective 
that carries on until today in treating the “international” as a “trouble-free, neutral 
space.”67 In order to ensure this neutrality and universality, mainstream international 
lawyers then need to ensure themselves a “view from nowhere in particular,”68 so that 
they avoid the otherwise troublesome realm of everyday realities of life in the world, 
and to ensure their commitment to a sense of humanist or cosmopolitan 
progressivism.69 This in turn prompts them to either treat the social contexts either as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 15, at 130-131.  
66Ibid., at 128.  
67D. Buss. “Austerlitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries.” Supra 
note 5,  at 87.  
68 A. Riles, “International Plane.” Supra note 58, at 133. 
69 Koskenniemi suggests that any commitment to international law “still implies a commitment 
to a mild cosmopolitan progressivism.” M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 15, at 514.  
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irrelevant for international law (e.g. by distinguishing them as “domestic” or “national” 
concerns) or to treat them through the detached lens of regulation, only reluctantly 
dealing with social phenomena through the vocabularies such as human rights and 
development. This further reinforces the spacelessness of the “international” as “over 
and above” the everyday socio-political processes.   
Certain sociological approaches to international law in the early twentieth century, e.g. 
those of George Scelle and Alejandro Alvarez, conceptualised the universality of 
international law differently, through their “vision” of social solidarity amongst 
everyone, but their conception of sociality remained a utopia, to be sidelined by other 
commitments after the WWII.70 In Koskenniemi’s words, for this group of international 
lawyers (largely from inter-war France), “the state becomes an ephemeral, almost 
transparent form, at best an instrument or a “function” – sometimes a metaphor – for 
actions of the social collectivity that encompass all aspects of the lives of individuals.”71 
However, the way they substantiated this utopian vision was by relying on assumptions 
of free individuals, represented through different professions who have the people’s 
utility at the heart of their collaborative operations. George Scelle, an important figure 
in French solidarism, saw the international system “as an aggregate of individuals, living 
through varying solidarities,” with the role of “law as a translation of social or moral 
necessities.”72 Even though this was a radical view of the international system, it still 
relied upon the mediating role of state which exercised a double function connecting 
the social experience of the individual in society to the higher order of international law. 
What is important for my analysis is that the ideas of the “international” being made of 
people as a unitary society of (hu)mankind, only remained in the realm of mental space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For an authoritative account of “solidarism” in international law (1871-1950), see M 
Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Ibid., at 266-352.  
71 Ibid., at 268. 
72 Ibid., at 338.  
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and the only real sociality continued to be the world of formal treaty negotiations and 
the pragmatic operation of experts within international organisations. This political 
reality was arguably further reinforced through the instrumentalist approaches to 
international law within the Cold War period.73 International law remained in need of 
commitments to define itself as “law” (and “international”) and at the same time the 
need to be situated within the political reality of the world for those commitments to 
cut.        
As Pearson observes this then creates an international law which is “created by global 
elites in exclusive hierarchical spaces [such as international conferences and institutions]; 
[with a conception of] law portrayed as neutral and aspatial but based on partial 
perspectives; law as removed from the space of the realms in which it is lived, from space of diverse 
participation.”74 This is a point also raised by Pahuja who describes international law as 
“spatially ‘transcendent’,” especially in its relation to commitments to justice. These 
commitments often manifest themselves through international institutions and the 
principles of justice and equality within their constituent instruments and treaties.75 
Therefore in addition to being characterised in terms of physical/territorial space (either 
representing the aggregate of territorial states or physically occupying a delimited space), 
international institutions can also be seen to “represent the concrete manifestation of 
the normative aspirations of law in the international system.”76 In this reading of 
international institutions, the “international” ceases to be solely about the aggregate of 
its member states. It also stops being necessarily associated with a specific 
physical/spatial location of the institution or its conferences. Instead the “international” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For a great analysis of the post-WWII instrumentalism in international legal theory, see I. 
Scobbie, “Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law.” In 
International law, edited by Malcolm D. Evans, 58-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.  
74 Z. Pearson, “Spaces of International Law.” Supra note 5, at 504. [Emphasis added] 
75 See for instance the language of Charter of the United Nations Art 1(1) and Art 2(4).  
76 B. Rajagopal. International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistence 
[hereinafter “International Law from below”]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 40.  
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through international institutions comes to act as the spatial referent of imagined 
aspirations and commitments belonging to an ideational/mental space, being 
represented and manifested through the operations and action of the institution.  
An example of the operation of this mental space through the institutional structure of 
international law is provided by Pahuja’s discussion of the case of Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR, within the context of the New 
International Economic Order).77 The movement which was launched by a group of 
Third World states for the international recognition of their economic control over their 
natural and economic resources soon fell in the process of being characterised as 
“international” in order to take concrete legal effect. As Pahuja shows, once this claim 
entered the sphere of international law, it was “transformed by, and subsumed within, a 
nascent regulatory framework dealing with foreign investment. The transformation 
occurred via the projection and stabilisation of a particular meaning for the ‘international’ sphere.”78 
Pahuja then goes on to claim that “the transcendent positioning of development and 
economic growth,” as “universal” commitments of international law, acted as the main 
stabilisers of the claims of PSNR as “international” within the institutional framework 
of international law. Since the institutionalisation of international law, especially from 
the end of the Second World War onwards, institutions come to embody different 
“domains” of the commitments of international law, and economic development is no 
exception.  
Another example of the institutional manifestation of the “international” belonging to a 
space “over and above” is the transformation of the cosmopolitan principles into 
categories such as universal human rights through institutional frameworks. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 The PSNR, is an initiative launched by the Third Word in the 1950s and 1960s in order for 
them to assert more control over their assets and economies. For a detailed discussion see S. 
Pahuja, Decolonising International Law. Supra note 57, at 95-172. 
78 Ibid., 96.   
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absence of natural law, international human rights norms and laws are probably one of 
the most important offshoots of the Kantian categories within modern day international 
law. International human rights which are based on (and encapsulate) principles such as 
individual freedom and equality, require the Kantian notion of categorical imperative to 
provide “crucial support for the universality of human rights.”79 The existence of rights 
and duties which are imagined beyond national/territorial borders require an image or a 
supposed awareness of a “world society” in which individuals are not divided by 
national and cultural boundaries, and united through their mere “humanness”. 
However, the reality of international law, its subjects and institutions does not spatially 
reflect the existence of such a society. As a result, the debate over human rights is often 
fraught with claims of contextual relativism.80 Given the prominence of ideals and 
principles behind the international human rights regime, this union of values and 
principles (taking the shape of laws, rights and duties) exists in the utopian/abstract 
space of universality and represented through international institutions and legal 
frameworks. This in turn gives authority and validity to the claims of international 
institutions and states who act on the basis of those values and commitments, further 
reinforcing the detachment of the mental space of the “international” from the 
domestic (physical) spaces where human beings and societies are seen to exist.  
Therefore seeing the “international” as a space “over and above” and conceptually 
distinct from the collection of states is central to international law (parallel to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 F. Teson, “The Kantian Theory of International Law.” Columbia Law Review 92, no. 1 (1992): 
64. According to Kantian theory, the Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle which 
acts as an unconditional command for our will to act “morally.” This principle is fundamental 
to Kant’s moral philosophy in general and has had a significant influence in what one might 
refer to as Enlightenment jurisprudence. On Kant’s philosophy of Categorical Imperative see 
H. E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and Enlarged. 
Yale University Press, 2004. 
80 On the relativism of human rights and paradoxical character of the discourse see C. 
Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: the Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. New York: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007; or D. Kennedy, The Dark Side of Virtue: Reassessing International 
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continued importance of territory). This “over and above” character of the 
“international” is then manifested through the operation of states, international 
institutions or international courts and tribunals (in the form of universal principles of 
justice, etc.). It is in critique of this perspective that Koskenniemi argues that “because 
no position or policy may be identified with the international spirit as such, and even if 
it were, there would be no guarantee of its beneficiality, taking on the ‘international’ as 
the space for one’s commitment is meaningless [...]”81 However in the lack of an 
identifiable physical spatial referent for the “international”,82 the “utopian” (mental) 
space of our commitment to ideals, dreams and values of (international) law become 
associated with the “international”. Yet, taking the “international” as belonging to the 
mental space of commitments is meaningless when that space is empty of social 
experience. As I will expand further in the next chapter in the case of non-territorial 
social movements, the existence of an “international [social] spirit” requires accessing a 
sociality which neither relies on the abstract space of commitments, nor is enclosed 
within the territorially bounded ideas of society and space. If international law has the 
conceptual tools to access the co-constitution of the international spirit in its socio-
spatiality, it can neither cling on to territory, nor detach from space entirely. This is the 
form of social space nomos provides conceptual access to and it is my intention to 
expand on it in the next chapter.  However, before proceeding to the analysis of nomos 
and international law, I will point to two important and interrelated critical projects in 
international legal theory which help demonstrate the interconnectedness of the spatial 
sensibilities of international law (demonstrated above) with the structure of the 
international legal argument and its critical instability.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See generally M. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer. Supra note 15, at 514.  
82 This is if we see the state territory, therefore the “national” territory, as the basis of the 
physical notions of spatiality in international law.  
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5.4. Logos :  Koskenniemi, Pahuja and the Critical Instability of 
International Law  
One of the clearest articulations of international law that highlights the dominance of 
logos can be found in Pahuja’s analysis of the “critical instability of international law.”83 
Pahuja’s reflections on the critical instability of international law are an articulation of 
logos in international legal theory and practice, and more specifically with regards to 
fundamental categories such as the “international”. According to Pahuja, fundamental 
categories like the “international” are not seen as pre-existing international law but 
instead produced through international law both as the subjects of law, as well as its 
objects of regulation. This (discursive) self-constitution is on a definitional level, 
responding to the questions that include “what is law” and “what is international”. 
Therefore “international law’s claim to be defined as ‘law’ (and indeed, to be 
‘international’ law) relies upon a self-constitutive gesture in which it is cut from its 
others and raised to the status of universality.”84 This “quality” of international law, referred 
to by Pahuja as “postcoloniality of international law,”85 acts as a guarantor for its legal 
authority and claim to normativity. So in this process the “international” appears to be 
simultaneously constituted as a conceptually delimited category while being detached 
from the contingent reality of society and politics. Hence, the “international” in 
international law is placed in a privileged position, alongside law, “cut from a plurality of 
forms of ordering, which are then defined as something else – [what law [read 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law. Supra note 57, at 26.  
84 Ibid., at 27. [Emphasis added] See also at 97. Pahuja is borrowing the notion of ‘cut’ From 
Jacques Derrida’s “Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority.” 
85 Pahuja uses postcolonial theory mainly as a “style of engagement,” which focuses on the way 
categorisations operate within “imperial and post-imperial contexts,” on how Western identities 
and categories are constantly “constituted in opposition to an alterity that it has itself 
constructed.” S. Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law. Ibid., at 27. Pahuja quoting E. Darian-
Smith, and P. Fitzpatrick (eds.), Laws of the Postcolonial: Law, Meaning and Violence. Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 1999: 1.   
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“international”]  is ‘not’] – and denied the status of law [read “international”].”86 This 
detachment reflects my analysis of the “international” as belonging to a space “over and 
above”.  
Defined and cut through the postcolonial quality of international law, the fundamental 
categories such as the “international” are also situated within the “political” quality of 
(international) law. Pahuja uses the word “political” to accommodate a specific 
meaning. For her this quality of law refers to “the gap between positive international 
law and its aspirational relationship to an idea of justice.”87 This gap is to a large extent 
consistent with the “postcolonial” quality of international law. It is the gap between this 
transcendence and the body of international rules and customs that characterise what 
she calls the “politics of international law.”88 The spatial transcendence of the 
commitments to justice, values and morality are arguably what qualifies the body of 
rules in a positivist understanding both as international and as law, while simultaneously 
situating them within the aggregate of state territories. From a cosmopolitan or a 
solidarist lens, even though the goal is to characterise the “international” sociologically, 
the sociology remains a utopian vision of a single society of human beings. It is utopian 
since human beings have so far largely been unable to communicate and interact on a 
multi-party basis unless through their representatives (political and economic). The 
“international” is imagined as an abstract, neutral space of commitments “over and 
above”, detached from the aggregate of state-spaces. 
The requirement of international law to constantly define itself as something more than 
just “rules-plus-violence” requires a claim to “justice” which is reached through a claim 
to universality. What Pahuja calls international law’s “promise”, is constantly evaluated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law. Ibid., at 28.    
87 Ibid., at 33.  
88 Ibid., at 36.  
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and criticised with respect to the constructed categories and political dynamics of 
international law, acting as a motive/impulse for any form of deconstruction (and 
reconstruction) of (international) law. The simultaneous existence of fundamental 
claims of justice and universality alongside a claim to political situatedness is how I 
suggest Pahuja’s theory articulates the idea of logos in the context of international law. 
This is because it locates the “international” both in the material space of politics and 
detached through the mental/abstract space of commitments to values and justice. 
A second influential theory which I associate with logos in this project is Martti 
Koskenniemi’s characterisation of the international legal argument in From Apology to 
Utopia. In this seminal text, Koskenniemi famously characterised the nature of the 
international legal argument as indeterminate, claiming that “indeterminacy is an 
absolutely central aspect of international law’s acceptability.”89 As identified by 
Koskenniemi, international law becomes indeterminate because of it political character, 
being stuck between claims of concreteness and objectivity of international legal rules.90 
Even if we accept this “middle-ground” characterisation of international law by 
Koskenniemi, international law remains a legal system, with a set of legal rules and 
principles (however contextually dependant) which need (at least the claim to) 
determinacy and objectivity in dealing with different phenomena and cases. The 
constant need for a detachment from material reality for purposes of normativity is 
exactly what distinguishes international law from pure politics and process. 
Contemporary international lawyers (from the positivists to the critics) see the need for 
international law being more than “mere sociological description,” and seek to come up 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. Supra note 10, at 591.  
90 As also mentioned by Pahuja herself, the use of the word “political” for Koskenniemi is 
similar to her suggestion of the “political” quality of international law. This being said, she does 
distinguish her approach from Koskenniemi’s especially with respect to the latter’s use of the 
word in the seminal article called “The Politics of International Law.” See S. Pahuja, Decolonising 
International law. Supra note 57, at 33, note 80. See also M. Koskenniemi, “The Politics of 
International Law.” European Journal of International Law 1, no. 4 (1990): 4-32.   
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with ways of ensuring the lawness of international law, while keeping “in touch” with 
sociological and political processes.  
The argument put forward by Koskenniemi is similar to Pahuja’s position regarding the 
“critical instability of international law,” since it requires most international law scholars 
[...] [to] continue to treat international law as a ‘hybrid’ being which keeps in contact 
with reality without being totally absorbed by it.”91 It is through this position that the 
law takes on the character of logos, at the same time being “both ‘within’ and ‘outside’ 
the world” holding on to the detachment characterising it as logos. It is outside the world 
through the characteristic detachment of law from the socio-spatial reality; at the same 
time it is within the world, through a relation of regulation and control (“rules-plus-
violence”92), still treating reality as an object of regulation. In other words, even though 
(international) law is always “located” in socio-political reality, it always remains “law” 
through the detachment of its authority from that reality and placing it “over and 
above” to ensure universality.  
To sum up, Pahuja and Koskenniemi both demonstrate the need for the “detachment” 
of law and legal “authority” from the everyday socio-political realities in order to 
underpin a claim to universality (even though it might be invisible to uncritical eye). On 
the other hand, since the rise of positivism and the formation of a tradition of 
international law, this claim to universality is always accompanied by a need for 
concreteness. Different approaches to international law differ on the basis of how to 
characterise the processes and contexts of international law, and whether they prioritize 
(and emphasise) the political and sociological context of international law over its legal 
(rule/regulation based and a-contextual) character.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 C. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012: 113.  
92 I am borrowing this phrase from Pahuja. 
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The central theme of this chapter is to offer a description of the “international” as 
implied by predominant approaches to international law. Through this description, a 
specific logic behind international law’s view of its own “international” is apparent. On 
the one hand, using the insights of scholars such as Koskenniemi and Pahuja, the 
international legal argument can be characterised by a spatio-legal detachment and fixity 
associated with the normative claim of “the legal” through utopia. On the other hand in 
order for the categories and doctrines to be concrete, a certain socio-spatial setting has 
to correspond to the law. However, this sociological base for the law is constantly 
detached from “the legal” in order to ensure a universal position through which 
international law’s regulatory (law-like) character can be achieved. This form of 
regulation centred relationship between law and the social context (as the object of 
regulation) can be seen as the first step in tracing the logic of logos in most approaches to 
law within the international legal tradition.  
A parallel spatio-legal dichotomy affects the imagination of the international lawyer with 
regards to the “what” and the “where” of the “international”. Analysing the different 
ways the “international” is imagined (spatially) in international law (following Delaney), 
the concept tends to be, broadly speaking, stuck within the modern spatial binary of 
material (physical space)/ discursive (mental space). The “international” is seen through 
categories and entities which are either based operationally and fundamentally on a 
territorial understanding of state spaces, or somehow “cut-out” of the spaces dominated 
by states in order through negative identification. In the latter, the “international” is 
then identified as any space which is either not claimed by the category of the national 
(the High Seas, outer space, etc.), or somehow identified as a distinct space within the 
territorial boundaries of the state or municipality (institution headquarters, conference 
spaces, etc.). From these perspectives, the “international” is then associated with 
categories and entities using the notion of physical space. It is through observing the 
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“international” as within real/physical space that the requirement for the concreteness 
of international legal argument is also fulfilled.     
Yet despite the above, “international law’s claim to be defined as ‘law’ (and indeed, to 
be ‘international’ law) relies upon a self-constitutive gesture in which it is cut from its 
others and raised to the status of universality.”93 Spatially, at the same time as the 
“international” is, so to speak, left on the ground, it is “raised” to an abstract space of 
universality; the mental space of all other principles and values associated with the 
universal character of law and its authority. After all, the idea of a cosmopolitan social 
space characterised by an international solidarism or a cosmopolitan humanism were 
mere “visions;”94 abstract utopian spaces, in need of materialisation; a materialisation 
that only really happened (and was accepted by international law) within the context of 
international institutions and inter-governmental organisations. It is the existence of this 
persistent dichotomy between mental and physical space in the construction and 
predominant understanding of “international” in international law that arguably mirrors 
the indeterminacy of the legal argument, or its “post-colonial” quality highlighted by 
Koskenniemi and Pahuja. 
Consequently, with regard to the legal and spatial treatment of the “international” in 
international law (both in its traditional and critical variants), it is possible to 
demonstrate a predominant conceptualisation of the “international” as logos. The 
mental/physical binary of space within international law mirrors and arguably reinforces 
the detachment between law’s authoritative space and the “apologetic” sense of real 
world (political) relations and spaces which are always uncomfortably positioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 S. Pahuja, Decolonising International Law. Supra note 57, at 27. 
94 In the epilogue of the Gentle Civilizer of Nations, Koskenniemi announces that “[t]he vision 
of a single social space of “the international” has been replaced by a fragmented, or 
kaleiodoscopic understanding of the world where the new configurations of space and time 
have completely mixed up what is particular and what universal.” See M. Koskenniemi, Gentle 
Civilizer. Supra note 15, at 515.  
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together. The real/physical spaces become objects of regulation, while also being the 
site and products of the “political” process of law. This regulatory character of 
international law enshrined in logos, be it motivated through idealistic/utopian dreams or 
a series of interrelated material “interests”,95 performs the defining, cutting and 
spatialisation of the “international” either as an object of regulation or a mental space of 
commitments, values and visions.  
What I have argued regarding the nature of the predominant understanding of the 
“international” in international law commences from a descriptive account. By 
exploring the types of space used in the imagination of international law regarding the 
“international” (as suggested by Delaney), and combining them with critical 
observations regarding the form of the international legal argument, I have only applied 
half of my conceptual framework to the subject matter of my analysis. As I have argued 
previously, the aim of this thesis in not just to describe but to attempt a re-description 
according to a different legal/spatial framework (nomos) so as to be able to understand 
and engage with forms of everyday non-territorial social experience.  
As we are reminded by the spatial heroes of this project, i.e., Foucault, Delaney and 
Massey, space and society are non-separable. Therefore, viewing the “international” 
through the spatiality of logos which separates the two, limits the forms of sociality 
international law tends to take into account. In instances when the existence of a 
sociality is presumed as the basis for an international legal system/community, that 
community is either reduced to the community of states, or the social relations amongst 
experts, professionals and academics who communicate within certain physical spaces 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 For a great analysis of the role of “interest” within positivist thinking in international law see 
M. García-Salmones Rovira. The Project of Positivism in International Law. Supra note 29.   
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such as institutional headquarters and conferences.96 Given the continued prominence 
of states’ representatives within most international institutions, this “tribal” sociality 
stays largely between states, but is actualised through the detached legality and space of 
institutions.97 On the other hand, the logic of logos simultaneously denies international 
law a social base by “lifting” it (the “international”) “over and above” everyday global 
interactions.  
5.5. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the dominant spatio-legal logic dictating the 
view of international law towards its own conception of the “international” is logos. In 
other words, territoriality (or its absence) dominates the way international lawyers view 
space and the socio-spatiality of the “international”. As with cyberspace, viewing the 
“international” through the category of logos leaves it as a concept which, whether seen 
as territorial or abstract (“spaceless”), lacks a living socio-spatiality which goes beyond 
limited territorial configurations. The persistence of the “international” seen through 
logos was further demonstrated through Koskenniemi’s and Pahuja’s theories/critiques 
regarding the indeterminacy and critical instability (respectively) of international law and 
legal argument. In other words, I established that despite both theorists criticising the 
standard accounts of international law (such as formalism, positivism and natural law), 
asserting that international law is apologetic (material) and utopian (“spaceless”) at the 
same time, they do not depart from the standard spatio-legal account demonstrated 
through the idea of logos which is at the heart of this thesis’ problematic. If international 
lawyers seek to conceptualise social, legal and spatial experiences of everyday life within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 This sociology resembles the sociology offered by Hart, since even though it seeks to view 
international law as “a social construct,” it still fails to go beyond the society of experts, officials 
and organisations. Orford also point to the focus of sociological approaches to international law 
on international organisations and the decision making processes. See A. Orford, “On 
International Legal Method.” London Review of International Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 177 
97 I am borrowing the term “tribal” from Marti Koskenniemi’s use of the word in the Epilogue 
of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations.  
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their image of the “international”, then going beyond the limitation of logos becomes a 
necessity. This move, as I illustrate in chapter six through the analysis of social 
movements, is crucial for projects of international law which seek to destabilise both the 
territorial logic of the state, and the non-territorial life (and temporal repetitions) of 
Empire.    
The case for a move to nomos facilitates a more sophisticated understanding of the 
relation between law, space and society. Moving towards nomos requires a re-
conceptualisation of how international lawyers treat the concept of space and how we 
understand the legal, spatial and social “world” of international law. In order to be able 
to conceptualise the legal in its experienced and lived sense, international law and 
lawyers must simultaneously adopt a spatial framework in which socio-spatiality does 
not collapse back on the physical/mental binary central to logos. This in turn requires an 
open mind about what is meant by “international law” and to avoid the assumption of 
fixity of character in a “post-ontological” era.98 Legal geographers help illustrate that 
considerations of space are integral and inseparable from questions about law, since law 
is either seen to belong to a physically delimited “setting”, or influence the ways spaces 
are constructed for purposes of regulation. As a result, a shift from logos to nomos means 
a move from a territorial configuration of socio-spatiality (seen in binary form with 
mental space) towards more fluid, lived and experienced notion of space: an 
understanding which suggests a co-constitutive relationship between law, society and 
space. This in turn provides us with a conceptual basis for expanding our notions of 
“community” or “sociality” in international law beyond the states and their geographical 
bounded spaces into the everyday experiences of people all around the world; socio-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Thomas Franck famously announced in his book Fairness in International Law and Institutions, 
that “[t]he questions to which the international lawyer must now be prepared to respond, in this 
post-ontological era, are different from the traditional inquiry: whether international law is law.” 
See T. Franck. Fairness in International Law and Institutions. London: Carendon Press, 1995: 6.    
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spatial experiences such as the ones I highlighted through my re-description of 
cyberspace in the previous chapter. In the remainder of this thesis, I will demonstrate 
this shift through the lens of social movements and international law and will evaluate 
its effect on international law.  
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Chapter 6 – Nomos  and International Law: Re-Considering 
Social Movements  
 
We inhabit a nomos -  a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a world of right and 
wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. The student of law may come to identify the 
normative world with the professional paraphernalia of social control. The rules and principles of justice, 
the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social order are, indeed, important to that 
world; they are, however, but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention. 
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it 
meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the 
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, 
but a world in which we live.  
R. Cover 
 
6.1. Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the socio-spatial fluidity of nomos offers a more 
complete view of the “international” which is neither spaceless nor territorially 
configured, but indeed fundamentally challenges the material/utopian binary of logos. As 
such, the “international” is not only spatial but also (inseparably) social; it is a socio-
spatiality which is lived, experienced and dispersed into the fabric of everyday life. What 
nomos achieves, is a challenge to the territorial (or lack of) spatio-legal sensibility of 
international law (described in terms of logos), and to add a fluid non-territorial sociality 
to the conception of the “international” that seems to be largely missing from the 
discourse of international law; a socio-spatiality which I demonstrated in the case of 
cyberspace.  
The shift to nomos inevitably destabilises the central position of the territorial state in the 
social and spatial imagination of the discourse of international law, as well as the 
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(social/political) “emptiness” of any purely normative claim.1 An already established 
path in posing such a challenge at international law is provided by the relatively recent 
attention paid to social movements in the development of the theory and practice of the 
discipline (SMIL). In order to further illustrate my thesis, I will consider the critique of 
SMIL in light of my observations in the previous chapters. The critique of SMIL is 
significant for international law, since it puts people and their socio-legal experiences, 
lives and resistance at the centre of its agenda, in order to tell a narrative of international 
law “from below” and to emphasise the importance of the “local”. By taking social 
movements and inserting them into international legal discourse, both the sociological 
and hierarchical fabric of international law is challenged. 
In the wake of cyberspace and increasing mobility of people and capital, “[s]ocial, 
economic and political life cannot be ontologically contained within the territorial 
boundaries of states.”2 Consequently, the experience of social movements and activism 
has significant overlaps with this increasing porosity of information and capital, made 
possible to a great extent by the Internet. It is by following this sensibility that I 
challenge the way in which the socio-spatility of social movements are conceptualised 
within the discourse of SMIL.  
Building on my re-description of cyberspace in chapter four, I will demonstrate that 
accessing the socio-spatial fabric of contemporary forms of resistance3 which are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005: 533- 548. In this section, Koskenniemi responds to critics 
who argue that claims of indeterminacy lead to legal nihilism. He disagrees by arguing that 
criticising the “objectivity of the legal argument” does not mean commitment to irrationality “or 
to an “anything goes” morality. Even though I agree that forms of knowledge do not have to be 
objective to be considered knowledge, this alternative form of knowledge is inconceivable if one 
holds on to the presupposed ideas of society and space.  
2 J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and Intenrational Political Economy. 
London: Routledge, 1995: 100.  
3 I am using italics because part of my critique in this chapter is directed at the ways in which 
the predominant use of the term “resistance” reinforces forms of socio-spatial understanding 
central to logos. I will discuss this further in the chapter.     
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intimately woven with the non-territoriality of cyberspace, requires a fundamental 
conceptual shift. In line with my argument regarding international law’s characterisation 
of cyberspace, I argue that a socio-spatially fluid framework of nomos offers us the 
modes of analysis needed for this shift.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First, I will provide a critique of the three main 
components of the argument presented by SMIL (especially focusing on the work of 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal) in challenging the formalities and hierarchies of international 
law, namely the category of the “local”, the metaphor of “from below”, and the role of 
Empire as a broad context for resistance (specifically focusing on Hardt and Negri’s 
account).4 With this background, I then present two cases of the overlap between 
contemporary social movements and cyberspace (#occupy and #queer), as examples of 
non-territorial international sociality which are neither captured by SMIL, nor the 
predominant understandings of the “international” (as presented in the previous 
chapter). This chapter will conclude with an analysis of what a conceptual shift to nomos 
means for international law, especially focusing on the possibilities it provides for 
critical projects to capture the multiplicity of socialities and spaces through which life 
and resistance are experienced around the world.    
6.2. A Critique of Social Movements in International Law  
Definitions of social movements are plenty, each emphasising a different aspect of this 
relatively broad category.5 John Wilson creates a typology of four kinds of social 
movements (transformative, reformative, redemptive and alternative) focusing more on 
the different approaches of the movements.6 In contrast, Paul Byrnes’ definition of 
social movements highlights the internal characterisations that he associates with social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See generally M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire. USA: Harvard University Press, 2000.  
5 See section 1.2.3.  
6 J. Wilson, Introduction to Social Movements. United States: Basic Books Inc., 1973.  
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movements, including unpredictability, irrationality (non-self-interestedness), 
unreasonableness and being disorganized.7 Zirakzadeh’s approach to defining social 
movements is to combine a focus on characterisations and approaches with a reflection 
on their social fabric.8 It is not my intention here to agree or disagree with any of the 
ever-growing characterisations and definitions of social movements offered by 
scholarship and activists. There are at least two descriptive characteristics of social 
movements shared between theorists. First, they share a central role for people and groups 
in creating, maintaining and directing a fundamentally social experience. It is through 
embracing this fabric that Rajagopal, for example, has sought to challenge the “elitist” 
fabric of international law’s social reality. It is from a similar sensibility that I proceed in 
this chapter, the larger aim of which is to make accessible certain experiences of lived 
sociality, that I also associated with cyberspace in the fourth chapter, within the sphere 
of international legal knowledge. Second, and interrelated to the first shared 
characteristic, is the way in which the theorists of social movements view the space of 
social movements and their spatial relation to the “international” in international law. It 
is the circumscribed approach to spatiality of social movements (especially as seen in 
SMIL) that I call into question, and further use my critique as a platform to argue for a 
re-framed engagement with new forms of socio-spatiality represented by and 
demonstrated through cyberspace. The literature on social movements and international 
law currently falls short of grasping a growing range of experiences that not only affect 
the formation and operation of social movements, but social life in general around the 
world that are enhanced and created by/through/with/in cyberspace.  
Most scholarly work on social movements and international law revolves around the 
concerns of critical and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 P. Byrne, Social Movements in Britain. London: Routledge, 1997. 
8 C. E. Zirakzadeh, Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006. 
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through mostly historical evidence “seeks to dis-enchant international law by revealing 
its imperialist, gendered and racist underpinnings.”9 The critical and TWAIL attempts to 
destabilise the privileged position of states within the narrative of mainstream 
international law uses social movements in order to emphasise the importance of 
resistance in the formation of international law. A cyber-socio-spatial turn works to 
position social movements beyond territorial understandings of the category of Third 
World.10 Scholars mean different things when speaking of the Third World; for instance 
as an ideological category, a political strategy, a shared colonial history, political 
geography or in the case of Rajagopal a “certain set of images: of [...] simply lack of 
modernity.”11 Rather than enter the debate of what the Third World means within 
international law literature, I focus on the counter-hegemonic/counter-imperial 
sensibility of TWAIL literature, and its translation into the SMIL literature through 
socio-spatial categories and metaphors. The descriptive observations of TWAIL 
scholars regarding the nature of the global political economy and locating the sociality 
of human life within categories such as the “local” or the “periphery” has the danger of 
reinforcing the same spatio-legal structure that social movement approaches “locate” 
resistance within.12 This is why a different, more comprehensive, conceptual framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 R. Buchanan. “Writing Resistance into International Law.” International Community Law Review 
10 (2008): 446. 
10 In International Law From Below, Rajagopal highlights that he is using the “Third World” not 
“to mean the exclusivists, politico-territorial space of states, but, rather, a contingent and 
shifting cultural-territoriality which may encompass states and social movements.” [Emphasis 
added] Even though this definition clearly challenges the post-decolonisation, state-based, 
notion of “Third World”, it still fails to imagine the space of “Third World” non territorially, 
even though this territoriality might at times hint at a conceptual delimitation and closure. See 
B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistence 
[hereinafter “International Law from Below”]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 41, 
note 5. On alternative ways of seeing the “Third World” spatially, see also T. Mahmud, 
“Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial Mapping.” Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 5, no. 2 (2007): 525-561.  
11 See B. Rajagopal, “Locating the Third World in Cultural Geography.” Third World Legal Studies 
15 (1999): 15-19. See also K. Aoki, “Space Invaders: Critical Gography, the "Thirds World" in 
International Law and Critical Race Theory.” Villanova Law Review 45, no. 5 (2000): 913-958. 
12 On TWAIL and global political economy, see L. Eslava and S. Pahuja. “Between Resistance 
and Refrom: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law.” Trade, Law and Development 3, 
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that prioritises consideration of socio-spatiality of social movements as part of the 
“international” rather than detached from it through the boundaries (conceptual or 
physical) between categories such as the “local”, the national and the mainstream 
“international” is needed.13 For an international lawyer this is important since it 
potentially transforms the configuration of international socio-spatiality, a fabric which 
is at the centre of international legal argument and context.14  
As noted in my earlier analysis, the SMIL literature,15 in addition to largely belonging to 
the TWAIL/critical tradition and questioning the elitism of the international legal 
narrative, opens up a window of analysis through the realisation of the importance of 
collective action with regards to international law. Ranging from discussions on human 
rights discourses to environmental practices and opportunities, this literature highlights 
the role of individuals and groups as more than mere “bearers of human rights”.16 In 
other words, individuals and groups are seen as more than passive actors locked within 
a rights/duty relationship with their states, but rather as experiencing and influencing 
the development of international law. I am primarily interested in the socio-spatial 
sensibilities of SMIL and their relation to international law, the most important of 
which is the insistence on a move to the “local” and a desired view of international law 
“from below”. In order to demonstrate my observations and expand on my critique of 
these two characteristics (the “local”, “from below”) using the logos/nomos distinction, I 
mainly focus on the scholarship of Balakrishnan Rajagopal, while drawing on the works 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
no. 1 (2011): 103-130. See also M. Fakhri, “Questioning TWAIL's Agenda.” Oregon Review of 
International Law 14, no. 1 (2012): 1-17. 
13 For an analysis of the predominant understandings of the “international” in international law 
see chapter 5.  
14 See discussion of Pahuja and Koskenniemi in section 5.4. 
15 See section 1.2.3. 
16 See for instance Stammers, Neil. “Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human 
Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1999): 980-1008.  
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of other leading scholars of the field.17 In particular, I draw on Rajagopal’s work to 
demonstrate three important elements/characteristics of the SMIL argument, namely 
the move to the “local”, use of the “from below” metaphor and positioning social 
movements in a “counter-hegemonic” relationship with Empire.18 
In International Law from Below, Rajagopal intervenes in the TWAIL literature by forming 
a triangle between international law, “development” and “human rights” discourses, and 
social movements.19 Rajagopal repeatedly calls for a fundamental rethinking of 
international law if “Third World resistance” is to be taken seriously.20 He makes the 
case for this rethinking through analysing the historical relationship between Third 
World resistance and, first, the development agenda of the institutional framework of 
international law from the League of Nations to the post-Cold-War institutions and, 
second, human rights discourse. As Rajagopal highlights, he is primarily “interested in 
how one might de-elitize international law by writing resistance into it, to make it 
recognize subaltern voices.”21 While pointing to an “extant bias in favour of the 
‘global’” in the mainstream narrative of international law, Rajagopal lays down the 
groundwork for a reversal to the local for developing an “understanding of the role of 
social movements in international law.”22 He argues throughout his work that the 
“local” is often ignored in existing attempts of appropriating the democratic challenge 
faced in the Third World, because it is either appropriated by the universalising language 
of the Western “international” (e.g. human rights), or their unique substance is made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In particular, I draw on the contribution of scholars such as Ruth Buchanan, Neil Stammers 
and Edward Rubin.  
18 For the former two, I mainly draw on his seminal work, B. Rajagopal, International Law from 
Below. Supra note 10. In the case of the latter (Empire), I point to his analysis in B. Rajagopal, 
“Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a 
Third World Strategy [hereinafter “Counter-Hegemonic International Law”].” Third World 
Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 767-783. 
19 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Supra note 10. 
20 Ibid., at 1 and 295.   
21 Ibid., at 45. 
22 Ibid., at 47.  
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invisible to the discourse because of limits of territoriality. This is because on the one 
hand “the resistance of mass movements is appropriated as empirical evidence of the 
triumph of the human rights discourse” and on the other “the [heterogeneity of] praxis 
of these social movements is largely ignored.”23 He calls this a “double move of 
appropriation and invisibility” by international law in dealing with social movements. 
Rajagopal’s characterisation of international law and the “hidden” role of resistance in 
the development of its narrative are demonstrative of the general sensibility of – and the 
challenge facing – a large swathe of SMIL literature.24  
It is common for scholars to consider the interaction between social movements and 
international law and to challenge (and expand) the SMIL/TWAIL literature through 
promoting socio-historical methodologies.25 However, the spatiality of this relationship 
is scarcely addressed. As critical geography indicates there is also a need for a different 
understanding of the relation between space, law and the social, alongside 
considerations of history. Additional engagement with the spatiality of the 
“international” is required to further the aspirations of this strand of scholarship. This, 
of course, does not mean that space does not play a role in existing approaches: the 
focus on the “local” as a spatial (as well as a cultural and political) category allows social 
movements scholarship to further theorise diversity and plurality, in face of the often 
liberal, and progress oriented, narrative of globalisation within international law. In this 
section, I demonstrate, through a three-stage analysis, why a re-conceptualisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., at 166. 
24 See for example R. Buchanan, “Writing Resistance into International Law.”Supra note 9. For 
an overview of perspectives in SMIL see J. Mertus, et al., “International Law and Social 
Movements: Towards Transformation.” American Society of International Law Proceedings 97 (2003): 
295-308. See also K. Khoday, and U. Natarajan. “Fairness and International Environmental 
Law from Below: Social Movements and Legal Transformation in India.” Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 2012: 415-441. 
25 See R. Buchanan, “Writing Resistance into International Law.” Ibid; and  V. Nesiah, 
“Resistance in the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending Investigation.” Third World 
Qaurterly 27, no. 5 (2006): 903-922. 
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(spatial, legal and social) of international law’s fundamental category of the 
“international” is needed, and why my conception of nomos provides an alternative 
theoretical framework. As such, I analyse the role of the “local”, conceptions of 
“below” and the resistance to Empire in the following section of text, as each of these 
engage socio-spatial knowledge for SMIL and TWAIL thinking, yet resist the full shift 
towards socio-spatiality represented within nomos. 
6.2.1.  Writ ing “the Local” into Internat ional  Law 
An important analytical move by the SMIL literature is moving to the “local” in order 
to challenge the hegemonic and elitist conception of the “international” and 
international law. This move is best demonstrated through Rajagopal’s final proposition 
in his book, where he emphasises that “[i]t is important for the discipline of 
international law to rethink its categories and learn how to take the ‘local’ more seriously 
in its problematic and contested relationship with the Third World.”26  The turn to 
“local” is a spatial proposition or choice. It comes from Rajagopal and other SMIL 
theorists’ attempts to problematise the centrality of the state (both as a category and a 
geographic entity) and the “highly problematic relationship” of international law to the 
“local” rooted within the institutional framework of the “international”.27 Rajagopal 
demonstrates that “the place-based praxis of social movements has emerged as an 
important site of re/formulation and transformation of the space-based global legal 
discourse.”28 What is important here is the choice to look at social movements as 
“place-based”: Rajagopal suggests that new social movements within the context of 
globalization happen within “particular enclaves of the ‘international’ that exist in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Supra note 10, at 296. 
27 Ibid., at 71. Rajagopal traces this “problematic relationship” through the inter-war years and 
the Mandate system to the post-cold war institutional setting of international law.  
28 Ibid., at 271.  
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different locations.”29 He argues that in reaction to the new “political spaces” of 
globalization which disrupt the centrality of the territorial nation state, resistance 
emerges “along different [local] spatial orderings which are not necessarily organized on 
a ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ basis.”30 Therefore, in his attempt to bring social movements 
to the attention of international law, Rajagopal makes a spatial choice to draw our 
attention from the category of the “international” to the “local”.    
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the predominant understanding of the 
“international” in international law fits the spatio-legal conception of logos. This 
conception can be criticised for being seen either as territorial or imagined as a 
mental/conceptual space of commitments and “shared” values.31 The dominance of 
logos in international legal imaginations also means the experiences of sociality and 
everyday relations in the “international” are placed within the bounded entities of 
mainly territorial states but also institutions. If a territorial placing of social movements 
is chosen as a strategy of “writing resistance” into international law, the logic of logos, 
which is based on a territorial/abstract spatial binary, remains untouched by a move to 
the “local” since it still contains the socio-legal experience and resistance within a 
notion which is territorial (“place-based”).  
Through the “local”, scholars such as Rajagopal seek to access and bring to our 
attention the “non-global” or “non-international” spaces of resistance. By placing social 
movements within the socio-spatial category of “local”, it “gives undue weight” to the 
predominant, largely territorial view of the “international”.32 This persistence of logos is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For Rajagopal’s discussion of social movements within the context of globalisation, see B. 
Rajagopal, International Law from Below. Supra note 10, at 266-270. 
30 Ibid., at 270.  
31 For the discussion of the physical/mental dichotomy in international law see sections 5.2. and 
5.3. 
32 Here I follow a similar sensibility to Susan Marks’ analysis of the position of approaches 
within international law, which are critical of “state-centrism”, arguing that by defining 
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fraught with difficulties in the current state of human communications and activism 
through cyberspace, as it comes at the price of making invisible a range of non-
territorial social experiences (including but not limited to resistance) that have become 
increasingly important and relevant to international relations per excellence. In 
reinforcing the predominant view of the “international”, SMIL, through its turn to the 
local, prevent international law from taking seriously the experiences of “non-
territorial” sociality.   
If SMIL seeks to de-elitize international law and its discourse, then it is not only 
through the move to the local that this can be achieved. In fact, doing so, and limiting 
“non-elite” forms of socio-political movement to the local, ignores a crucial aspect of 
contemporary everyday life (shared by a considerable proportion of human life not all 
confined to the “Global North”)33 and how its spaces have become increasingly in 
contact with spaces of our daily life which themselves have become increasingly non-
territorial. Everyday life and social movements (often reacting to concerns of daily life 
experience around the world) have come to share the same non-territorial social space. 
6.2.2.  The Need to Move beyond Our “Desire  for  a Foundat ion”34   
It is not only through the category of the “local” that the spatio-legal logic of logos 
comes through the language of SMIL scholars. Another related trend in this literature is 
the reliance on the “from below” analogy, when the social movements and experiences 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
something negatively, one further brings the object of critique to the fore. See generally S. 
Marks, “State-Centricism, International Law, and the Anxieties of Influence.” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 19 (2006): 339-347. 
33 The statistics on the use of the Internet and membership in social networking websites, in 
addition to the central role of such spaces to subaltern processes of resistance, e.g. “the Arab 
Spring”, demonstrate that non-territorial experiences of sociality and “resistance” are not 
limited to the Global North and the developed countries. For a collection of recent papers on 
“the Arab Spring” and the Internet, See M. Taki and L. Coretti (eds.), “The Role of Social 
Media in the Arab Uprisings - Past and Present.” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 
9, no. 2 (2013).  
34 I am drawing the phrase “desire for a foundation” from Doreen Massey. See, D. Massey, For 
Space. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005: 98. 
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of everyday life are to be put in relation to the wider structure of international law.35 
Everyday life is seen as belonging to a “below” and the “international” of international 
law located “above”. According to de Sousa Santos, what is common amongst the 
multiplicity of contributions within the legal field engaging with social movements is 
“the particular, bottom-up perspective on law and globalization” which is advanced and 
illustrated.36 Globalisation is seen through the lens of hegemony and the everyday social 
(and political) life of social movements is seen on the receiving end of this hegemonic 
relationship. At the “above” of this hegemonic (hierarchical) order are a range of 
interrelated institutions and structures, with international law taking centre stage, 
supposedly fixing and legitimising the hegemonic order through time and space.  
The SMIL literature arguably performs a mere flipping of the direction of this 
relationship, without questioning socio-spatial connotations of this flip. To recall, the 
notion of logos is associated with fixity of law and legal authority, separated from the 
fluidity of social life and action. Though seeking to “give voice” to and recognise the 
role of social movements (which are often absent from the detached “above”) is 
completely understandable, changing the direction of the hierarchy to “from below” 
does not solve the detachment of the “international” from the “below”. Although this 
approach rightly and accurately “de-elitizes” the international legal narrative, it still 
operates within the same spatio-legal hierarchical logic of logos. There still remains a 
“below” and an “above” even though the relationship between the two is redefined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In addition to Rajagopal’s International law From Below, there are a number of other scholars 
using this metaphor. For instance see J. Ife, Human Rights From Below: Acheiving Rights Through 
Community Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; or  D. della Porta, et al., 
Globalization from Below: Transnational Activists and Protest Networks. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 2006; or B. S. Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito (eds.). Law and Globalization from 
Below: Towards Cosmopolitan Legality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
36 B. S. Santos and C. A. Rodríguez-Garavito. “Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in Counter-
Hegemonic Globalization [hereinafter “Counter-Hegemonic Globalization”].” In Law and 
Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality , edited by Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005: 4. [Emphasis 
added] 
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within the SMIL literature. Laws and law making institutions and bodies of international 
law, once emerged through the interaction of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
processes, are then put in a fixed and detached position with regards to a whole array of 
social relationships, lived experiences and socio-political movements.  
To move beyond the focus on the “from below” metaphor in international law does not 
mean that hierarchical political economies of hegemony do not operate. There are many 
instances where the local engagement with international law is best articulated through 
the language of resistance while locating the experiences of the people strictly within the 
local context. However, the reduction of counter-hegemonic socio-political processes to 
the “from below” approach is problematic. This continued detachment of the “below” 
from the “above” (with the exception of where the “below” is somehow included, or 
makes its mark on the “above”) reduces the possibilities of engagement and 
understanding social processes and social spaces where neither the “local” nor the 
“from below” analogy apply.  
An instance where the above/below dichotomy comes through the language of SMIL 
literature is the insistence on using the vocabulary of “resistance”. As SMIL scholars 
have rightly shown, resistance certainly exists and is worthy of attention in international 
law. However, the phrase “resistance” suggests something that is being resisted, and in a 
way externalises the thing being resisted and detaches from the everyday life of the 
people who are doing the resisting, located above them. In the case of international law, 
the instances of resistance explored by scholarship, for example the Seattle protests of 
1999, seem to suggest that some “international” phenomenon (in this case the World 
Trade Organization) is either being resisted within the “local”, or that “international” 
legal vocabulary is being adopted (as if chosen at will from the outside and brought to 
the local) as a strategy of pursuing the goals of social movements.  
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Probably the most prevalent vocabulary of resistance used by, or associated with, a 
range of social movements globally is human rights. Edward Rubin has convincingly 
argued that social movements, in addition to their role in the processes of 
implementation of human rights, also play an important and undeniable “conceptual 
role” in the gradual development of human rights as a discourse of resistance.37 In this 
way, the central characteristic of human rights becomes conceptually intertwined with a 
continual and fluid relationship between human rights and power. Basing his argument 
on this observation, Neil Stammers in his influential contributions to the theorisation of 
the social construction of human rights through social movements, points out a crucial 
issue with the position of human rights discourse in social movements. He accurately 
highlights a paradoxical relationship between social movements and institutions, (which 
are often associated with the resisted “above”) where human rights become 
transformed from a “pre-legal” stage to a legal/institutional stage. Stammers associates 
the latter with the “arguments handed down to them [activists] by either so-called experts 
or established political ideologies” and invites “contemporary activists” to “grasp the 
complexity of the world we are living in.”38 Similar to Buchanan’s point regarding a 
historical methodology, he suggests that in order to grasp and engage with this 
complexity “we need a perspective through which the general dynamics of social 
relations can be incorporated.”39  In order to achieve this, Stammers offers a “socio-
historical” analysis of human rights which describes it as socially constituted.40 
According to de Sousa Santos, the growing literature on “global social and legal 
processes” that uses the “from below” analogy/metaphor, performs “a combination of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 E. Rubin, “The Conceptual Role of Social Movements.” Amercian Society of International Law 
Proceedings 97 (2003): 296-299. 
38 N. Stammers, “Social Movements, Human Rights, and the Challenge to Power.” American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 97 (2003): 301. [Emphasis added] 
39 Ibid., at 300.   
40 See generally N. Stammers, “Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human 
Rights.”Supra note 16. 
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qualitative methods applied to the study of different locales that aims to examine the 
operation of global sociolegal processes shaping events in such sites.”41 However, even 
though understanding human rights within their temporal/social fluidity is an important 
move, it still holds the above/below distinction intact, and with it the reliance on the 
“local”.42 
The reliance on the “local” and “from below” arguably reflects what Massey calls “a 
desire for a foundation; a stable bottom to it all; a firm ground on which the global 
mobilities of technology and culture can play.”43 This assumption of a “stable bottom” 
is then combined with an unquestioned character of international law’s fundamental 
category of the “international” which ultimately resolves in logos. This is where the 
problem lies: even though scholars, such as Stammers, try to make sense of social 
movements within social fluidity (albeit only temporal) the fundamental category of the 
“international” with which they seek to engage is detached from that fluidity through 
the logic of logos reflected both in reliance on “local” and “from below”. This in turn 
creates problems for taking into account certain forms of social movement and certain 
forms of social interaction which are neither locatable within a “local”, nor can 
necessarily be positioned against an “above”. For instance, in the consideration of New 
Social Movements through their attempts to “generally abjure power in the sense of 
control of the state” and seek “instead political alternatives to the state itself,”44 old 
spatial referencing becomes problematic. The state is an essentially territorial entity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, and César A. Rodríguez-Garavito. “Counter-Hegemonic 
Globalization.” Supra note 36, at 4.  
42 Costas Douzinas raises a similar point in his discussion of the paradoxes of human rights. See 
C. Douzinas, “The Paradoxes of Human Rights.” Constellations 20, no. 1 (2013): 51-67. 
43 D. Massey, For Space. Supra note 34.  
44 N. Aziz, “The Human Rights Debate in an Era of Globalization: Hegemony of Discourse.” 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 27, no. 4 (1995): 14. He distinguishes New Social Movements 
from “past socialist and communist movements” which sought to replace one form of state 
with another.   
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Therefore, an alternative to the state is not just a social, political or a legal matter but, at 
a fundamental level, it is a spatial issue.  
6.2.3.  Empire ,  Mult i tude and the Dif f i cu l ty  o f  Deal ing with Empire 
By turning to the “local” and adopting the spatial language of “from below”, SMIL 
emphasises counter-hegemonic strategies important in challenging the globalizing effect 
and characteristics of Empire. In other words, the general sensibility of the 
SMIL/TWAIL literature involves a counter-description to the dominant “imperial” 
narrative of international law. Hardt and Negri, whose account of Empire plays a 
central role in some SMIL/TWAIL scholarship,45 argue that Empire is a “smooth 
space” where “there is no place of power – it is both everywhere and nowhere.”46 This is 
in contrast to the accounts of empire or imperialism which suggest a broad set of 
practices “including those by which a great power in essence governs the world 
according to its own vision, using a variety of means that may or may not include actual 
conquest or settlement [as with ‘classical’ colonialism].”47 As such, although I am 
committed to a further spatial turn in SMIL contexts, it is important to pause and 
consider the discourse on Empire in both SMIL and TWAIL accounts.  
For Hardt and Negri, “Empire is an ou-topia, or really a non-place.”48 In characterising 
Empire as a “non-place”, Hardt and Negri also theorise the specific form of resistance 
that “grows within Empire” through the idea of the Multitude.49 Characterised through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See for instance B. Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law.”Supra note 36; R. 
Buchanan, “Writing Resistance into International Law.” Supra note 9;  V. Nesiah, “Resistance in 
the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending Investigation.” Supra note 25.  
46 M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire. Supra note 4, at 190.   
47 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005: 273, note 2.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Note that I am using resistance in italicised format to distinguish it from the mainstream 
perspective on the term/concept.  
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difference and multiplicity, Multitude is different from people, working class, or the masses.50 
Similar to Empire, the Multitude is a distributed network of differences with no singular 
identity and no single place. As Tayyab Mahmud points out, in the same way that the 
mainstream globalisation literature seeks to show the world (or at least the future of it) 
at the end of classic geography, Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire also seeks to offer 
an image where space (and place) lose their significance.51  In assessing the prospects for 
a counter-hegemonic or anti-imperial international law, Rajagopal and others seek to 
bring the attention of international law to “the politics of the ‘multitude’.”52 However, in 
doing so, they offer a contradictory account of “resistance” and social movements 
experience to international law.  
As demonstrated above, the physically bounded sense of space and place are far from 
losing significance in SMIL, but in fact gain importance through the “local” and “from 
below”. If for Hardt and Negri, a consideration of space is besides the point in the 
operation of Empire and Multitude, then the move to the “local” as a quintessentially 
spatial category, while holding on to Hardt and Negri’s theory, seems to be 
contradictory. In other words, locating the Multitude within the “local” goes against the 
“place-less” characteristic of the relation between Empire and the Multitude. This is 
clearly not a critique of the latter two’s scholarship, rather this understanding positions 
the TWAIL international lawyer who seeks to “write resistance into international law” 
within a theoretical contradiction, which is primarily caused by the spatial logic of logos, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 M. Hardt and A. Negri. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire [hereinafter 
“Multitude”]. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004: xiv.  
51 T. Mahmud, “Geography and International Law: Towards a Postcolonial Mapping.” Supra 
note ?, at 548-554.  
52In “Counter-Hegemonic International Law”, Rajagopal argues that the “future of the world – 
its ability to deal with problems of peace, was, survival, prosperity, planetary health and 
pluralism – depends on a range of factors, including the politics of the ‘multitude’, as Hardt and 
Negri call the governed.” B. Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law.” Supra note 36, 
at 780. See also V. Nesiah, “Resistance in the Age of Empire: Occupied Discourse Pending 
Investigation.”Supra note 25. For a great analysis of these two see Buchanan, Ruth. “Writing 
Resistance into International Law.” Supra note 9. 
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firmly based within the mental/physical binary. Of course, I am not denying the fact 
that many forms of resistance, even to the non-territorial forces of Empire, happen 
within different localities. However, as I will demonstrate in section 6.4, this is not the 
case for many others, in which case neither “local” nor “from below” capture the socio-
spatiality of such movements.  
It is in response to Empire that SMIL/TWAIL scholars seek to bring our attention 
back to immediate effects of and resistance to the forces of global imperial order which 
both in its operations and effects, are characterised as defying territoriality. However, in 
so doing, the range of problems that lie with territorial characterisation of social 
experience, central to logos and my critique of it, are ignored. This persistence of logos is 
fraught with difficulties in the current state of human communications and activism 
through cyberspace, since it comes at the price of making invisible a range of non-
territorial social experiences (including but not limited to resistance) which are an 
integral part of Empire and the Multitude.    
6.3. The Double Trouble of International Law  
In bringing a spatial-legal analysis to international law and its sociality, new limitations 
within the discipline are made visible. On the one hand, the discipline is faced by 
Empire and on the other by a conceptual inability to offer any alternative to an 
essentially territorial analysis. This leaves international law at an impasse. In this 
impasse, (critical) international law is stuck between two equally problematic positions: 
to choose to be impartial to the operations of Empire, which poses serious threats to its 
ability to envision a tangible role as a legal discipline with real emancipatory potential, 
or, to ensure this potential, the critical legal scholar can choose to resist Empire by 
falling back on a much criticised “territorial temptation” that I have demonstrated in the 
case of SMIL/TWAIL scholarship. However, the “local” and “from below” do not 
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capture the practices and experiences of the Multitude to the full. In contrast, a 
different spatio-legal vocabulary allows movement beyond the spatiality of logos and a 
way through this problematic position.    
To demonstrate this further, I rely on the examples of #occupy movements and #queer 
activism. By doing so, it becomes apparent that my criticism of “local” and “from 
below” is aimed at gaining conceptual access to movements that either in their 
interactions, organisation and mobilization, or via the vision of an “alternative” (or 
both) do not necessarily view the world through the lens of territorial spatiality.53 It is 
regarding these forms of movements and lived experiences (which through the 
“expansion” of cyberspace have become part of the shared experience of everyday life 
through social networking websites, etc.) that a solely temporal consideration of fluidity 
is not enough, as it reinforces the detachment of socio-spatial experience from what is 
predominantly deemed as the “international” of international law.   
If we do not assume a “cut off point” between “below”/ “local” and “above” / 
“international”, then it becomes possible to see social movements as part of the 
“international”, living it rather than just experiencing (the effects of) it, utilizing it 
(human rights language), or resisting it. In order to access these diverse and 
multiplicitous realms of non-territorial human/social interaction and movements then 
the socio-historical approach of Buchanan and Stammers, should be accompanied by an 
alternative conception of law and space. This conception moves away from the 
territoriality of the state or the “local”, towards embracing the multiplicity and plurality 
of legalities and power relations within a fluid social space which is essentially non-
territorial. This is precisely where I bring in the concept of nomos, since it offers a mode 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This group of social movements can be seen as part of Aziz’s category of “New Social 
Movements.” See N. Aziz, “The Human Rights Debate in an Era of Globalization: Hegemony 
of Discourse.” Supra note 44. 
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of analysis which highlights the relation between society and legality away from the 
spatial omnipresence of the state as a territorial (physical) entity.    
6.4. Re-Thinking the Space of Social Movements in International 
Law: Two Cases 
Through the widespread reliance on the “local” and “from below”, the existing 
literature on SMIL fails to envision social movements and sociality outside the logic of 
logos. In this section, I point to two instances of social activity and movement to further 
emphasis this claim: the #occupy movement and #queer activism.54 Both of these social 
movements defy a territorial characterisation of sociality in their operations, goals and 
strategies. Such movements are often referred to as “global” or “transnational;” an 
undoubtedly spatial description which still does not emphasise the non-territorial socio-
spatial characteristics of the above cases. This is because the two categories often rely 
on spatial imagery which holds on to physical territoriality as the “location” of the 
socio-spatial experience of these movements. “Global” suggests a territorial totality. 
Transnational similarly suggests a simultaneous existence of movements, with similar 
agendas, within specific locales. By focusing on their non-territorial socio-spatiality 
through nomos, I move beyond the spatial limitations of the above descriptions. The 
examples chosen are non-exhaustive and there are countless examples of social activity 
and social movement that are not (at least in part) limited to a territorial conception of 
spatio-legality.55 For Jeffrey S. Juris, “[n]owhere has [the challenge to “traditional vertical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The use of “hashtags” here is a symbolic move seeking to emphasise the fundamental role of 
cyberspace (social networking websites, forums, etc.) in the identity formation and progress of 
the social movements in question. I will further clarify this in text. See section on #occupy.   
55 Other potential occasions for these forms of non-territorial socio-political activism could be 
seen in instances of transnational women’s movements, environmental activism, anti-nuclear 
campaigns, etc. Even though these movements have had a global agenda for a while, they have 
become more and more intertwined with everyday experiences of sociality since the advent of 
the Internet and cyberspace.   
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hierarchies”] been more apparent than within the realm of collective action.”56 What I 
seek to do here is to point to these movements as instances of “international collective 
action [that] cannot be reduced to the sum of local and national protest events and 
movement actors because we are dealing with different conditions and structures of 
aggregation and integration.”57 It is these different structures and (social) spaces that I 
argue are only accessible through a different conceptual framework – namely, nomos.  
My choice of these movements (#occupy and #queer) is prompted by a concern to 
identify both what they have in common, but also to point to their difference. To put it 
in Cohen and Rai’s words, these movements seem to share “an implied universal 
logic,”58 a universality which is as much premised on sameness as it is on difference and 
fluidity of identities, concerns, strategies and the multiplicity of their socio-spatial 
ontology. In their contemporary form, these movements are highly dependent on real-
time communication networks (the Internet, telephone, satellites, etc.). What is 
significant is the way the fluid character of these networks, experienced through socio-
spatial phenomena such as cyberspace, enables the realisation of a non-territorial 
sociality. Furthermore, the possibility of real-time social communication for instance 
allows movements, such as the labour and women’s movements, to transform their so 
far largely “imaginary” social field,59 into a practiced, performed and created one which 
until very recently was difficult if not impossible.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 J. S. Juris, “Networked Social Movements: Global Movements for Global Justice.” In The 
Network Society: A Cross-cultural Perspective, edited by Manuel Castells, 341-362. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2004. 
57 C. Lahusen, “International Campaigns in Context: Collective Action between the Local and 
the Global [hereinafter “International Campaigns in Context”].” In Social Movements in a 
Globalizing World, edited by Donatella della Porta, Hanspeter Kriesi and Dieter Rucht. London: 
Macmillan Press, 1999: 202.  
58 R. Cohen and M. R., Shirin Global Social Movements. London: The Athlone Press, 2000. 9. 
59 I am using the term “imagined” similarly to Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined 
communities”. In his seminal text, he argues that the “nation” is imagined “because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” See 
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In particular, I emphasise the social spaces that are co-produced and lived 
through/across these social movements. Through the use of countless social 
networking websites, one does not even need to be an activist (in a sense of being 
physically present in meetings, and actively pursuing a goal) to be part of the non-
territorial “social field” of such movements. Exchange of information, communication 
and interaction happen on a range of levels that cannot be limited to a “local”, and 
concerns and intentions of movements are both non-territorial and lived (non-utopian) 
at the same time. They exist. We are increasingly experiencing and coming in contact 
with social movements, not through the local aspect of our everyday life but through 
non-territorial experience of cyberspace through social networking websites, forums, 
and online interaction.     
In the following section of this chapter, I will explore why some social movements (or 
some aspects of certain social movements) cannot be understood and engaged with 
simply through imagining the space of international law via the material/mental binary 
of logos. Limiting the parameters and the characteristics of the following examples by 
categories such as “local” or “below” seriously undermines their non-territorial 
characteristics both in terms of their identity and their relation to the experience of 
everyday life of spaces such as cyberspace. These social movements appear to be part of 
a transformation in activism that flows from activism into an ever-expanding range of 
lived experiences that share a form of socio-spatiality, enhanced by cyberspace, which 
re-formulates the way the “international” is experienced.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: 
Verso, 1991: 6. Through new communication tools and forums, social movements can have 
more than just an “image of the communion” in their minds, by in fact knowing, “meeting” 
(even online) them with time or space absent from their obstacles of communication.  
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6.4.1.  #Occupy  
The #occupy movement is one example of a global/international social movement, 
where cyberspace and interactive social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, etc. 
have played a crucial role. Even though the movement was largely born out of a shared 
frustration about inequality of wealth distribution and socio-political representation in 
the United States, it grew into a global social movement in a short period of time.60 
#Occupy grew into an idea, a “work in progress,”61 which had no set physical place. It 
was not held by a group of people who could be localised, and was developed through 
democratic processes, forums and debates both on the ground,62 and online. The 
movement clearly consisted of a continuum of social spaces, both materially and 
virtually placed. Activists made extensive use of social networking websites in order to 
mobilise, to exchange their views and, most importantly, their lived social experiences. 
It was, and arguably still is, the sharing of lived stories that created and developed the 
backbone of #occupy and once shared and discussed, such stories became part of a 
non-territorial sociality. It was this social space that gave rise to slogans such as “we are 
the 99%” and countless other twitter “hashtags” and Facebook pages.63 This co-
produced social space was not a utopian/celebratory space of “coming together”. 
Through its very sociality, it produced and sustained a range of social hierarchies as in 
any other human space.64 Yet, #occupy epitomises the form of socio-spatiality I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The #occupy movement started after an online blog and email list called Adbusters posted a 
blog asking their supporters to physically occupy Wall Street in 17th September 2011.  
61 www.occupy.com/about  
62 This was done through what was called general assemblies, which were democratic processes 
where anyone who wanted to share an idea was given the chance to voice it and everyone in the 
crowd created ways of reacting to and debating those ideas.  
63 “We are the 99%” originated in the Tumblr blog page of an activist called “Chris.” It is also 
attributed to the anthropologist David Graeber.     
64 Even though their sought-after democratic process was to be as inclusive and fluid as 
possible, distribution of responsibilities both online and on the ground inevitably produced a 
range of hierarchies and responsibilities, e.g. different people in charge of different parts of the 
encampment, some in charge of dealing with the press, etc.  
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perceive as international, because it operates on the basis of an experienced and lived 
socio-spatiality which is not confined to a specific territory.  
When Lawrence Lessig was writing on the #occupy movement in November 2011, he 
began by talking about the social movement by saying that “the protesters #occupy(ing) 
Wall St are looking for answers [...]”65 This is a significant move in the way a prominent 
legal theorist and specialist in cyberlaw speaks about this movement. By adding the 
hashtag sign to the verb “occupying” he is hinting at an important spatial shift in the 
way social movements are imagined and talked about. The difference that the hashtag 
sign makes is that it signals a move away from pure localisation of a social movement, 
and instead connects it to a fluid social space (cyberspace), that is essentially non-
territorial. Notwithstanding this, territory and territorial experience continue to be 
present and local concerns are real. After all, the occupation of specific territorial spaces 
was (remains) central to the #occupy movement. Like international law, the creation 
and maintenance of a non-territorially defined social space does not dislodge the lived 
territorial condition. Non-territorial refers to forms of socio-spatiality which is not in a 
“container-like” relationship with territory, but one which discursively (through the 
discourse of the social movements and the interactions happening) co-constructs its 
relation to the material (territorial) space, while remaining essentially social and 
multiplicious. 
Even though physical occupations of material spaces within cities seem to have 
subsided, new sets of social communications techniques and ideas (such as the “99%” 
imagery) are being used, experienced and lived on a day to day basis within online 
forums, new and old media, and everyday conversations. In addition, “occupy” has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 L. Lessig, “#OccupyWallSt, Then #OccupyKSt, Then #OccupyMainSt.” Huffington Post. 10 
May 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-lessig/occupywallst-then-
occupyk_b_995547.html (accessed August 22, 2014). 
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become a word used and shared by a range of different groups, with a multiplicity of 
goals and stories, which do not necessarily involve the physical occupation of a space. 
Entering #occupy in the Twitter search box allows us to see how the hashtag has 
developed the concept of occupy because of the fluidity that is cyberspace. A simple 
word acts as a flexible sign, connecting stories of everyday life to social activities of both 
local and global nature. As a social movement, #occupy is therefore not localisable, 
since it lives through the non-territorial social field that is created through the sharing of 
stories, non-territorial access to websites, in principle allowing almost anyone to 
participate.      
Despite the range of critiques directed at the ways the #occupy movement conducted 
its protests and dealt with problems of representation, one could contribute and play a 
part in the formation of the movement and experience its sociality even without being 
present in the material setting of protests.66 For instance, throughout the time of the 
“encampments” and afterwards, the questions regarding organisation stability, goals and 
the future of the movement were the subject of discussion and discourse within a 
multiplicity of spaces and between a plurality of contributors both online and in the 
“occupy camps”.67 For instance, lived and multiparty communications were (are) made 
possible between “general assemblies, working groups and supporters across the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Of course there are a range of valid critiques of purely “online activism” or as it is sometimes 
referred to “slacktivism.” For an analysis see for instance, W. A. Gamson and M. L. Sifry, “The 
#Occupy Movement: An Introduction.” The Sociolological Quarterly 54 (2013): 159-163. However 
these criticisms do not mean that non-physical “presence” in social movements is not important 
or effective. After all, as I argued above, the role that shared stories through online social media 
played in the strengthening of the #Occupy Movement cannot be understated.  
67 During the time of encampments, one of the discussions amongst the participants was about 
their organisation methods which were largely “structureless” and followed a 
“hyperdemocratic” model of no hierarchies. However after the end of the encampments, 
participants attempted to continue the momentum of the discussions in the absence of the 
“general assemblies.” One way was through the establishment of websites and new discussion 
forums and hashtags. Through this, their online “presence” continued, given the centrality of 
social networking websites and cyberspace for the movements.  
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Occupy movement” through websites such as InterOccupy.com.68 This is, of course, in 
addition to social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Tumblr which were absolutely 
crucial for the #occupy movement. Most importantly, social media permitted the space 
of the protests to be co-produced non-territorially through the non-territoriality of 
cyberspace.   
In dealing with a social movement such as #occupy, given the dominance of logos in the 
way international lawyers tend to see the “international”, it is not surprising that 
traditional legal analysis engages with the movement in very specific ways. It would not 
be an exaggeration to say that almost all of the already limited engagement of 
international law with the #occupy movement has been through the language of human 
rights. Either the demands of the movement (which is not a singularity but a fluidity of 
actions and interactions) become theorised under human rights language,69 or human 
rights law is seen to be violated by the state in dealing with the protesters on the 
ground.70 One can again note the sensibility of logos in operation here; the movement is 
either appropriated by the “over and above” space of the “international” or limited to 
locating social experience within an “international” viewed as the aggregate of territorial 
states (with sociality happening within them). As discussed in the previous chapter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 N. Chomsky, Occupy. London: Penguin, 2012: 69.  
69 A look at the different range of goals and demands of the #occupy activists (for instance in 
the GlobalMay manifesto by International Occupy assembly) shows an important parallel in the 
diagnosis and solutions of the movement and the language of international law (specifically 
human rights and development). See generally Occupy Movement. “The 'GlobalMay manifesto' 
of the International Occupy assembly.” The Guardian. 11 May 2012. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/11/occupy-globalmay-
manifesto#start-of-comments (accessed August 2014, 22). The predominance of “international 
legal language” in the formation of the language of resistance can be theorised through 
hegemony over people’s thoughts (Antonio Gramsci), but this analysis lies outside the 
boundaries of this thesis. On the hegemonic role and the counter-hegemonic possibilities for 
social movements and resistance see B. Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law.” 
Supra note 36. 
70 M. F. Davis, “Occupy Wall Street and International Human Rights.” Fordham Urban Law 
Journal 39 (2012): 931-958. For an extensive report on the human rights violations, see S. 
Knuckey, et al., Suppressing Protest: Human Rights Violations in the U.S. Response to Occupy Wall Street. 
Protest and Assembly Rights Project, 2012. 
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human rights simultaneously alludes to a universal and “spaceless” order, while being 
organised through the medium of rights and duties which are deeply territorialised since 
the duty is always the duty of the territorial state.  
The demands and social processes of movements such as #occupy are not just 
important for international law because they draw on aspects such as food security, 
social justice and environmental standards, etc., most of which resonate a range of 
human rights and development oriented instruments and institutions of international 
law. On a different level, this form of social movement and experience of shared 
common goals through the non-territorial sociality of forum and “assembly” 
participation, is significant to understand and engage with since it challenges the 
mainstream view of how socio-spatial experience is organised across the globe. More 
specifically, this form of mobilisation and organisation of ideas, ideals and processes can 
neither be always associated with a specific (if any) “local” nor can it be put in a strict 
hierarchical relation with the space of “international” that international law seems to 
envision for itself (“above”). It is also not a purely virtual social space of resistance 
happening online since on the ground presence is also significant. This is the reason 
why I suggest throughout this chapter that with movements that rely on spaces that are 
“integrated seamlessly into the exiting textures and details of our lived communal [non-
territorial] experiences,”71 cannot be adequately accessed by international law, if 
scholars, social movements and international law scholarship insists on relying on 
categories which tie it strongly to the spatio-legal logic of logos.    
6.4.2.  #Queer 
Even though many social movements are contained within, drawn from, or “attached” 
to a specific locale, both in terms of their goals and sociological make up, this is not the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I. Shangapour, et al., “Cyber Social Networks and Social Movements.” Global Journal of Human 
Social Science 11, no. 1 (2011): 11. 
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case for a range of others. The second example to which I would like to point is the 
collectivity and multiplicity of movements, praxis and interactions that identify with the 
category of “queer”. The queer community is nowhere in particular, yet it is everywhere, 
in every social setting running fluidly within all forms of socio-sexual experience. There 
is no ideal form of subjectivity within queer.72 As a result, activists and communities 
associating with the movement seem to largely reject fixed categories such as lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transsexual, since they are seen as constructed socio-legal categories 
which detach human subjects from the fluidity of socio-sexual experience, and largely 
seek “normative inclusion.”73  
Cyberspace has proven to be an essential asset to the expansion and development of the 
queer movement. The non-territorial and largely anonymous character of interactions in 
a range of online forums and social networking platforms allows experiences and stories 
of people to flow freely. Participants and activists then enter into conversations with 
anonymous users and create a network of interactions that does not necessarily operate 
on the basis of local identities. Nor is it specifically directed at a certain hierarchically 
imagined source of power. Their concern is social, their claims are social, their space is 
social, but their sociality is neither local, nor national. Going back to the discussion of 
the fourth chapter, this is what cyberspace is made of. Embracing the fluidity of the 
queer identity is impossible if one does not embrace the non-territorial nature of this 
social experience, in parallel with the local specificities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Although, given the fluidity of its character, queer might actually be treated as a form of living 
ideal which is not associated with fixity or detachment from social experience, but rather created 
through human life itself.  
73 D. Otto, “Queering International Law: "Taking a Break" from "Normal": Thinking Queer in 
the Context of International Law [hereinafter “Break from Normal”].” American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, 2007: 2.  
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A look at online queer communities/forums indicates how territoriality (local or 
international) does not emerge often as a central part of the discussion.74 Neither does it 
seem to limit the goals, actions and solutions to a specific bounded space/society. 
Websites/forums such as Reddit, Twitter, or Tumblr are forums where experiences of 
“queer” which are largely deemed as “local” or “national”, are in constant interaction 
and communication with the use of simple tools such as “#’s” and many other 
interactive online media. Tweets and re-tweets, discussions, comments and referrals, 
happen with the use of a single “hashtag” which brings local experiences such as the 
Pennsylvania judgment on gay marriage or the resolution of the African Commission on 
LGBT rights, within one ever-expanding fluid space of social relations and fluid 
identities. This space of shared experiences and interrelations is neither local, nor 
completely virtual. It expands with conversations and interactions regarding the queer 
experiences and concerns.75  
Probably the best example of this is the “micro-blogging” service Tumblr, which allows 
users to create their own blogs and post materials (video, image, text, etc.), and for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 One of the best “platforms” to access the form of fluid interaction around queer concerns is 
through the micro-blogging website Tumblr. These blogging pages allow the blogger to post 
images, videos, and texts that are not necessarily territorially identifiable, and others who also do 
not have a territorial identifier on their accounts and “like,” re-blog the posts.  There are 
countless blogs with different agendas and interests, posting and reposting pictures, videos, text, 
etc., engage in conversations and through this they create a fluid network of interactions. 
This form of activity occupies a large portion of online queer activism.  
75 Given the fluid range of issues that concern queer activism, it is impossible to provide 
definitive examples, since each blogger has their own interests and their preferred method of 
communication. Sometimes blogs draw upon everyday issues and topics that refer to a specific 
locale. This, however, does not remain so, since other bloggers, with little identifying territorial 
presence, might re-blog the posts and as a result create a non-territorial web of social relations 
around a topic which may very well be about a particular place. In other instances, some 
bloggers (e.g. Fandoms and Feminism (www.fandomsandfeminism.tumblr.com) put some form 
of territorial identification (in this case the place she was born). However, there is no indication 
as to where this person is at the moment, nor at the time of posting the posts. This is arguably 
irrelevant since one’s ability to post and re-blog other posts essentially detaches the social space 
of activism from one’s territorial setting, without making it absolutely irrelevant.     
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others to comment, debate, share and endorse the content of the posts.76 The fluid 
expansion of this micro-blogging network of interactions happens every time a 
conversation occurs around a post by a user. These posts can themselves be a re-
posting of another user’s comment or link, sometimes connected to mainstream media 
and news websites. In addition to the fluid structure of cyberspace which makes this 
network essentially non-territorial,77 most users and their comments are often not 
accompanied with a territorial signifier and this therefore makes the locality of the user 
who makes the comment or the initial post irrelevant and absent.78 The knowledge and 
sensibility of queer is therefore built through multiple, interrelated layers of images, 
texts, signs and icons that clearly resist being territorially or temporally classified, but 
instead construct a non-territorial and fluid international space.  
The socio-spatial structure described above is at odds with approaches which often 
immediately seek to locate these experiences within a specific locale, and seek to reflect 
on the regulatory regime which conditions that experience as the concern of law. This 
latter approach is often inevitably accompanied by fixed categories such as gay or 
lesbian which require an activist to detach their legal claim from their lived experience. 
Sarah Keenan makes this point nicely when she argues that her “use of the terminology 
[gay/lesbian] is an acknowledgment of the narrowness of legal identity categories and of 
the reality that not all queer women define themselves as ‘lesbians’, but might do so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 These characteristics are not limited to Tumblr, but are experienced in many different social 
networking forums such as Facebook and Twitter, where the diversity of their membership is 
unprecedented in human social interactions.   
77 For an overview of the decentred structure of the Internet as a network of networks see 
Appendix 1. For a discussion of cyberspace as a fluid social space of multiplicities and 
interaction, see section 4.3. 
78 For instance, not all users on Twitter have a location attached to their accounts. This is the 
same in Facebook. However, given the unique number of each computers IP address, one who 
has the skills might be able to source the location where the message came from. This, however, 
is not something that is experienced by users on a daily basis, and as long as an identifying sign 
such as a flag or the name of a country/city is not immediately visible next to a user’s name (e.g. 
a participant in an online discussion), the location of the user is neither immediate available nor 
particularly significant.  
	  
	  
Page | 208 
strategically when engaging with law.”79 Even though Keenan’s analysis regards domestic 
legal systems, her perspective resonates well with the way non-normative sexual 
orientations are dealt with within international law.  
Looking at the predominant engagement of international law with non-normative sexual 
orientations and identities reveals the clear preference for the more fixed categories 
such as gay and lesbian.80 The logic of pushing for domestic legal reform through 
human rights vocabulary and legal instruments largely dominates the engagement of 
international law with queer activism.81 Therefore, following Keenan’s observations, it is 
not surprising that international law also prefers the LGBT framework, which more or 
less operates within what Diane Otto refers to as “the dualism of heterosexuality and 
homosexuality.”82  It is only within the past decade that queer activism has begun to 
specifically distance itself from LGBT, and this distancing only means the distancing of 
the language of international law (and human rights) from the lived experience of 
activists and movements which do not associate their lived, and socially experienced 
identity as neither fixed by categories such as gay, straight, or lesbian, not by their 
physical location. The queer movement is more socially and spatially fluid than LGBT, 
and international law seen through logos will only seek to impose fixity of location and 
identity categories because of its spatio-legal logic. For instance, this could be seen in 
the case of context-based (jurisdictional) human rights debates on gay marriage.83 As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 S. Keenan, “Safe Spaces for Dykes in Danger: Refugee Law's Protection of Vulnerable 
Lesbians.” In Regulating the International Movement of Women: From Protection to Control , by Sharon 
Fitzgerald, 29-47. New York: Routledge, 2011: 30. 
80 For a detailed overview of the development of legal debates within international legal bodies 
and conferences regarding sexual orientation, see D. Sanders, “Sexual Orientation in 
International Law.” International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association. 16 May 2007. 
ilga.org/ilga/en/article/1078 (accessed June 14, 2014). 
81 See R. Wilde, “Queering International Law: Introduction.” American Society of International Law 
Proceedings, 2007: 1. 
82 D. Otto, “Break from Normal.” Supra note 73, at 2. 
83 This debate is between proponents of the human right to enter into marriage for same sex 
couples. As it stands in international human rights law everyone has the right to marriage 
regardless of race, ethnicity or religion (ICCPR Art 23(2)). However when sexual orientation is 
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Ralph Wilde identifies, “‘queer theory’ [is] an approach to ideas rooted in the experience 
of non-heterosexual sexualities in the world.”84 The fluidity of the queer experience 
does not seem to be able to find a socio-spatial presence in international law,85 so long 
as the “international” is seen through the spatio-legal binary of territory/abstraction. 
The #queer movement’s relation to international law can neither be theorised as 
apologetic, nor utopian.  
Moving away from the language of mainstream international law and to the SMIL 
literature does not seem to offer an understanding of this fluidity either. In order for 
these interactions and experiences to become a concern of international law and social 
movement, they are either ignored (only to be “dealt with” through the professional, 
bureaucratic framework of human rights organisations and international institutions) or 
limited within the “local” in order to enable a discourse of resistance “from below” in 
international law. However, similar to the #occupy movement (at least certain aspects 
of it), “the experience of non-heterosexual sexualities in the world” is far from 
something that can be localised.   
In the same way that cyberspace is a social space which is neither purely discursive nor 
completely material (physical), there is no above or below to the relationship of queer 
activism with the wider socio-political body. Queer activism is the fluid life experience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
included in the possible limitation, it becomes a matter of domestic jurisdiction and 
international law has so far had a very limited role in guaranteeing equal “universal” rights 
“regardless of sexual orientation.” On this debate see for instance N. Crombie, “Same-Sex 
Marriage and International Law in the Ninth Circuit.” Jurist. 29 December 2011. 
http://jurist.org/dateline/2011/12/nathan-crombie-marriage.php (accessed August 9, 14). 
84 R. Wilde, “Queering International Law: Introduction.” Supra note 81, at 1.  
85 Sarah Lamble argues a similar point with regards to domestic legal frameworks. She argues 
that the “invisibility of transgender and lesbian bodies in the legal domain may be an effect of 
particular modes of legal rationality that actively render queer bodies and sexualities 
unknowlable and unthinkable.” For Lamble’s reflection on the unknowlable and unthinkable 
bodies and sexualitites see S. Lamble, “Unknowable Bodies, Unthinkable Sexualities: Lesbian 
and Transgender Legal Invisibility in the Toronto Women's Bathhouse Raid.” Social Legal Studies 
18, no. 1 (2009): 111-130. See also S. Keenan, “Safe Spaces for Dykes in Danger: Refugee Law's 
Protection of Vulnerable Lesbians.” Supra note 79, at 34.  
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of the people who actively contribute to the creation of blogs and forums, and perform 
a queer life rather than simply pursuing a queer politics. The extensive social presence 
of “queer” is evidence of the non-territoriality and fluidity of the socio-legal identity of 
queer. Given the argument of the previous chapter, for international law to have an 
engagement with this fluid social identity formation, a fundamental shift in the ways we 
(as international lawyers) view the socio-spatial “international” is needed. The lived 
space of queer is very much at odds with the space of logos. Even though some 
international law theorists and scholars have paid attention to the potential of queer 
theory for international law,86 the spatial qualities of the queer movements and the ways 
in which it challenges the fundamental categories of the discipline are absent from the 
discussion.  
The discipline of international law and specifically the scholars considering the role of 
social movements within international law would benefit from a conceptual framework 
that does not seek to enclose (spatially and conceptually), detach and fix sexual identity 
from the fluidity of its socio-spatial performativity; a detachment which is necessary for 
legality under the framework of logos. Thinking about law in terms of nomos is to pay 
attention to the experiences and interactions amongst this community, which are queer 
before being “local” or “below”. In the next section, I will explain further how this re-
conceptualisation in terms of nomos will affect the ways international law tends to view 
the “international”.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 For instance see A. Carline and Z. Pearson, “Complexity and Queer Theory Approaches to 
International Law and Feminist Politics:Perspectives on Trafficking.” Canadian Journal of Women 
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6.5. Nomos, Social Movements and the “International”  
According to the late international lawyer Antonio Cassese, “we all live within the 
framework of national legal orders.”87 This is exactly the framework that I have 
challenged throughout this thesis. As examples of #occupy and #queer suggest, we are 
living at a time where social power is increasingly becoming non-territorial and 
experienced through a multiplicity of actors and spaces.88 It is against defining and 
locating “life” or the lived experience of law strictly “within” the national (territorial) 
legal orders that I pose the concept of nomos. In other words, the aim of this section is 
to explore the idea of understanding the “international” as neither space-less 
(ideational/mental/utopian), nor perceived as physically identifiable and definable, 
identifying a sort of social “in-betweenness”. Searching for this “in-between” space of 
(international) law, I argue for bringing people’s lives and sociality into the picture of 
international law through a simultaneous re-conceptualisation of the legal and the spatial 
through the concept of nomos.  
In the previous section, I suggested that not only are New Social Movements “involved 
in global or transnational affairs,”89 they are also operating and being experienced in 
spaces (such as cyberspace) that cannot be localised or nationalised. As a result, we 
cannot claim to engage critically with this form of social power (as sought by SMIL), if 
our fundamental categories do not allow us access to this form of sociality in the first 
place. Through the discussion above, I showed how the predominant approaches to 
international law and the SMIL literature, largely operate within the framework of logos, 
enclose and limit lived social experiences (#occupy and #queer) through sets (often in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 A. Cassese, International Law. 2nd. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 3. 
88 Multiplicity here is used here following Doreen Massey’s account of the term. For a 
description of Massey’s notion of multiplicity see sections 3.3.2. and 4.3.3.  
89 L. Coetzee, “World Wide Webs: Social Movements Cross Global Divided in the Public 
Cyber-Sphere.” Postamble, 2008: 81.  
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binary form), categories (mainly human rights), in order to be considered as a matter of 
international law. In other words, following the spatio-legal logic of logos inherent in the 
mainstream discourse of (international) human rights, non-territorial social experience 
of certain social movements is fixed within a territorial and regulation centred view of 
law and space. However, as Aeyal Gross argues with respect to sexual identity that “[i]n 
the global context, it is [...] necessary to do the complex work of seeing how identities 
and meanings given to sex are articulated.”90 Understanding and engaging with these 
complex socio-spatial processes of articulation is the single most important reason for a 
shift from logos to nomos in our understanding of the “international”.   
What the concept of nomos (defined through a synthesis of Schmitt, Cover and 
Delaney’s theorisations of the concept) offers is a conceptual framework where, by the 
coming together of the “living” and the “legal order”, we are capable of imagining our 
life as not necessarily enclosed within the territorial sensibility of the national legal 
order. Instead, it allows us to embrace approaches which challenge the dualisms 
inherent in the limited legal imagination which “enable us to pay attention to the ‘in-
between spaces’, ‘because they take us beyond the confines of dichotomous thinking to 
a deeper analysis of the multiplicitous interactions between diverse networks of public, 
private and hybrid forms of power.”91 It is with this perspective in mind that I argue for 
understanding the “international” through nomos.    
Nomos provides international law conceptual access to the lived experience of 
participation and praxis within these movements not as something local but non-
territorial. It also does not fix the relation of these movements to international law 
within the institutional framework associated with international organisations and treaty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 A. Gross, “Queer Theory and International Human Rights Law.” Supra note 86, at 14. 
91 D. Otto, “Handmaidens, Hierarchies and Crossing the Public-Private Divide in the Teaching 
of International Law.” Melbourne Journal of International Law 35, no. 1 (2000): 54. 
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bodies, but rather allows the “legal” to be understood in a non-territorial socio-spatial 
fluidity. Looking back at the central place of the work of David Delaney in the 
formation of nomos as a conceptual synthesis, law and space are both seen as 
performative.92 When law and space are both seen as socially performed rather than 
physically located, we are provided with a conceptual framework to move beyond 
territory. The experiences and movements such as #occupy and #queer can be 
described as non-territorial making the insistence on defining them as local and national 
obsolete. As Christian Lahusen points out, “internationalization is a process in interplay 
with the national and local level, but relatively autonomous from it.”93 Not only is this 
“relatively autonomous” process socially fluid, it is also produced through the practice 
(and performativity) of a sort of spatial fluidity that is usually contained and enclosed by 
the discourse of international law (logos), seeking to regulate and to “include” them 
within its mainstream discourses such as human rights and/or development.   
Another important characteristic of nomos, discussed in detail in chapter three, is that 
through the connection of materiality and discursivity within the notion of 
performativity, the separation of space and law is made redundant through a social link. 
This is important since it embraces an expanded and reconceptualised notion of law 
which is as lived and socially performed as are space and society. Therefore, through 
nomos, the social experience and performativity of social movements (and everyday life) 
through cyberspace simultaneously co-constitute the “legal”. This understanding of the 
“legal” goes beyond (top-down/detached) regulation, and embraces sociality, 
understood more broadly as an in-between normative universe, both material and 
discursive, both spatial and legal. Therefore, the considerations of spaces of New 
(“networked”) Social Movements and their place within international law literature is 
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93 C. Lahusen, “International Campaigns in Context.” Supra note 57, at 202. [Emphasis added] 
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not just an argument about space, but also an inherently legal one. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the predominant understanding of the “international” in international 
law is co-produced through interrelated conceptions of law and space, which operate on 
the basis of a fundamental distinction between the two, enshrined in logos. 
By viewing social movements, cyberspace and the “international” through nomos 
international law finds access to an in-between space beyond logos, between the 
territoriality and the spacelessness of the “international” as seen predominantly in 
international law. This is the space that is co-constituted, amongst the plurality of other 
forms of normative social fields, by social movements with a non-territorial agency, 
sociality and agenda. Through the concept of nomos, we are enabled to access forms of 
society and sociality that do not operate on the basis of spatial or institutional 
hierarchies but rather characterised through communication networks amongst a 
plurality of people. After all, as Castells points out, “[c]ommunication is at the heart of 
human activity in all spheres of life.”94 The notion of network that I am using here is 
close to Bruno Latour’s use of the word. As he explains, the reason he chooses 
“network” as a central theme is that “it has no a priori order relation; it is not tied to the 
axiological myth of a top and of a bottom of society; it makes absolutely no assumption 
about whether a specific locus is macro- or micro- and does not modify the tools to 
study the element ‘a’ or the element ‘b’.”95 The experiences of sociality that are central 
to the conceptual build-up of nomos resemble this understanding of “network” in a sense 
that they are not “organised” through a spatial logic that embraces a “physical” notion 
of “bottom” and “top” but rather operates in a more fluid and indeterminate fashion. 
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Press, 2007: 1.  
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Therefore, the geography I point to for the “international” through nomos is one where 
scale does not necessarily characterise the workings of legality (jurisdiction) or power. In 
what Agnew calls an “integrated world society” model, “[t]ime and space are both 
defined by the spontaneous and reciprocal timing and spacing of human activities.”96 
Even though I am not going as far as describing the “international” as an integrated 
world society, the centrality of human activity to the construction of the “international” 
as a space is vital to the move to nomos.  
The access to the non-territoriality of the above social movements and their discussion 
through nomos disrupts the predominant relationship that exists between the discourse 
of international law and the idea of sovereignty. Nomos reconceptualises the “starting 
point” of law from the idea of sovereignty (partly based on territoriality and partly 
through abstraction),97 to the social, spatial and legal experiences emerging through the 
performativity of everyday life. What it allows us to do is to envision a way out of 
international law’s “double trouble” through providing international law a middle space 
of analysis. Nomos allows international scholars to move the legality of international law 
beyond the bounds of territoriality (and sovereignty) and at the same time avoid falling 
back on the place-less operations of Empire. In addition, it allows us to weave the co-
constitutiveness of law, space and society into the fabric of international law without 
relying on categories and entities which prevent us from capturing the non-territorial 
fluidity and multiplicity of the Multitude as the resistant child of Empire. The approach 
of nomos is not strictly in contrast to the operations and effects of (state) territoriality. 
Instead, it allows us to imagine as the starting point for international law the non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 J. Agnew, “Political Power and Geographical Scale.” In Political Space: Frontiers of Change and 
Governance in a Globalizing World, edited by Yale H. Ferguson and R.J. Barry Jones. New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2002: 120.  
97 See discussion on logos and the characteristics of law and the role of sovereignty in forming 
the positivist tradition, at section 3.2. 
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territorial socio-spatial dimensions through which social movements (and indeed a large 
portion of everyday social life) increasingly operate.   
My insistence on reconceptualising the “international” through a move to nomos should 
be treated as a double interjection. On the one hand, it is specifically aimed at the 
discourse on the role of social movements and their relations to the “international” and 
the formation of the “legal” in international law. On the other hand, embracing the 
non-territorial spaces of everyday life and social movement activism by 
reconceptualising the “international” through nomos can be read as a turn against the 
rigid formalism of international law more generally. David Kennedy points to this rigid 
formalism in the case of internationalized commercial and financial markets. He argues 
that: 
 Indeed, the world of public international law, like the institutional apparatus of 
the U.N. family, seems hopeless in the face of the international market. Public 
international institutions seem, as they have seemed in every generation, far too 
focused on the state to regulate market actors, and far too formal in their 
approach to law to be able to construct a modern market regulatory regime.98  
The critiques of formality (and the overt focus on the state) are common to many 
“critical” scholars of international law.  However, the ultimate goal of a better and more 
fitting regulatory regime still seems to be central to such projects and arguably ensures a 
predictable fate for critical projects. In other words, this critique of formality eventually 
leads to projects of reform and renewal rather than a serious engagement with the 
informal.  
There is a fear of the informal within international law, even amongst critical scholars. 
The most direct example of this is Koskenniemi’s argument that “there is a danger that 
the critiques of the state – as much a part of international law as statehood itself – 
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collapse into an uncritical endorsement of informal social power.”99 Many sceptics fear 
that by moving to the “informal” will bring us to the realm of indeterminacy where 
international law collapses on a “simply subjective and arbitrary” idea of politics and law 
loses any form of objectivity.100 If, for something to be called law, the international 
lawyer feels obliged to perform a “universalising act” of detachment (associated with 
logos and highlighted in the previous chapter in the context of Pahuja and Koskenniemi’s 
critique), then formality (however “indeterminate”) still seems to be the inevitable 
outcome of juggling apology and utopia. Koskenniemi dismisses this worry and offers 
to solve it by taking an alternative position to the subject/arbitrary view of politics. 
Koskenniemi’s solution to this problem is to show that “political views can be held 
without having to believe in their objectivity and that they can be discussed without 
having to assume that in the end everybody should agree.”101 Yet, this solution is, at 
best, limited since it is only directed at how international law views politics and leaves 
the criticism of the “legal” out of the picture.  
A turn to nomos allows international law a way out of its own sociological/spatial 
“emptiness” by offering a possibility of (an already existing) sociality, seen through the 
lens of everyday socio-spatial experiences of human beings, which may be regarded as 
“international”. Koskenniemi’s warning against an “uncritical endorsement of informal 
social power” is extremely important. However, more emphasis should be put on the 
“uncritical” rather than the “informal” in this warning. This fear seems sensible only if 
one holds on to the fundamentals associated with logos which claims a strict distinction 
between law, space, society and politics, viewing sociality as physically bounded. The 
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fear of the “informal” can become obsolete, or sidelined, if parallel to its endorsement 
we also question the fundamental conceptual framework through which we view the 
trio of the legal, the spatial and the social. The fundamental questioning is encapsulated 
within the concept of nomos. As I suggested in the previous section, an example of this 
critical attitude towards looking at informal social experiences and actions, is to 
question the hierarchical image we have between what is formally international and 
legal, and what is social and informal. The approaches to social movements, by relying 
on “from below” and the “local”, are prone to this uncritical endorsement. Nomos offers 
us a conceptual framework that does not require formality for the “legal”. Therefore, it 
allows us to see the “legal” as being performed not only through the formal and official 
outlets (states, diplomats, NGOs, international organisations, etc.) but through non-
territorial social experiences and spaces as well.102 Through this expansion of 
understanding the “international” (through nomos), plurality is not limited to the 
political, but also to the sociology and legality of international law and how it is 
performed and how it operates. By doing so, international law moves through this fear 
of informality without endorsing a purely indeterminate view of politics (and law) 
because formal determinacy is removed as a necessary condition of the “legal”. As a 
result the sociological base of international law is expanded; experiences of everyday life 
find a way through to this sociology, not at the “receiving end” of international law but 
at the heart of international law’s aspirations towards an idea of justice.         
6.6. Conclusion  
To further illustrate my thesis, I directed my attention/critique specifically towards the 
growing literature on social movements and international law, whose main goal is to 
“de-elitize” international law while taking a generally anti-Imperial position. Following 
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the observations of the previous chapter, and my argument regarding the spatio-legal 
characteristics of the predominant understanding of the “international” as logos, I 
suggested that the SMIL literature is no exception; i.e. their categories and analyses do 
not allow us to go beyond logos. In other words, their arguments still operate on 
territorial understandings of social experience (“local”), and seek to include social 
movements through reversal of the hierarchy of law from “from above” to “from 
below”. Moreover, I pointed to the role of Empire (as characterised by Hardt and 
Negri), and established that the “local” and “from below” categories of analysis do not 
capture the fluid experienced character of resistance within Empire (theorised through 
the idea of the Multitude by Hardt and Negri). Through two examples, I demonstrated 
that the current discourse of SMIL cannot capture the “networked” structure of 
“resistance” enhanced and enabled through cyberspace. Doing so is necessary for 
international law to connect to the lived and experienced spaces of the “international” 
and to go beyond the “double trouble” of fighting a territorial and a “place-less” battle 
at the same time.       
Territorialising the growing set of social experiences and interactions which are 
intertwined with the fluidity and non-territoriality of cyberspace further separates 
international law from the very experiences that co-produce plural and multiplitous 
social spaces of international law. The discussion of this chapter further illustrates my 
point regarding a need for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the socio-spatial fabric 
of international law or the “international” using nomos as a mode of analysis with a 
socially fluid and co-produced notion of law, space and society.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion  
Hello,  
So ... One thing ... You might have noticed there are cameras everywhere. We are doing two things with 
the cameras. One we are recording everything [someone screams] so that in the future we can help... 
[another scream]... Wow you like cameras!... umm... and also we are live streaming it, so in addition to 
the 2000 people here, there are about 500000 people watching this at home ... [everyone screams and 
claps] ... So ... Let’s say hi ... Hello 500000 people, scattered around the world!  
Moby (live in concert, October 2013, LA) 
7.1. A Summary 
Throughout this thesis, I have provided a critical interjection into the socio-spatial 
fabric of international law, with a special focus on the overlap between cyberspace and 
social movements. I demonstrated the case for re-conceptualising the socio-spatial 
analytical framework of international law, from what I referred to as logos to 
conceptualising the “international” as nomos. This re-conceptualisation is necessary for 
international law, because critics have so far largely focused on the temporal dimensions 
of international law’s parameters. A spatial critique can highlight the socio-spatial 
continuities of the international narrative that have so far gone unnoticed. This is a 
timely intervention, especially because in the past two decades, life and social experience 
have undergone significant transformations in their organisation and ordering, taking an 
unprecedented non-territorial form to them, largely due to the expansion of the 
Internet, and via cyberspace. Nomos locates the professional paraphernalia of social 
control as part of a socio-spatially fluid (normative) system.1  In this framework the 
“legal” responds to both lived/material conditions and the utopian ideals of law which 
are deemed as co-constitutive and non-separable. Incorporating the wider socio-spatial 
fluidity allows the interactive sociality of cyberspace, to be understood as part of the 
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non-territorial world of law, an important aspect of legal life (living (with) the law) that 
is otherwise ignored by international law. 
I have used cyberspace to question international law’s relation with its own 
understanding of what constitutes the “international”, as well as the role and impact of 
social movements. I initially examined the relationship between international law and 
the Internet, demonstrating the failure of international law to engage with the socio-
spatiality of cyberspace, as opposed to the Internet, unless for a limited role of content 
regulation. After spelling out the specificities of the logos/nomos distinction, setting out 
my approach to the concept of nomos, I argued that logos is the framework by which 
international law conceptualises cyberspace, producing and maintaining a territorially 
configured international legal structure around it.   
My observations regarding the current relation between international law and 
cyberspace, was followed by a re-description of cyberspace via the analytical framework 
of nomos, placing non-territorial experiences of sociality at the centre of any legal analysis 
of cyberspace. This, I argued, gives access to an ever-expanding, non-territorial overlap 
between the lived experience of the legal, the social and the “international”. The 
elaboration of the existence of a socio-spatial overlap through the analysis of 
cyberspace, brought me to the crux of my thesis; that is, a questioning and an 
interrogation of the absence of any socio-spatial critical engagement with the 
“international”, beyond the temporal frame of critique, adopted by a range of 
approaches ranging from critical and New Stream, to TWAIL and SMIL.   
Pointing to a range of ways by which international law and legal theory conceptualise 
the “international”, I highlighted how (similar to its engagement with the Internet) the 
conception of logos dominates the analytical framework of international lawyers, both 
“mainstream” and critical. In other words, territoriality and abstraction (the 
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physical/mental binary) are the two spatial categories in operation, and sociality is either 
limited to the domestic/local space or happens within the context of international 
institutions that are themselves spatially detached from the multiplicity of non-territorial 
socio-legal experiences. Reaffirming the blind spot of international law towards the 
socio-spatial fluidities, discussed in the case of cyberspace, led me to the final step of 
my exploration; illustrating what a fundamental re-conceptualisation (from logos to 
nomos) would mean for an area of international law which is most directly affected by 
the socio-spatial fluidity of cyberspace, the social movements and international law 
literature.  
I substantiated my re-description of cyberspace as nomos through the overlap between 
international law and social movements. Initially, I argued that the relation between the 
latter two is also characterised by logos, demonstrating what it would mean for 
international law to actually embrace nomos as a framework for comprehending and 
accessing the socially co-produced and interwoven character of the social, legal and 
spatial experience of international law. Bringing the attention of my critical (socio-
spatial) analysis of the “international” to the field of SMIL had an important 
consequence. Through a critique of the current SMIL literature, focusing mainly on the 
work of Rajagopal, I demonstrated that even though the intention of the field is to 
make a historical and conceptual connection between international law and social 
movements, their conception of both international law and social movements are 
limited by the social, spatial and legal framework of logos.       
Nomos, as a mode of analysis, allows the international lawyer to look at the world of 
(international) law, which consists of more than territorially/physically imagined spaces, 
and to view territoriality as part of the wider socio-spatial fluidity of the legal, the spatial 
and the social experience of the fabric of the “international”. Through my critical use of 
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contemporary social movements such as #occupy and #queer, I argued that nomos 
brings to light the overlap between non-territorial social spaces of everyday life (and 
activism), and the socio-spatial fabric of the “international”. I finally argued that nomos 
enables us to deal with the “double-trouble” of facing the non-territoriality of Empire 
on the one hand and the territorial configuration of international law vested in the 
dominance of the state on the other. By embracing the non-territorial socio-spatiality of 
lived experience (as exemplified through cyberspace and social movements), nomos 
enables us to conceptualise and “expand” the sociality of the “international” beyond the 
dominant territorial configuration.      
Here, I would like to conclude the journey I have taken through the Internet, 
cyberspace, international law and social movements, by offering three thoughts on what 
re-conceptualising the socio-spatial fabric of international law as nomos might mean for 
us more generally. First, I will consider the effect of this re-conceptualised mode of 
analysis on the sociology of international law. Second, I will reflect on what this revised 
sociology might mean for international law’s emancipatory promises. I will finally 
conclude the thesis by exploring two ways in which the international lawyer’s research 
agenda might change given the attentiveness to nomos.  
7.2. Towards a Non-Territorial Sociology of International Law  
The central argument of this thesis is that nomos blends the materiality and the idealism 
of international law, through conceptualising lived socio-spatiality as the experience of 
the “international” par excellence. To develop nomos, without the collapse into territorial or 
temporal descriptions of the “international”, the world of law requires representation as 
a socio-spatially fluid “universe” of materiality and discursivity, where legal meaning is 
co-constituted with/through/by the socio-spatial relations and interactions, ranging 
from between experts and state representatives, to the everyday non-territorial relations 
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amongst people (groups and individuals). Turning to an understanding of nomos that 
encompasses both sociality and spatiality has important implications for what is 
considered to be the sociology of international law. As discussed at the end of chapter 
five, a conceptualisation of law as nomos demands that we go beyond the logic of 
sociological inclusion; it facilitates a transformation in the sociological fabric of 
international law. It is on the consequences of this transformation that I would like to 
add some final remarks.  
In From Apology to Utopia, Koskenniemi famously described “international law as a 
language and the opposition [between apology and utopia] as a key part of its 
(generative) grammar.”2 What this suggests, is that international law is in a way the 
substance of a key structured form that is characterised by “the opposition”, seen as a 
grammar.3  The structure of international law (legal argument) then seems to act as an 
empty vessel to be filled with the substantive and “fluid” language of law, which is not 
limited to either sovereignty (associated with apology) or sources (associated with utopia) 
doctrines, but a result of their “merger”.4 In this analysis, the socio-spatial fabric acts as 
the context for the fluidity of international law as a language; in other words the context 
in which the language develops and is experienced. Even though conceptualising this 
fluidity might seem to liberate international lawyers from constant debates between 
concreteness and normativity, it nonetheless operates within the socio-spatial fabric of 
logos, characterised by a limited notion of sociality which itself is limited by the 
territoriality of space and the “closure” of law.5 It is through bringing the attention of 
international law to these socio-spatial limitations of international law’s dominant 
conceptual framework (logos), that I challenged the sociological “emptiness” of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005: 565. 
3 Ibid., at 573.  
4 Ibid., at 572 and 575.  
5 For full discussion see section 5.4. 
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“international”. In contrast, the sociology envisioned throughout this thesis is the non-
territorial social connections and interactions between individuals and groups, which are 
international par excellence, but cannot be comprehended as such, so long as one hold to 
the territorial configuration of logos. 
Following the scholarship of Schmitt and Cover, and combined with the insights of 
Critical Legal geography, the concept of nomos brings to light what I referred to as the 
co-production of space, law and society. As I demonstrated in chapter five, within the 
logic of logos, sociality either exists within nation states (and hence of not much concern 
to predominant approaches to international law), or within the international institutions, 
which themselves are often composed of entities that are identified territorially (such as 
states and international institutions). In nomos, space is not seen through the 
territoriality/abstraction binary. Removing the dominance of territory from the 
conceptual framework of international law, opens up the discipline to a new form of 
sociology, a sociology which is not stuck within the “grammatical” bounds of logos, but 
instead allows us to see the language and form of law as co-produced and not separated. 
Through this view, the “international” of international law becomes essentially social, 
but through a sociality which is non-territorial.  Grammar is no longer the form and the 
territorial socio-spatial fabric, the content. The fluid fabric of nomos, seen in this thesis 
through the socio-spatiality of cyberspace, is the context where grammar and the 
language of law are co-constituted.  
The sociality of everyday life and the “international” become overlapping and co-
produced. The diversity of socio-spatial experiences lived by Marko, Zaynab, and Arash 
(the three narratives I started my project with) are part of this co-production; a broader 
socio-spatiality of the normative universe of nomos. By reformulating sociality, the 
fluidity of everyday life and living (with) the law becomes integral to the world of 
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international law, and this has potentially important consequences for the emancipatory 
aspirations of international law. In other words, this newly imagined sociality might 
make visible an “international” that has so far remained invisible to the territorialising 
and controlling modes of jurisdiction that connect contemporary international law to its 
ugly history of emancipatory ambitions entrenched into the fabric of power,6 as a veil 
for exploitation or a tool of privilege and civilising missions.    
7.3. Emancipation of/and International Law 
The question of emancipation is arguably central to both mainstream and critical 
accounts of international law whether in the formulation of a “better world” or in 
critique of the existing world. Many broad categories serve as the target of emancipatory 
projects, ranging from war and violence, to Empire and economic exploitation and 
discrimination (on the basis of race, gender, class, etc.). In order for international law to 
fulfil its emancipatory potential in the contemporary sociological, political and 
economic context, I have argued that it is necessary for the discipline to first 
conceptually emancipate itself from the dominant framework regarding law, space, 
society and the relation between them (logos). As shown through my examples of the 
overlap between contemporary social movements and cyberspace (#occupy and 
#queer), it is essential for international law to acknowledge and connect to the socio-
spatially fluid fabric of these movements, by re-conceptualising its own fundamental 
categories. This arguably allows international law to expand what Andrew Lang calls “its 
ideational conditions of possibility.”7 Logos stops international law from letting go of a spatio-
legal framework (dominated by territoriality and detached regulation), which in turn 
prevents it from directly connecting its aspirations to the way (international) law, society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Here power is understood in its traditional sense, associated with force, domination and 
hierarchy.  
7 A.T. F. Lang, “World Trade Law After Neo-Liberalism.” Social and Legal Studies 23, no. 3 
(2014): 408.  
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and space are being increasingly experienced and lived around the world. Nomos 
provides the framework for the emancipation of international law from logos.   
Through enabling a non-territorial sociology for international law, nomos acts as a 
conceptual framework which challenges and changes what we consider as worthy of 
attention for international law’s emancipatory promise. One does not necessarily need a 
socio-historical approach, if one seeks to access international law regarding something 
contemporary from a critical perspective. Given the incredible increase in the frequency 
of information exchange, one does not need to wait until an international lawyer or a 
news website brands something as an issue of international legal concern for it to 
become a matter of research interest.8 With the growing shared social space between 
international law (academic and practice), social movements and everyday sociality of 
life through cyberspace, a non-territorial, temporally released and socially co-produced 
nomos allows us to roam within the overlap of these fields of performativity as the world 
of international law, rather than something outside it, to be accessed, used and/or 
regulated.  
Of course, regulation and the existing territoriality and material limitations of many 
aspects of contemporary life are amongst these different fields of performativity, rather 
than detached from them. For instance, the existence of material limitations such as 
Internet/telephone connections, or national regulations and controls in many countries, 
might prevent people from experiencing and living this non-territorial sociality. In other 
words, there is no sense of utopia attached to the sociality of the “international” within 
the framework of nomos. However, despite the clear limitations, divides and possible 
dangers of cultural and technological hegemony, one can say with confidence that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A. Riles, “The View From the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the Architecture of 
Colonial International law.” In Laws of the Postcolonial, edited by E Darian-Smith and P Fitzpatrik, 
127-142. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
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fluidity of cyberspace has challenged, and continues to challenge, many physical and 
ideational limitations associated with the experience of everyday life. Furthermore, this 
is not an experience which is necessarily conditioned by a clear cut North/South divide. 
This is clearly visible in the context of recent social movements in the Global South, for 
which the non-territoriality of cyberspace was a crucial asset.          
Nomos provides a radically different image of international law, from what is taught in 
academia or practice. In this format, international law is neither “from below” nor 
“from above”. It is rather performed, lived and re-lived through the socio-spatial 
multiplicities of a normative universe, consisting of the aggregate of territorial state 
representatives, expert rule, and more importantly, non-territorial social relations 
concerned with normative claims. The latter has so far not been fully understood as an 
international space, indeed perhaps the international space, unless for regulatory 
purposes, in which case it is either reduced to a domestic concern, or is treated as the 
content of a delimited spatio-conceptual form, e.g. the Internet. In this thesis, I have 
demonstrated that this understanding and engagement can only be achieved through the 
radically different, yet inclusive, framework of nomos. Nomos adds to the spatio-temporal 
relevance of international law, providing both critique of temporal accounts of 
international law and release from the territorial spaces assumed as dominating 
encounters in the “international”,9 hence increasing the meaningfulness of any 
emancipatory dream attached to the realm of the “international”.   
In chapter six, I explained the trouble of defining the emancipatory potential of 
international law through the vocabulary of resistance to Empire. Whether one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Pahuja’s recent piece “Laws of Encounter” provides a radically different account of the 
international encounter through a “jurisdictional account” of international law, drawing on the 
responsibility of the international lawyer at the moment of encountering the “other” of 
international law. See generally S. Pahuja, “Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of 
International Law.” London Review of International Law 1, no. 1 (2013): 63-98. 
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contextualises resistance within the operations of the global political economy 
enshrined in the institutional framework of international law (traditional empire: 
continuation of the territorial sensibility, and its translation into the institutional 
framework, rule of the experts and territory), or within Hardt and Negri’s “place-less” 
Empire of Capital, international law fails to capture the non-territoriality of international 
life. If (critical) international law seeks to envision emancipation from the two imperial 
models (which arguably operate in parallel to one another), then it is essential to grasp 
and comprehend the complexities, fluidities, and multiplicities of socio-spatial 
experience, which are increasingly occurring in an overlapping, non-territorial fashion. 
As pointed out by Hardt and Negri’s theory of the Multitude, this complexity and socio-
spatial fluidity characterises both the object and the sites of resistance.  
When emancipation is at the heart of a legal system, then it is only through experiencing 
and living (with) the law, that emancipation becomes meaningful to the people who are 
being emancipated or doing the act of emancipating. Emancipation from logos translates 
into better realisation of the wider emancipatory potential of international law, while 
avoiding the territorial trap of imperialism on the one hand, and accommodating the 
fluid and networked social spaces of resisting Empire and hegemony on the other (the 
Multitude). Promises and potentials of an international society or community, become 
connected to the spaces of everyday interaction and life, to the social context in which 
normative claims about what is right and wrong developed. 
Therefore, it is necessary to connect the emancipatory promise of international law to 
an experience of sociality that on the one hand is not bounded by territory, and on the 
other is not placed at the receiving end of law, but in fact it is the beginning and the end 
of law. In this thesis, I demonstrated through a multi-sided argument that nomos 
provides the key conceptual framework for an understanding of international law that 
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places the non-territorial (as well as the territorial) sociality at the centre of the 
process/life of law, so to be able to respond to both lived/material conditions and 
emancipatory potential/ideals.  
I should however note, that re-conceptualisation is the first step. It is through a re-
imagined research agenda, enabled by a re-imagined approach to nomos that we can hope 
to capture what this emancipatory potential means for the people who are living (with) 
the law and co-constituting the world of international law.  
7.4. From a Re-Imagined International to a Re-Formulated Research 
Agenda  
Since the central argument of this thesis is that the theoretical and the methodological 
choices made by international lawyers are intertwined, it is necessary to make some 
remarks on the possible methodological implications of the theoretical re-
conceptualisations offered. Throughout, I have demonstrated how a turn to nomos 
permits the understanding of a form of international engagement that is relevant, 
necessary and missing in contemporary accounts of the discipline. This 
theoretical/methodological challenge has direct consequences on the range of research 
agendas fitting the ambit of international law. In this final section, I would like to point 
out two interrelated ways these consequences can materialise: first, the transformation 
of legal focus through the expansion of the world of the international lawyer, and 
second, the availability of new connections between previously unrated areas of analysis.      
The first way the framework of a socio-spatially conceived nomos can affect international 
legal research, is to free the international lawyers from mainstream categories that define 
what is or what is not the appropriate field or topic of research. For instance, attention 
to discussion on forums, online comments and social networking websites, trends of 
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tweeting and re-tweeting hashtags, etc., all become important (if not essential)10 as an 
issue of international law. This is because international law is no longer bound by its 
own spatial and conceptual “closure”. This is a direct consequence of looking at the 
Internet as more than just an empty space, filled with data and content. Instead, one can 
look at cyberspace as an international/non-territorial field of sociality, revealing a 
central aspect of living in an infinitely connected world and potentially allowing 
international law to be a space of future enlargement and relevance.  
An example of this could be provided by the developments during 2014, concerning the 
“Islamic State” (ISIS) in the Middle East, in particular Syria and Iraq. At the time of 
writing, there is a growing social momentum within social media and social networking 
websites on this subject (and it is undoubtable that ISIS itself evolved in part through a 
form of cyber sociality). There is significant non-territorial conversation about the 
advance of this group and the atrocities committed by them. Indeed, a significant 
number of atrocities have relied on social networks that constitute cyberspace to 
instigate fear and support for ISIS. Similarly, the sharing and trending of distressing 
images (of atrocities) shared on social media have prompted and instigated a global fear, 
which is being translated into a renewed consolidation of authority over both Iraqi and 
Syrian territory.11 Configured as nomos, the choice of words, affects, agreements and 
arguments regarding the right or wrong response to this crisis, become accessible as part 
and parcel of the larger normative, international conversation. This allows the 
international lawyer to understand the world of international law as consisting of more 
than just the formalised, pre-existing categories such as international humanitarian law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See my discussion on emancipation above.  
11 I am referring to Barack Obama’s decision on September 10th, 2014, to authorise air strikes 
not only in Iraq but also in Syria. See D. Roberts, and S. Ackerman, “Barack Obama Authorises 
Air Strikes Against Isis Militants in Syria.” The Guardian. 11 September 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/10/obama-speech-authorise-air-strikes-against-
isis-syria (accessed September 11, 2014). 
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human rights law, humanitarian intervention, etc. This, in a sense, reflects an 
“expansion” of the socio-legal field of international law, not just in size but also in 
socio-spatial form. As such, the emergence of ISIS, and other cyber-savvy violent 
groups demonstrates how the socio-spatial framework of nomos explored in this thesis is 
not a utopia, rather a lived, human reality that contains all aspects of lived, social 
experience.  
Not only does this approach to nomos enable us to engage with debates and interactions 
regarding international law proper, it also allows us to go beyond the fixed categories 
and embrace a fluid and diverse normative universe. While drawing our attention to 
non-territorial social interaction as part of the wider “corpus, discourse and 
interpersonal commitments” of international law, nomos also leaves room for regulation 
and the more “traditional” research agendas. In other words, nomos is the normative 
world of international law, since in addition to regulation, it allows access to non-
territorial socio-spatial experiences as part of that world and not something outside it.  
Second, the socio-spatially fluid framework of nomos also allows international lawyers to 
see connections that may have been shielded before. As such, analysis of international 
law would look at events such as ISIS’s advance, or the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict,12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 From July 8th, 2014, to August 26th, 2014, Israel and Hamas were engaged in a conflict which 
involved heavy Israeli bombardment (shelling and air strikes) of Gaza (governed by Hamas) 
under “Operation Protective Edge,” purportedly in response to rockets launched by Hamas 
from within the Gaza Strip. In this conflict more than 2000 Palestinians (majority civilian) and 
73 Israelis (six civilians), were killed. At the time of writing, there is a ceasefire between the two 
sides, negotiated in Cairo. For current developments and analysis see, for instance, Aljazeera. 
“Israeli Army Opens Probe into Gaza War.” Aljazeera. 11 September 2014. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/israel-gaza-war-probe-
201491020115680284.html (accessed September 11, 2014); or R. Dixon, “Investigating the Gaza 
Conflict.” Aljazeera. 11 September 2014. 
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201491112454159948.html (accessed September 11, 2014). Also see A. Shlaim, “For Israel, the 
beginning of wisdom is to admit its mistakes.” The Guardian. 7 September 2014. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/07/israel-palestinian-unity-land-grab 
(accessed September 11, 2014).  
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beyond the territorial and jurisdictional issues often raised,13 so as to see the impact and 
increased relevance of non-territorial social movements and conversations which 
mobilise change and affect decision making at different levels (regardless of the “value” 
of this change or impact). Contemporary international law does not currently make the 
connection between a crisis and the social movements, collective expressions of ideas, 
discussions, stories and analysis that precede, function alongside and/or beyond the 
“crisis” moment. Hillary Charlesworth points to a similar shortcoming when she argues 
that “the crisis orientation of our discipline [international law] promotes a narrow 
agenda for international law.”14 A socio-spatially fluid conception of nomos does not 
operate on the basis of limited categories but instead propels international law into a 
non-territorial international social space. In other words, all the debates and social 
interactions based on these events, either based on moral claims or claims of legitimacy, 
or simply the description and re-description of atrocities and observations, all become 
part of law, part of living (with) the “international”. This constructs connections 
between international law and those events and the social interactions that are available 
as/through/on (but not limited to) cyberspace. This framework of nomos gives 
international law and international lawyers a framework to avoid territorialising and 
localising these views and to think about them as non-territorial. This then flows back 
into the very understanding of what constitutes the “international”, and opens a 
mechanism for re-imagining the basic categories of the discipline, not constricted by a 
past that is built on the empire of territory.   
Within the socio-spatially aware framework of nomos, one does not need to phrase 
something in the accepted formal format in order for that thing to become a matter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I am referring to the consistent use of terms such as “territorial integrity” or “political 
independence” of states which are fundamental to the territorial imagining of the 
“international” of international law.      
14 H. Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis.” The Modern Law Review 65 
(2002): 386. 
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interest or significance for international law. However, this embrace of informality does 
not affect the ability of lawyers to make normative claims about things, or assert rules 
and regulations on different social, economic and political phenomena. As pointed out 
by Cover, the rules and regulations are “but a small part of the normative universe 
[nomos].”15 In other words, nomos situates those rules, regulations and normative claims 
within the wider normative experience of everyday life and the everyday socio-spatial 
qualities of the “international”, which “locate [them] and give [them] meaning.”16 It is 
only in this way that future horizons of international law will be understood as not 
being limited by past decisions and ambitions.  
Ultimately, the analysis of cyberspace, and its practical and theoretical relation to the 
discipline of international law is much bigger than a PhD thesis. People’s social 
experiences are growing and changing outside the spatial categories that international 
law has previously deemed possible. The shift to nomos may propel the international 
lawyer to embrace the theoretical (and practical) implications of cyberspace imagined as 
the socio-spatiality of the “international”, providing a bourgeoning form of the 
“international” that was not available in the past.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 R. M. Cover, “The Supreme Court, 1982 Term -- Foreword: Nomos and Narrative.” Harvard 
Law Review 97 (1983): 4. 
16 Ibid.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The beginning of Internet is placed within the European/American research circles 
which in the cases of Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and 
Research and Development (RAND) were also associated with US Defence.1 The idea 
of computer networking through information packets, or packet-switching, started from 
1960s in UK’s National Physical Laboratory (NPL), DARPA (then known only as 
ARPA), and RAND (apparently parallel without each group knowing about the other). 
The first proposal was for the creation of ARPANET by ARPA.2 The development of 
applications to be used by computers and connected nodes on this network started in 
early 1970s. It was at the same time that this was shown to the “public” (research 
communities outside the military) and email was born.3 Even though the European 
initiative was not so successful in its realisation in the 1960s, its vision for the potentials 
of the computer network came to be influential in the decades to follow.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Internet is the global network of networks (and computers) that uses the TCP/IP 
protocols. On the Internet and computer networks, see generally, D. E. Comer, Computer 
Networks and Internets. 5th. New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2009. 
2 The reason that the UK network was not successful in application until much later was that 
researchers at NPL did not have the resources or the authority to realise their ideas on a 
national scale. In 1997 the International Packet Switching Service was built in the UK, but this 
time using technology from a spin-off of ARPA called Telenet.   
3 The new network created by ARPA was first showcased at an international conference in 
Washington D.C. in 1972. See M. Ziewitz, and I. Brown, “A Prehistory of Internet 
Governance.” In Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, edited by Ian Brown. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013: 4. 
4 The American networking project, which was partly financed by the US Department of 
Defence, was “a project which aimed to explore the possibility of a decentralized (military) 
communication network which would make it difficult for the Soviet nuclear Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) to destroy it with one hit.” See W. Kleinwachter, “The History of 
Internet Governance.” In Governing the Internet: Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region, edited 
by Christian Moller and Arnaud Amouroux. Viena: Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, 2007: 44, note 13. The idea of researchers at Britain’s National Physical laboratory 
for packet switching, was not “robustness of networks,” but rather providing an interactive and 
affordable “computing for commercial and entertainment purposes.” See M. Ziewitz and I. 
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ARPANET was the “mother of the Internet” as we know it; a network of networks 
with an open and decentred architecture. It was from within ARPANET, by researchers 
such as Vint Cerf and Robert Kahn, which the currently dominant Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) grew during the 1970s.5 TCP/IP meant 
that not only computers (the nodes) but also networks can also communicate through 
the new “network of networks”. Given the current dominance of the TCP/IP model, 
many see the US government as the ultimate source of funding and oversight over the 
development of the Internet. This, however, is only partly true, given that many 
initiatives were developed solely within the research community by many researchers 
who were in essence against many forms of hierarchical government control.6 The 
development of the Domain Name System (DNS) or the “Root Server System” was 
supposedly “without any guidance from or consultation with governmental agencies.”7 
In addition, no one has (had) the legal proprietary ownership over any of the protocols 
and naming systems mentioned above.8 This is of great importance for the governance 
of the Internet and the emergence of a range of models in the past two decades or so. 
TCP/IP made end-to-end communication between computers and networks possible, 
without requiring any technical specifications from each network or host. In other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Brown, “A Prehistory of Internet Governance.” In Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, 
edited by Ian Brown. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2013: 3. It was the latter 
vision that eventually prevailed in the formation and development of the truly international 
Internet. 
5 This protocol took shape at different stages in the development of the Internet, through 
multiple Request for Comments documents (which are technical memorandums describing 
methods, behaviours, research, or innovations applicable to the working of the Internet and 
Internet-connected systems). The early RFCs originated from the first four “nodes” of the 
nascent ARPANET such as UCLA and Stanford University.  
6 Many of the academics and researchers working on the Internet were part of the 1960s anti-
establishment movements, and saw the Internet as an opportunity to “explore alternative 
governance mechanisms.” See W. Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance.” Supra 
note 4.  
7 W. Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance.” Ibid, at 45.  
8See generally M. Muller, “Who Owns the Internet? Ownership as a Legal Basis for American 
Control of the Internet.” Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 15, no. 3 
(2005): 709-748. 
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words, it only acted as an open architecture where, in addition to peer to peer 
information transfer, applications such as the World Wide Web (WWW) were designed 
and run (of course around 15 years later).9 Given the openness of the architecture the 
number of Internet hosts (computers and servers connected to the Internet) expanded 
during the 1980s,10 the management of the new independent networks’ names and 
identifications became difficult. As a result the Domain Name System (DNS) was 
developed. Initially the networks that “popped up” were all purpose-built and restricted 
to closed communities. During all this time the management and development of this 
new and expanding Internet was with the research community mainly in the US.11   
It was during the 1980s that software emerged that made communication outside the 
ARPANET backbone possible and commercial entities tried to claim copyright on 
applications and platforms that ran on top of the Internet.12 However, given the general 
Internet community culture amongst the early users and developers of both the network 
and software, proprietary rights claims by big corporation over open-source software, 
such as AT&T over UNIX, were countered by a new licensing arrangement amongst 
users and developers called “copyleft”. According to Malte Ziewitz and Ian Brown this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The World Wide Web was created by Tim Berners Lee at CERN, as an application that 
facilitated the exchange and access of information between scientists. Later this application 
became the face of what most of us know as the “Internet.”  
10 “Australian Academic Research Network AARNET connected with NSFNET in 1989, by 
which time there were over 100 000 hosts on the network.” See J. Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder 
Governance and the Internet Governance Forum. Perth: Terminus Press, 2008: 6   
11 Interestingly, other technologies and networking protocols were being pursued by others at 
the same time by the likes of Xerox and IBM. However, they were not as successful as the 
TCP/IP system to take the global Networking by storm. This is partly because the first 
expansion of the TCP/IP system was by the British JANET and the US NSFNET programmes 
in 1984 and 1985. The decision to make TCP/IP compatibility a condition for the networks was 
a key to the dominance of the TCP/IP suit. According to some of the founders of the 
Internet, “the strategy of incorporating Internet protocols into a supported operating system for 
the research community was one of the key elements in the successful widespread adoption of 
the Internet.” See B. M. Leiner, et al. “Brief History of the Internet.” Internet Society. 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/internet-51/history-internet/brief-history-
internet#Transition (accessed Oct 31, 2012).  
12 UNIX is an operating system which was developed in 1969 by AT&T employees. See M. 
Ziewitz and I. Brown, “A Prehistory of Internet Governance.” Supra note 4, at 14.  
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“enabled programmers to develop software without the constraints of traditional 
copyright.”13 As a result of this, to date, we have successful (both technical and 
commercial) open source projects such as Mozilla and Linux.      
It is also noteworthy that digital communications were not solely done through 
ARPANET, and certainly not just in the US. It was during this period (mid 1980s to 
mid 1990s) that networked communities such as Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) gained 
in popularity. BBSes were computer systems which for a membership fee allowed users 
to connect to a database (initially via a telephone line and a modem) and to download 
and upload software and data, send emails and even chat to other members. Initially 
local, these networks grew dramatically in size with improvements in technology and 
reductions in costs. In addition to the growing networked communities, interest in the 
commercial potentials of the Internet for businesses and entrepreneurs also grew. Until 
1995, they were faced by restrictions of commercial use put forward by NSF, who had 
taken over the funding of the Internet after ARPANET was dissolved in 1990. 
Although NSFNET had allowed commercial use of the network, it still resisted 
commercial access to the backbone. Because of the restrictions, online services were set 
up outside the ARPANET backbone such as CompuServe or The Source. Such 
companies also created their own applications and offered email services as early as 
1978 in the case of CompuServe.14 Also, importantly and parallel to this, a lot of 
investment went into Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who were amongst the pioneers 
of “long-haul infrastructure,” making way for network access beyond the local 
networks, especially after the ARPANET backbone was made available to commercial 
use.15 Computer networking and online services were also prevalent in other countries. 
An early example of such online computer networking services (before the invention of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid., at 15.  
14 These services were provided to users beyond the research community for a fee. 
15 The first public dialup ISP was The World and was established in 1991.   
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WWW) was Minitel (France), a networking system which relied on French technology 
for the provision of early online services such as purchases, message boards, and 
emailing. Minitel became popular in many other countries such as Brazil, South Africa, 
and Canada (and many others).     
Until today the TCP/IP model dominates the Internet. Even the current version of the 
TCP/IP is likely to have changes made to it, such as the constant changes made to the 
Internet Protocols. Changes in technologies (wireless, fibre-optic, smart-phones and the 
unprecedented expansion of personal computers) are commonplace and with these 
come innovations in networking. However the open structure of the Internet generally 
based on the DNS, Root Server System, and IP address numbering protocols has 
remained largely the same over the past years.  
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